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The topic of this thesis is the use that member-state governments make of their opportunity to 
submit legal arguments in preliminary reference proceedings at the Court of Justice. Which 
Member States submit observations and which do not? What motives do Member States have for 
their submissions, and what influence do they have on the development of EU law? Can their 
influence be accommodated within existing models of European legal integration? And can we 
learn more about the Member States' policy preferences from their submissions to the Court? 
The study of EU legal integration stands on the boundary of political science and law, and 
researchers have tended to develop theories using their own disciplines' perceptions. In doing so, 
political scientists have neglected judicial reasoning, while lawyers have overlooked the political 
and economic contexts of cases and the non-legal actors involved in them. This thesis uses both 
quantitative and qualitative empirical methods to develop a conceptual framework for evaluating 
different theories of EU legal integration. 
The provisions that enable member-state governments to present arguments to the Court are 
introduced, and the data sources evaluated. The variations between the Member States are 
discussed, before states' motives are examined in more detail, and a taxonomy developed. The 
elements of the taxonomy are then demonstrated via the submissions of three chosen states: 
Denmark, Ireland and the UK.  It is argued that governments' observations to the Court form part 
of a wider discourse between the Member States and the EU, in which they may better represent a 
Member State's true preferences than its voting behaviour at the Council. The thesis concludes 
that theoretical models of the relationship between governments and the Court must account for 
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Any theory of European integration must notice and take account of the role of 
governments, clearly stating how that role is conceptualized.1 
                                                   
1 Alec Stone Sweet and Thomas L Brunell, ‘Constructing a Supranational Constitution : Dispute Resolution and 






Chapter 1: Introduction 
This thesis considers what can be learnt about the role of member-state governments in European 
integration from the observations submitted by Member State governments in preliminary 
reference cases at the Court of Justice of the European Union. It argues that Member States’ 
motives for taking part in proceedings at the Court are more diverse than they are commonly 
portrayed, and demonstrates that different states have different motives and levels of engagement 
with the Court. Attention is drawn to what empirical research can contribute to the critical 
analysis of the prevailing theories of European integration, examining three theories in particular: 
the classical law-textbook explanation of EU integration and two opposing theories of legal 
integration that stem from political science, neofunctionalism and intergovernmentalism. The 
thesis argues that each model is vulnerable to criticism in the way in which it envisages the role 
of Member States’ submissions to the Court, and indicates an analytical framework that can be 
applied to all theoretical models of legal integration. It concludes by placing member-state 
governments’ submissions to the Court within the broader argumentative space within which 
Member States convey their preferences to the EU. 
The European Union had its historical origin in treaties that were conceived in public 
international law, but in some respects, the European Union has achieved a level of integration 
that makes it different from other international regimes: its law reaches deeply into the 
jurisdictions of the Member States, the scope of its influence continues to widen, and it has 
become a political power in its own right. The European Union’s unprecedented status has made 
it the subject of considerable interest in several disciplines, including political science, 
international relations, economics, history and, above all, law. This has led to a proliferation of 
competing theories purporting to explain its unusual features and an extensive literature that is to 
a greater or lesser degree segregated by academic field.2 To the extent that scholars in one area 
are aware of the work in others, there may be a significant degree of mutual incomprehension, 
and even those whose work can be described as interdisciplinary may find it challenging to 
reconcile theories that are rooted in the different disciplines. 
                                                   
2 In 2013 alone, the legal bibliography of European integration shows that the Court’s library acquired over 
7,000 publications on the topic. 
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The interface between law and political science has been fruitful in producing competing theories 
of EU legal integration. They largely share the ‘integration through law’3 paradigm identified by, 
among others, Stein, Cappelletti, Seccombe &Weiler and Burley & Mattli.4 This argues that 
European integration has been the consequence, in large part, of the constitutionalisation of the 
Treaties by the Court of Justice, initially via the classic cases that established the principles of 
supremacy and direct effect.5 In other respects, they differ. Several theories attempt to explain the 
influence of the Court of Justice in terms that are drawn from political science, and these may 
struggle to account for the legal logic that is manifested in the Court’s decisions. Meanwhile, it 
can be argued that the typical doctrinal account of the evolution of EU law leans too heavily on a 
subset of relatively rare ‘constitutional’ cases and ignores the cumulative effect of the everyday 
cases which make up most of the Court’s case-load.  
The entirety of the case law has, however, been recruited as empirical evidence for several of the 
leading theories of EU legal integration, with somewhat disappointing results. These theories will 
be outlined below, but this thesis argues that the same body of empirical evidence, evaluated in 
terms of the legal logic and policy content of Member States’ observations, indicates an avenue 
of critical analysis that is applicable to all theoretical models of legal integration. The use of this 
particular basis for critical analysis stems from the belief that states’ persistence in making 
observations—both as written briefs and as oral submissions—in cases before the Court of Justice 
demands an explanation, and that no model which overlooks this aspect of the interaction of 
Member States with the institutions of the EU can be considered adequate. 
This is not to say that state observations have invariably been neglected. Stone Sweet and 
Brunell, in a 2012 paper, discuss the work of several researchers on the possible influence of the 
content of state observations on the Court’s decisions.6 The theories they discuss range from their 
own neofunctionalist approach, which does not regard observations as having a significant 
influence on the Court, to intergovernmentalist models that regard observations as implied threats 
                                                   
3 An expression possibly first used by the Florence Project on ‘Integration through Law’, described by the 
editors in ‘Integration Through Law: Europe and the American Federal Experience’ in Mauro Cappelletti, 
Monica Seccombe and Joseph HH Weiler (eds), Integration through Law Vol 1: Methods, Tools and Institutions 
(De Gruyter 1986).  
4 Eric Stein, ‘Lawyers, Judges, and the Making of a Transnational Constitution’ (1981) 75 AJIL 1; Cappelletti, 
Seccombe and Weiler (n 3); Joseph HH Weiler, ‘The Transformation of Europe’ (1991) 100 Yale LJ 2403; 
Anne-Marie Burley and Walter Mattli, ‘Europe Before the Court: A Political Theory of Legal Integration’ 
(1993) 47 International Organization 41. 
5 Case 26/62 Van Gend en Loos, EU:C:1963:1; Case 6/64 Costa v ENEL EU:C:1964:66. 
6 Alec Stone Sweet and Thomas L Brunell, ‘The European Court of Justice, State Noncompliance, and the 
Politics of Override’ (2012) 106 AmPSR 204, 205. 
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to the Court of non-compliance by the Member States.7 Larsson and Naurin have analysed 
member-state governments’ observations with a view to deciding on the best model to describe 
how the Court may adapt its decision-making to its political environment.8 These authors take a 
narrowly-focused quantitative approach, mining the figures to find statistical support for (or 
against) the view that the Court complies with states’ preferences as expressed in the observations 
submitted. By contrast, Granger has written extensively on governments’ European litigation 
strategies taking a mixed approach, analysing patterns of intervention in court proceedings and 
conducting interviews with litigants and court officials.9 It can be argued that it is this latter 
approach that seems likely to be more fruitful in explaining exactly why member state 
governments choose to invest time, money and effort in submitting observations to the Court, 
given that the evidence of such observations actually constraining the Court’s decision-making is 
inconclusive. 
Any explanation of governments’ behaviour must be capable of being theorised in such a way as 
to test the competing models of European integration that jostle for precedence. It must also 
provide an adequate explanation for a phenomenon that is rarely mentioned other than in passing 
by the statisticians: that Member States differ both in their pattern of making references to the 
Court and in their likelihood of submitting observations, in their own or other Member States’ 
cases, to an extent that cannot be explained simply by the sizes of their economies, their volumes 
of intra-state trade or the extent to which their domestic industries are affected by EU law. 
Governments’ participation in the preliminary reference process 
The primary mechanism by which the Court gives an authoritative interpretation of European 
Union law is the preliminary reference procedure under Article 267 of the Treaty on the 
Functioning of the European Union (TFEU), whereby the Court interprets the law but leaves the 
referring national court to apply the law to the facts of its case. The procedure is not merely a 
                                                   
7 Clifford J Carrubba and Matthew Gabel, ‘Do Governments Sway European Court of Justice Decision-
Making ?: Evidence from Government Court Briefs' (IFR Working Paper Series No 2005-06) (2005). 
8 Olof Larsson and Daniel Naurin, ‘Judicial Independence and Political Uncertainty: How the Risk of Override 
Affects the Court of Justice of the EU’ (2016) 70 International Organization 377.  
9 Marie-Pierre Granger, ‘Governments in Luxembourg: How Do Governments Use EU Litigation to Protect 
National Policies or Influence EU Policy and Law-Making' (ECPR Fifth Pan-European Conference on EU 
Politics, Porto, 24-26 June 2010) <https://www.semanticscholar.org/paper/Paper-1596%3A-Governments-in-
Luxembourg%3A-How-Do-Use-Granger/d95b6c5e9d3014db20e65728bc7fc66a5063c42a> accessed 31 July 
2020.; also Thomas de la Mare and Catherine Donnelly, ‘Preliminary Rulings and EU Legal Integration: 




system by which national courts can check that their application of EU law is correct, although 
that meaning can be found in a literal reading of the Article. Instead, it forms a link between the 
legal system of the EU and the implementation of that legal system in the jurisdictions of the 
Member States that has three aspects. First, it has a supervisory aspect, ensuring uniformity in 
national implementation. Secondly, it has a participatory aspect, linking the day-to-day 
administration of justice in national courts with relevant European law. Thirdly, it provides an 
opportunity for EU law to evolve and move into new domains. 
Through preliminary references, the Court has established principles that would have been 
revolutionary in an ordinary treaty of international law: the principle of supremacy—that Member 
States have relinquished sovereignty in certain areas to the EU;10  the principle of direct effect—
that individuals can vindicate their rights under EU law before their national courts,11 and the 
principle of state liability to individuals.12 Article 267 TFEU provides the fuel for ‘the motor of 
integration’,13 operating (arguably) to make of the Court of Justice not just a constitutional court, 
but the creator of a constitution.14 
Both direct actions and preliminary references provide an opportunity for national governments 
to be heard by the Court, via their right to submit legal arguments to the Court. This right is not 
confined to Member States’ own cases, but applies to those of other nations as well; indeed, well 
over half of observations submitted by governments in preliminary references are in cases from 
other Member States. In practice, the submission of legal arguments to the Court represents the 
main avenue of communication between Member States and EU law, and as will be demonstrated 
in Chapter 3, two-thirds of such interactions with the Court consist of the submission of 
observations in preliminary reference cases.15 These legal arguments are potentially a rich source 
of information on states’ policy preferences and attitudes to legal and political integration. Some 
reasons why this potential may be unfulfilled will be discussed in Chapters 2 and 3. 
                                                   
10 Case 6/64 Costa v ENEL EU:C:1964:66. 
11 Case 26/62 Van Gend & Loos EU:C:1963:1. 
12 Joined cases C-6/90 and C-9/90 Francovich and Bonifaci EU:C:1991:428. 
13 This term is variously applied to the European Commission, the Franco-German axis within the EU as a 
whole, and the Court. In the latter sense it has been placed in quotation marks on numerous occasions but not, as 
far as I can see, attributed to a source. 
14 Stein (n 4); Stone Sweet and Brunell, ‘Constructing a Supranational Constitution: Dispute Resolution and 
Governance in the European Community’ (n 1). For a contrary belief, see the works of Peter Lindseth, e.g. Peter 
L Lindseth, ‘Reconciling Europe and the Nation-State in Law and History’, Power and Legitimacy: Reconciling 
Europe and the Nation-State (OUP 2010). 
15 Chapter 3 Fig 1. 
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The opportunity for member-state governments to submit legal arguments to the Court is 
provided by Article 23 of Protocol (No 3) of the Statute of the Court of Justice of the European 
Union. The provision may originally have been assumed to be a minor detail of court procedure. 
During the 1960s, nearly half of cases received no legal arguments—written or oral—from 
national governments. Van Gend, arguably the most important decision the Court has ever handed 
down, received observations from three out of six governments; Costa, perhaps the second most 
important, only from Italy, although the result of the latter case may have been unexpected.16 But 
from the mid-1970s, the proportion of cases that received input from national governments began 
to rise, and by 1994 the UK government was describing it the opportunity to submit observations 
as ‘a valuable and important right.’17 In the decade up to the end of 2013 more than nine out of 
ten cases received at least one submission from a Member State; more importantly, in 2013, 69% 
of all member-state government interactions with the Court of Justice as a whole consisted of 
submitting observations in preliminary references.18 
The provisions of Article 23 give national governments a chance to present legal arguments in 
support of the departments that are parties to the cases referred. Equally, governments may wish 
to back each other up in support of a favoured implementation of EU legislation or where they 
perceive a threat to national practices—and finances—from an anticipated decision. But 65% of 
all submissions in preliminary references are made in cases from other Member States, and their 
content often addresses issues well beyond the confines of the questions referred. This high level 
of participation in cases originating in the national courts of other Member States suggests that 
these submissions to the Court go beyond the defence of national legislation and the protection of 
national revenue. It seems clear that Article 23 allows all member-state governments to try to 
influence the evolution of the jurisprudence of the Court above and beyond the outcome of a 
particular case. In particular, it should give the opportunity for smaller Member States to make 
their voices heard at the Court and to influence EU law on a level playing-field with the larger 
and more powerful Member States. Why do some not take the opportunity? 
                                                   
16 Arguably it should not have been: the doctrine of supremacy had been trailed in Van Gend. It was also no 
coincidence that Mr Costa was himself a lawyer. 
17 Timothy Pratt, ‘View from the Member States’ in Mats Andenas (ed), Article 177 References to the European 
Court: Policy and Practice (Butterworths 1994) 49. 




The number of governments submitting arguments varies a great deal from case to case, with an 
average in the period since the 2007 enlargement of 2.5, and a maximum of 13.19 The highest 
ever number of government observations received by the Court was 14 from 15 Member States.20 
The nature, in terms of substantive content, of the cases that have received the most government 
submissions will be returned to later, but most have been ‘technical’ cases on tax, competition 
and intellectual property, rather than cases that might be regarded as having immediate 
constitutional significance. 
The wide variation in the take-up of the opportunity to put legal arguments to the Court is a 
surprising aspect of member-state government behaviour. Some Member States rarely make 
submissions to the Court in non-national cases. Bulgaria has never done so.21 Germany, by 
contrast, has made the most submissions in total but has done so in only 45% of its own cases. 
The Member States with the highest rates of interaction with the Court in the period studied were 
Poland and the UK, then Austria, the Czech Republic and Germany. The lowest rates are seen 
with Malta, Luxembourg and Romania—but wealthy Luxembourg makes the most submissions 
per head and second-poorest Romania the fewest. However, rates of interaction with the Court 
are not merely a function of wealth or size, a point that is strikingly illustrated by comparing pairs 
of countries. Poland and Sweden, for instance, have similar gross domestic products, but Poland 
makes nearly three times as many submissions to the Court as Sweden. Finland and Denmark 
have similar populations, but Finland makes three times as many submissions as Denmark.22 
Nevertheless, small size and lack of wealth do seem to be limiting factors on states’ activity at the 
Court. In addition, other economic factors play a part indirectly via their influence on the number 
of cases referred by national courts: a state’s volume of intra-EU trade is an example. 
It is important to distinguish between the resources that a Member State has available to it and its 
reasons for choosing to devote those resources to its legal relationship with the EU. The lack of 
direct correlation between economic factors and Member States’ participation in Court 
proceedings does not indicate that states’ means are irrelevant, but points towards historical and 
                                                   
19 In joined cases C-316/07, C-358/07, C-359/07, C-360/07, C-409/07 and C-410/07 Stoß EU:C:2010:504, on 
gambling. 
20 Twice: Case C-44/98 BASF EU:C:1999:440; Case C-475/03 Banca Popolare di Cremona EU:C:2006:629. 
21 Even in Case C-681/13 Diageo EU:C:2015:471, in which the defendant in the national case was a Bulgarian 
company and the case concerned an allegedly erroneous judgment of a Bulgarian court. 




constitutional factors and political considerations that may affect the investment that countries are 
willing to make. There is no doubt that governments must be willing to invest considerable 
resources to put their arguments to the Court. Some Member States make more than fifty 
submissions a year, each of which involves input from government ministries and their legal 
advisers and, as was the case with the UK, from independent counsel, all according to a very tight 
timetable. This requires not just financial but organisational, procedural and judicial resources 
and the coordination thereof, and represents a considerable commitment on the part of the 
Member State. Many Member States consider this commitment worthwhile. 
The non-economic factors affecting Member States’ participation have attracted relatively little 
attention, perhaps because it is difficult to operationalise them and thus subject them to statistical 
analysis. Marie-Pierre Granger’s comprehensive evaluation is an exception.23 In this thesis, the 
economic and non-economic factors affecting the participation of Denmark, Ireland and the UK 
will be contrasted to demonstrate that their legal and administrative cultures, and attitudes 
towards the EU, have a strong influence on their participation. 
Theories of member-state interaction with the Court of Justice 
In order to develop a useful theory of member-state participation at the Court, it is necessary to 
consider what benefit participation might confer on a Member State and what impact it might 
have on EU law in general and the Court of Justice in particular. A taxonomy of such influences 
will be developed in this thesis. It is argued that need for, and usefulness of, such a taxonomy 
makes it clear that the significance of member-state government interactions with the Court has 
been both underestimated and oversimplified. In particular, it can be argued that the way in which 
statistics on member-state government submissions have been operationalised to support 
competing models of European legal integration fails to account for the Court’s legal reasoning. 
Classical legal integration models 
Intergovernmentalism 
In its simplest form, the intergovernmentalist model emphasises the bargains made between the 
Member States in controlling EU integration and regards legal integration as taking place under 
the control of member-state governments. The Court of Justice is envisaged as being constrained 
in its decision-making by the need to find outcomes that are politically acceptable to the Member 
                                                   
23 Marie-Pierre F Granger, ‘When Governments Go to Luxembourg ... the Influence of Governments on the 
Court of Justice’ (2004) 29 ELRev 1; Granger (n 9). 
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States. The Court is not conceived of as an active constitutionalising force but merely as a 
delegated authority serving the interests of the Member States.24 
In this context, Carrubba, Gabel and Hankla, among others, argue that a Member State’s 
observations indicate to the Court what judgments its government will accept, and conversely 
what judgments might result either in the creation of contrary legislation by the member-state 
governments collectively (legislative override) or in non-compliance by the individual Member 
State concerned.25  They operationalise Member States’ observations to provide an empirical 
measure of such constraints on the Court. Meanwhile, neofunctionalists Mattli and Slaughter, and 
Stone Sweet and Brunell, have challenged their assumptions and methods in a disagreement that 
enlivened the pages of (particularly) the American Political Science Review for two decades.26 
Attention should be drawn at this point to one relatively recent model developed by Naurin, 
Larsson et al. at the University of Gothenburg. They argue that member-state governments do 
indeed influence the Court’s judgments via implied threats of override—if the Member States 
agree.27 If, however, the governments’ observations indicate substantial disagreement between 
the Member States, the Court is envisaged as able to proceed with an activist agenda, in the 
knowledge that the governments would be unable to muster a sufficient majority in the Council to 
pass blocking legislation.28  
                                                   
24 Andrew Moravcsik, Negotiating the Single European Act: National Interests and Conventional Statecraft in 
the European Community, vol 45 (1991); Geoffrey Garrett, ‘International Cooperation and Institutional Choice: 
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The neofunctionalist model, by contrast, sees ‘integration through law’ as an almost automatic 
outcome of the Court’s role in settling disputes concerning EU law.29 The concept of 
neofunctionalism was developed from the 1950s onwards by Haas to explain post-war European 
integration; it holds that integration is not the achievement of politicians but a natural process 
resulting from the ‘spillover’ of benefits from the functional institutions.30 The term was revived 
in the 1990s, most notably by Burley and Mattli and by Sandholtz and Stone Sweet, who propose 
a model of legal integration which is driven by cross-border markets and in which Member States 
play only a secondary role.31 
Stone Sweet’s model relies upon three elements: cross-border contract-making by individuals; the 
resolution by the Court of Justice of any disputes that arise concerning the EU legal rules; and the 
creation of further legal rules by the legislative institutions. Stone Sweet considers that these three 
elements exist in a dynamic relationship, evolving interdependently and together defining how 
the EU is constituted. As the number of contracts increases, the legal system becomes more 
active, and its dispute-resolution functions reduce the risks, and hence the cost, of contracting by 
settling disputes and increasing legal certainty, thus encouraging more transactions. Judicial law-
making widens in scope and thereby encourages further legislation; at the same time, contractors 
see the need for cross-border rules and policies, putting pressure on both national and 
supranational legislative bodies to provide them.  The combination of greater numbers of 
transactions and more legislation increases the potential for legal disputes and makes available 
more grounds for interpretative judicial law-making. The new rules then form the basis of further 
legislation in what Stone Sweet describes as ‘policy feedback’.  
Within this model, Member States’ observations are conceived of not as an effective mechanism 
for compelling the Court to comply with the Member States’ preferences, but as reactive defences 
of national practices that have relatively little success in persuading the Court. 
If there is one thing that comes out of this academic dispute over different, and in statistical terms 
somewhat abstruse, analyses of the same dataset, it is that the data support neither an 
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intergovernmental nor a neofunctionalist model with any degree of certainty. As noted above, the 
sheer amount of variation in national behaviour casts doubt on the usefulness of either. In 
addition, there were (and remain) considerable doubts over whether sufficient is known of the 
legal arguments contained in member-state submissions to support their operationalisation in this 
fashion. In many cases, nothing is known at all of what a government said, only that it did so, and 
the argument devolves to what assumptions might legitimately be made about such submissions. 
The issue of the availability of the actual contents of member-state governments’ observations 
will be discussed in Chapter 2. 
Instead of seeking to decide between these well-hashed positions, this thesis aims to explain what 
Member States believe they are achieving by submitting written and oral observations to the 
Court, and what effect their submissions have on the Court. In doing so, it supports a third, 
‘legalist’ perspective on integration that gives more recognition to the legal context within which 
states’ submissions are being made, and provides a taxonomy of the factors that a useful model of 
the interaction between the Member States and the Court of Justice must take into account.  
Threat or dialogue? 
Although, as Cramér et al. put it, observations may be intended to ‘counsel, guide, or, perhaps, 
push the CJEU in a desired direction’,32 they are better characterised as a dialogue with the Court 
than an ultimatum. Not only do many cases turn on technical questions, where the ‘threat of 
legislative override’ called for by Carrubba’s model is irrelevant, but the members of the Court 
may positively solicit not just further information but—if it becomes clear that a case is likely to 
consider significant changes to EU law—Member States’ opinions. Even if they are not solicited, 
states’ arguments may be legally persuasive. Advocates-General, who unlike the judges are not 
prevented from exposing their thought processes, may admit to occasionally being swayed by 
governments’ arguments, and the number and sources of member-state submissions may be used 
to argue the necessity of an Advocate General’s Opinion. While it is impossible to be sure that a 
Member State’s legal arguments have influenced the reasoning of the Court unless they are 
explicitly referred to in the judgment, Member States certainly believe their arguments have an 
influence. There is a plausible suggestion that the Court may be grateful for well-expressed 
contributions in areas of the law where it lacks expertise. Indeed, governments’ pleadings may be 
the best source of information on the thornier details of national legislation and ‘the niceties of 
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their legal systems’33—not least because the observations are compiled by, or in discussion with, 
national civil servants. The Court of Justice is, of course, supposed only to rule on the 
interpretation of EU law, for the national court to apply this ruling to the facts. In practice, a rigid 
division between the abstract principles contained in the legislation and their application to the 
facts is difficult to maintain, particularly where a question concerns the effects at the national 
level of an EU act whose validity is being questioned. In these circumstances, it may be necessary 
for the Court to find out what these effects are in Member States other than that of the referring 
court.34 Thus member-state government observations may affect the Court both at a procedural 
level and, through their effect on the Court’s judgments, in terms of substantive law—and may 
influence the evolution of EU law as a whole. 
From the other side of the dialogue, what do Member States believe they are attempting to 
achieve by submitting written and oral observations to the Court? It is surprisingly difficult to 
discover whether governments explicitly weigh up the benefits of intervening. However, their 
motivation is often explicit or can be deduced, in particular where their observations are not the 
first airing of their concerns but continue a ‘conversation’ with the EU that started during the 
formulation of the legislation concerned. Governments often have a direct interest in the outcome 
of a case, either because it would affect their revenue or because of the risk of having to redraft 
national legislation. They may have a prospective interest in the outcome of another Member 
State’s case for similar reasons. Government submissions may be directed towards a narrow 
question—what tariff should be applied to a product, for instance—or towards refining the 
principles laid down in a leading case. Their concerns may be broader: conveying their policy 
preferences in an area of substantive law, blocking a developing line of EU jurisprudence or 
defending their sovereignty.35 They may wish to put a political point that is incidental to the 
referred question.36 Alternatively, some governments may claim a disinterested desire to help the 
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Court extract the ‘right’ question from a muddled referral or to identify the wider considerations 
that may arise from a question that is ostensibly straightforward on its facts.37 
It can be argued that this is a genuine dialogue between governments and the Court. It is not 
merely concerned with the exposition of national law but may be an important mechanism for 
conveying Member States’ policy preferences to the EU, both in terms of substantive law and in 
terms of the evolution of EU law as a whole. 
Dialogue or discourse? 
This dialogue with the Court should not be looked at in isolation, but as one aspect of a wider 
discourse between the Member States and the EU with both political and legal aspects—what 
Wincott calls ‘the everyday grind of the Community.’38 Member States participate on a day-to-
day basis in many processes of EU decision-making, from the most official, such as voting in the 
Council of the European Union, through the prior preparations by the Committee of Permanent 
Representatives (COREPER) and other involvement in the administrative functions of the EU 
such as training, soft law and preparing national position papers, to informal ‘corridor 
bargaining’39 and lobbying the Commission during the fine-tuning of legislation that has already 
been approved by the Council and Parliament. The submission of legal arguments to the Court 
should be regarded as part of this continuum of interaction between governments and the EU. 
 Once member-state participation in court proceedings is thought of as part of a wider discourse 
between the Member States and the EU, it becomes clear that models that regard the legal 
arguments as a simple ‘threat of non-compliance’ are, at the very least, over-simplified. The 
discourse is ongoing and takes place at several levels. 
Conceptual framework for discourse 
This discourse has been characterised in several different ways. This thesis picks out two 
conceptual frameworks in order to discuss member-state governments’ interaction with EU law: 
first, the characterisation of this interaction by Weiler as the manifestation of ‘Voice’40 and 
                                                   
37 A process described by a retired Advocate General as ‘doing the Court’s homework’. 
38 Daniel Wincott, ‘Institutional Interaction and European Integration: Towards an Everyday Critique of Liberal 
Intergovernmentalism’ (1995) 33 J Com Mar St 597, 603. 
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second, its characterisation by Schmidt as a context for the ‘uploading’ of national policies to the 
EU and the ‘downloading’ of legislation and legal decisions by the Member States. It can be 
argued that they are not as much rival models as models that are useful in different contexts, and 
they can be reconciled into a more nuanced description of the relationship between the EU and its 
Member States. They are, however, discussed separately in Chapter 7. 
In the context of European law, Exit and Voice describe a Member State’s choice of whether, 
when faced with an unwelcome rule, to use persuasion to change the rule from within (Voice) or 
to employ selective Exit—choosing either not to implement, or not to enforce, EU law.41 It will 
be suggested that any legal actions that result from selective Exit give a Member State a last 
opportunity for Voice, and that this might act as a kind of safety-valve for national governments, 
tempering the Court’s perceived threat to their national sovereignty. 
Another way of addressing the discourse between the EU and the Member States is to borrow 
terminology from Europeanisation theory. The processes of transnational EU policy-making 
involve flows of information about policy preferences between Member States and the 
institutions of the European Union, which can be described as ‘uploading’ (to the EU level) and 
‘downloading’ (by a Member State). The uploading model employs somewhat less apocalyptic 
concepts than Exit and Voice and can be argued to fit the technical, mundane nature of much of 
the Court’s business more comfortably. In the context of member-state government interactions 
with the Court, uploading is the more important process, and this thesis will consider some 
reasons why states differ in their enthusiasm and capacity for uploading. But under this model, 
too, participating in court cases seems to give the Member States the opportunity for a last word. 
What can be learnt from the discourse? 
It will be argued in Chapter 7 that what Member States submit in court cases might, in principle, 
convey more about their policy preferences than can be learnt from looking at their voting 
behaviour in Council. The only information that is generally available about Council proceedings 
is the voting results and any accompanying statements, and these may convey less about member-
state policy preferences than would at first appear. There are several reasons for this. Firstly, the 
majority of votes in Council are unanimous, despite the unlikelihood of complete accord among 
the Member States. How a Member State votes in the Council does not necessarily indicate its 
true preferences but may be the outcome of considerable prior bargaining and negotiation 
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between Member States in a setting that values consensus.42 By contrast, it can be argued that  
Member States’ submissions to the Court are less likely to be the outcome of inter-state political 
bargaining. Secondly, even when a Member State does vote against the majority, it may not give 
a public statement of its reasons, although common sense may supply the explanation. Thirdly, 
records of Council votes are only publicly searchable from 1999 onwards, and voting results on 
some important measures seem to be omitted. Nevertheless, it should be feasible to demonstrate 
this discourse by looking at a Member State’s known position at the Council (which realistically 
would have to be evidenced by a vote against a measure) and linking it with subsequent 
submissions to the Court. 
Unfortunately, this raises the existence of a problem with both practical and normative 
implications. The content of member-state government submissions cannot be accessed directly 
but can only be deduced from the Reports for the Hearing (if any) or the Advocate General’s 
Opinion (also if any) or, rarely, from the Court’s published judgment. The information exists, 
because it was committed to paper and often expanded upon in an oral hearing, but it is available, 
at best, in summary. Thus the general propositions made here about the use that can be made of 
member-state governments’ legal arguments must be read subject to the proviso that their content 
may be obtainable only in outline, or occasionally not at all. Nevertheless, despite the difficulty 
of finding out the contents of governments’ submissions to the Court, the information is still more 
accessible than Member States’ arguing positions in the Council and therefore a resource that 
should not be neglected. 
It will be argued that a member-state government’s approach to contributing to Court proceedings 
is an indirect reflection both of its policy preferences and of its attitude to EU law. By allowing 
member-state governments to present legal arguments to the Court, the Court is being asked to 
consider not just questions of law but of policy, and questions that shade into politics. As 
Bengoetxea, MacCormick and Moral Soriano have pointed out, the Court has been criticised as 
‘crossing the line between the legal and political’ but, they argue, there is no line, but ‘an area in 
which law and policies overlap’, which the Court must manage.43 Similarly, Weiler says that 
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‘[T]he very dichotomy of law and politics is questionable.’44 This ‘minor detail of court 
procedure’ presents a microcosm of the overlap. 
It is proposed, therefore, that the behaviour of governments before the Court of Justice cannot be 
understood in isolation from their relationship with the processes of EU law as a whole. This 
proposal can usefully be examined by comparing and contrasting Denmark, Ireland and the UK: 
three Member State that—despite having joined at the same date—have (or had) different 
constitutional models, sizes and levels of participation in EU affairs. 
The structure of the thesis 
This thesis will proceed as follows. Chapter 2 introduces the procedural provisions that enable 
member-state governments to present legal arguments to the Court of Justice, describes and 
evaluates the various sources from which these legal arguments can be obtained, and explains 
how the research database was compiled. Chapter 3 discusses what the database reveals about the 
differences between the Member States in terms of their readiness to submit observations in 
proceedings at the Court of Justice. Chapter 4 presents a taxonomy of how the Court of Justice 
uses member-state governments’ observations, and Chapter 5 a taxonomy of the reasons the 
Member States may have for submitting observations. Chapter 6 reviews these reasons with 
reference to Denmark, Ireland and the UK, drawing attention to the differences between them that 
affect their readiness to make submissions to the Court. Chapter 7 argues that Member States’ 
submissions to the Court of Justice form part of a wider discourse with EU law that includes 
states’ voting behaviour at the Council of the European Union. It describes two models of this 
discourse and suggests that states’ observations to the Court are a better reflection of their policy 
preferences than are their votes. The thesis concludes that theoretical models of the interaction 
between the Member States and the Court of Justice must be able to account for the variation 
between the Member States and for both Member States’ motives for submitting observations and 
the benefits of those submissions to the Court. 
Terminology 
In general, Treaty provisions have been numbered according to the system in operation at the 
relevant date. However, as the preliminary reference procedure is the subject of this thesis, it has 
been designated Article 267 TFEU throughout for the sake of clarity. Similarly, what is now the 
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European Union is described thus other than where its historical status as the European Economic 
Community or the European Community is relevant to the discussion. 
Brexit 
The research for this thesis started before the UK’s referendum on EU membership. While the 
UK is one of the case studies, the cut-off point of the study is 31 December 2013 and Brexit is 
consequently not discussed, although its effect on the Court of Justice’s jurisprudence will be an 
intriguing topic in the future. Therefore, the only concession to Brexit has been the recasting of 
references to the UK’s interactions with the Court in the past tense where necessary. 
 
Chapter 2: Sources and Methods 
The Preliminary Reference Procedure 
This thesis considers what benefits accrue to the Member States and the Court of Justice from 
governments' participation in preliminary reference cases, plus the reasons why the participation 
rate varies between the Member States. A full analysis requires both statistical information on the 
number of observations submitted by each Member State and information about the contents of 
the submissions. In order to appreciate how the Member States can participate in the preliminary 
reference procedure, and to recognise the stages from which information about Member States' 
submissions can be drawn, it is first necessary to examine the procedure in detail. 
This chapter describes the provisions that enable the Member States to submit legal arguments to 
the Court in preliminary reference cases. The Court’s procedures are examined to discover where 
they give rise to documentary evidence of these arguments, and the method by which information 
can be extracted from each source is described and critiqued in terms of its practicality. The 
chapter concludes with a description of the coding method used to create the database of member-
state government observations. 
Procedure in preliminary reference cases 
This section outlines the procedure followed in typical preliminary reference cases. There are 
separate expedited procedures for use when the nature of a case requires that the Court deal with 
an issue within a short time or when a case raises questions in the Area of Freedom, Security and 
Justice.1 Such expedited cases are included in the database of coded cases.2  
The written procedure 
The opportunity for states to submit written legal arguments in preliminary reference cases is 
provided by Article 23 of Protocol (No 3) on the Statute of the Court of Justice of the European 
Union. 
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In the cases governed by Article 267 of the Treaty on the Functioning of the 
European Union, the decision of the court or tribunal of a Member State which 
suspends its proceedings and refers a case to the Court of Justice shall be notified to 
the Court by the court or tribunal concerned. The decision shall then be notified by 
the Registrar of the Court to the parties, to the Commission and to the Member 
States, and to the institution, body, office or agency of the Union which adopted the 
act the validity or interpretation of which is in dispute. 
Within two months of this notification, the parties, the Member States, the 
Commission and, where appropriate, the institution, body, office or agency which 
adopted the act the validity or interpretation of which is in dispute, shall be entitled to 
submit statements of case or written observations to the Court. 
Similar provisions apply to notifying the members of the European Free Trade Association 
(EFTA).3 Thus the parties, the Member States, the relevant institutions, the EFTA states and the 
EFTA Surveillance Authority are given two months to submit written observations to the Court if 
they so wish. External countries may also submit written observations in cases concerning certain 
treaties.4  
The only body that always submits written observations in preliminary reference proceedings is 
the Commission.5 The Council usually submits observations if one of its own legal acts has given 
rise to the question referred or is likely to be affected, and where international agreements are 
involved or where a case has international implications. It also occasionally does so in cases that 
are likely to have a high profile and attract many observations from the Member States.6 The 
Parliament almost invariably submits written observations if the validity of one of its legal acts is 
under consideration. Indeed, Rule 141 of the Parliament’s Rules of Procedure says: ‘If the 
Conference of Presidents takes the view that Parliament should, exceptionally, not submit 
observations or intervene before the Court of Justice of the European Union where the legal 
                                                   
3 European Free Trade Association (EFTA) members are Iceland, Liechtenstein, Norway and Switzerland. 
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validity of an act of Parliament is being questioned, the matter shall be submitted to plenary 
without delay’.7 It rarely does so in other cases.8 The EFTA Surveillance Authority submits 
observations where the EEA Agreement is concerned or where issues are likely to come up 
before the EFTA Court.9 However, over two-thirds of observations come from Member States, 
about a third in cases originating in their national courts and two-thirds in those of other Member 
States.10 
There is no formal requirement as to the structure or content of written observations. They can 
vary in length from half a side of A4 to a substantial brochure, such as the UK submitted in CD, 
and may include annexes and expert reports.11 Member States do not have to address all the 
questions referred and may announce at the beginning of their observations that they are only 
going to address a single issue. The written observations (but not usually the annexes) are 
translated into the language of the Court, French, and circulated amongst the parties, institutions 
and states. It is possible for those who did not receive another party’s annexes to request them or 
to consult them at the Court Registry. In Danske Svineproducenter, an attempt to have the oral 
procedure reopened, on the basis of the non-receipt of annexes, failed.12 There is no opportunity 
for the recipients to respond to each other's observations with a second round of written 
observations; instead, any response has to be reserved for oral argument at the hearing, if any. 
Any party that would have been entitled to submit written observations, but did not do so, retains 
the right to present oral argument at the hearing. 
After the written procedure 
After the written part of the procedure is closed, the Judge-Rapporteur assigned to the case 
composes a Preliminary Report,13 which is discussed at a general meeting of the members of the 
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Court.14 The Preliminary Report considers whether further information is needed from any of the 
bodies that are entitled to submit written observations. If so, the Court issues a request for more 
details, which may be directed at the referring court or a member-state government.15 
The preliminary report is an internal document, and because it contains not just recommendations 
about procedural issues but the Judge-Rapporteur's identification of the key legal issues and some 
thoughts on their resolution,16 falls within the exemptions to the institutions' transparency rules 
provided by Article 4(3) of Regulation 1049/2001. This states: 
Access to a document, drawn up by an institution for internal use or received by an 
institution, which relates to a matter where the decision has not been taken by the 
institution, shall be refused if disclosure of the document would seriously undermine 
the institution's decision-making process, unless there is an overriding public interest 
in disclosure.17  
The two most important decisions made at this point are whether the Advocate General should 
give an Opinion and whether there should be an oral hearing. The Judge-Rapporteur makes 
proposals on these decisions, in consultation with the Advocate General, after they have read the 
case materials.18 The Judge-Rapporteur's recommendations are then presented to the general 
meeting. These are not invariably followed.  
Should there be an oral hearing? 
Initially, there was an oral hearing in almost every case that did not result in a Reasoned Order.19 
The proportion of cases in which there was an oral hearing decreased substantially when the 
Court altered its working procedures in anticipation of an increased workload after the 2005 
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enlargement: for instance, in 2012, nearly one-third of preliminary reference cases proceeded to 
judgment without an oral hearing.20 The Rules of Procedure provide as follows: 
Article 76 
… 
2. On a proposal from the Judge-Rapporteur and after hearing the Advocate General, 
the Court may decide not to hold a hearing if it considers, on reading the written 
pleadings or observations lodged during the written part of the procedure, that it has 
sufficient information to give a ruling. 
3. The preceding paragraph shall not apply where a request for a hearing, stating 
reasons, has been submitted by an interested person referred to in Article 23 of the 
Statute who did not participate in the written part of the procedure. 
The opportunity to present oral argument without having previously submitted written 
observations is essential because Member States (and others) may only become aware of the legal 
implications of a case once they have read others' observations. This situation is not rare: in 2012, 
Member States presented only oral argument in around a tenth of the cases where there was a 
hearing.21 Equally, parties that did present written submissions may wish to respond to points 
made by others, either in support or disagreement. According to the Court's Notes for the 
Guidance of Counsel, the oral procedure should be used to: 
 allow the parties and other interested persons to reply to the arguments put forward by 
other participants in their written pleadings 
 provide a more detailed analysis of the dispute, by clarifying and expounding the points 
which are most important for the Court's decision 
 answer any specific questions put by the Court and respond to any requests made for the 
oral submissions to concentrate on particular issues 
 submit any new arguments prompted by recent events occurring after the close of the 
written procedure.22 
                                                   
20 83 of 267 cases. 
21 In 2012, of the 127 cases for which the information can be obtained from the Advocate General’s Opinion, 16 
had a submission from a Member State that had not submitted written observations. 
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The Notes also point out that 'the oral procedure must, however, involve no repetition of what has 
already been stated in writing. Participants at the hearing who have the same arguments to make 
should, where at all possible, avoid repeating points that have already been put forward at the 
same hearing.' There are two reasons: first, because each oral submission is limited to twenty 
minutes,23 and second, to avoid irritating the judges, who are presumed to be familiar with the 
contents of the written observations. Counsel may be—and often are—cut short if they start to 
repeat points made previously. Notionally, therefore, the content of oral submissions is new and 
may be as important as the written observations. 
In certain circumstances, a second oral hearing may be held. The Court may do so of its own 
account where, for instance, it feels that it lacks information, or new information has become 
available, or it considers that the case should be heard by a different formation of the Court. 
Officially, this may occur at the behest of an interested party, 'where a party has, after the close of 
that part of the procedure, submitted a new fact which is of such a nature as to be a decisive factor 
for the decision of the Court, or where the case must be decided on the basis of an argument 
which has not been debated between the parties or the interested persons.'24  
In fact, most requests for the reopening of the oral procedure are because an interested party 
disagrees with the contents of the Advocate General's Opinion. No such request has been 
entertained by the Court, which invariably replies with what has been described as a 'cut-and-
paste' refusal.25 Following the failure of an attempt to reopen the hearing in Emesa Sugar,26 
Emesa attempted to bring a case before the European Court of Human Rights on the basis that its 
right to a fair trial had been violated by the Court's refusal to allow it to submit written 
observations on the Advocate General's Opinion.27 Perhaps unfortunately—for this is an 
intriguing question—the case was ruled inadmissible on the basis that the national case did not 
raise an issue of human rights.28 Tridimas contends that '[T]he fact that the litigants may not 
                                                   
23 15 minutes in cases dealt with by chambers of three judges: see Broberg and Fenger (n 9) 4.4.3. 
24 Article 83 of the Rules of Procedure (n 1). 
25 Aidan O’Neill, EU Law for EU Lawyers (2nd edn, Bloomsbury 2011) 2039. See e.g. Joined cases C-544/03 
and C-545/03 Mobistar EU:C:2005:518, paras 22-25; Case C-312/14 Banif Plus Bank EU:C:2015:794 paras 27-
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26 Order of the Court in Case C-17/98 Emesa Sugar EU:C:2000:69, which contains a thoughtful discussion of 
the role of the Advocate General at paras 10-15. 
27 Article 6(1) of the European Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms. 
28 Emesa Sugar v Netherlands App no 62023/00 (ECtHR, 13 January 2005); see also Cooperatieve 




submit observations on the opinion is no more of a threat to the right to judicial protection than 
the fact that the litigants have no right of appeal against the judgment of the Court itself.'29 The 
fact that preliminary reference proceedings are—in principle—not contentious may invalidate the 
latter point. However, it does not invalidate concerns over the possibility of a misunderstanding 
by an Advocate General going unchallenged.30 Clearly, the Court is alerted to the possibility of 
such a misunderstanding by the application to reopen the hearing, even if the request is refused; 
nevertheless, it could be argued that the purpose of Member States' observations demands such a 
clarification. However, the Court has not infrequently reopened the oral procedure on its own 
account. 
One consequence of the holding of an oral hearing used to be that more information was 
publically available about the content of the written observations. Until November 2012,31  the 
Judge-Rapporteur would write a Report for the Hearing, which summarised the arguments in the 
written observations. The report was prepared in French, translated into the language of the 
case,32 and circulated to the parties entitled to present observations. Unfortunately, this useful 
document was abolished despite last-ditch attempts to save it by, among others, the Law Society 
of England and Wales,33 and despite grumbling by academics and the European Parliament. The 
Parliament, partly because its MEPs have themselves been denied access to documents of the 
other institutions34 has become 'the most significant institutional proponent of transparency.'35 
The Court acknowledges that the parties lack 'written assurance that the reporting judge has 
correctly understood the factual and legal framework and the substance of their pleadings' but 
argues that the 'inconvenience' is offset by speedier proceedings.36 The Parliament recommended 
reinstatement of the Reports, transparency in respect of written submissions to the Court and the 
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 Takis Tridimas, ‘The Role of the Advocate General In the Development of Community Law: Some 
Reflections’ (1997) 34 CML Rev 1349, 1382. 
30 See Noreen Burrows and Rosa Greaves, The Advocate General and EC Law (OUP 2007) ch 3. 
31 Rules of Procedure (n 1). 
32 Until the end of 1993, Reports for the Hearing were also translated into English and included in the published 
Court Reports. 
33 Law Society of England and Wales, ‘Reforms to the Court of Justice of the European Union: Position of the 
Law Society of England and Wales’ (2011) 4. 
34 See e.g. Case C-353/99 P Council v Hautala EU:C:2001:661; Quentin Ariès, ‘MEPs Launch Legal Challenge 
on Access to Documents: Left-Wing Group Says Commission Is Withholding Documents on Tax Deals’ 
Politico Europe Edition Online (14 January 2016); Francesca Bignami, ‘Creating European Rights: National 
Values and Supranational Interests’ (2005) 11 Colum J Eur L 241, 308. 
35 Bignami (n 34) 303. 
36 Niilo Jääskinen, ‘Through Difficulties towards New Difficulties – Wandering in the European Judicial 
Landscape' (King’s College Annual European Law Lecture, London, 15 February 2013). 
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extension of the current electronic filing system to allow registered third persons online access to 
court files.37 This recommendation has not been followed.38 
Should there be an Advocate General's Opinion? 
As noted above, the Judge-Rapporteur's preliminary report may also contain a proposal to 
dispense with an Opinion of the Advocate General if the case is considered not to raise any new 
point of law.39 This became a possibility after the Treaty of Nice of 2001,40 after which the 
proportion of judgments delivered without an Opinion increased from 30% in 2004 to 48% in 
2013.41 Moving to judgment without an Opinion represents a saving in time and resources for 
both the Court and the parties that are awaiting a resolution of their case at the national level.42 
The expediency may, however, need to be balanced against a decrease in the comprehensibility of 
judgments. This matters not only to an academic audience and the public, but to those who need 
to implement the Court's decisions,43 to courts referring subsequent cases on similar subjects, and 
to interested parties making observations in related cases.44 It also removes a reliable source of 
information on the legal arguments submitted to the Court.  
                                                   
37 Vesna Naglič, National Practices with Regard to the Accessibility of Court Documents (European Parliament 
2013) 6.2.2.1; European Parliament Committee on Civil Liberties Justice and Home Affairs, ‘Draft Report on 
Public Access to Documents (Rule 116(7)) in 2014 and 2015’ (2015) 2287. 
38 For the period from 1951 to 1978, the pleadings in both direct actions and preliminary references can be 
consulted at the Historical Archives of the EU in Florence. 
39 Article 20 of Protocol (No 3) on the Statute of the Court of Justice of the European Union, para 5. 
40 Article 20 of the Treaty of Nice Amending the Treaty on European Union, the Treaties Establishing the 
European Communities and Certain Related Acts [2000] OJ C80/1. 
41 Court of Justice of the European Union Annual Report (2004) 13 
<http://curia.europa.eu/jcms/upload/docs/application/pdf/2008-09/cj2004_2008-09-30_10-29-51_891.pdf> 
accessed 31 July 2020; Court of Justice of the European Union Annual Report (2013) 10 
<http://curia.europa.eu/jcms/upload/docs/application/pdf/2014-06/qdag14001enc.pdf> accessed 31 July 2020. 
42 An experiment in not publishing Opinions in 2008 was greeted with dismay and was rapidly abandoned: 
Alicia Hinarejos, ‘Social Legitimacy and the Court of Justice of the EU Some Reflections on the Role of the 
Advocate General’ [2012] CYELS fn 65. 
43 Eleanor Sharpston, ‘Appendix 5: Written Evidence of Advocate General Sharpston’ in European Union 
Committee (ed), The Workload of the Court of Justice of the European Union 1.8; HMRC v Aimia Coalition 
Loyalty [2013] UKSC 15 paras 87 and 129. 
44 Michal Bobek, ‘Learning to Talk: Preliminary Rulings, the Courts of the New Member States and the Court 
of Justice’ (2008) 45 CML Rev 1611, 1639. 
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After the oral hearing 
The Opinion is delivered, on average, two months after the oral hearing.45 Technically it forms 
the final part of the oral procedure, as the Advocate General does not take part in the Court’s 
subsequent deliberations.46 Each judge who participated in the hearing states his or her view and 
the reasons for it. The Court then makes its judgment based on the 'conclusions reached by the 
majority of the Judges after final discussion.'47 This terse specification does not mean that there 
may not be extensive discussion of the legal issues: as Edward says: 
Quite frequently, the parties to the proceedings before the referring court do not 
submit written observations or take part in the oral procedure, and the member states 
which might have most to contribute do not intervene ... Consequently, it may only 
be at the stage of deliberation that the points of view of a number of lawyers with 
different perspectives are brought to bear in identifying the issues and possible 
solutions.48  
If their contribution is mentioned in the judgment, this represents the final opportunity to discover 
what legal arguments these lawyers made to the Court. However, as Article 32 of the Rules of 
Procedure states, '[t]he deliberations of the Court shall be and shall remain secret.' The judgment 
is collegiate, and no dissenting or differently reasoned views are disclosed; similarly, much of the 
legal discussion to be found in the Opinion may fall by the wayside. Lasser observes that 'ECJ 
judgments remain not only collegial and unsigned, but also relatively terse and condensed: the 
vast majority run to only three to four pages in length, despite the often dazzling procedural 
complexity of the cases', leading the judgments to 'deny access to the finer points of their 
interpretative and normative decisions'. While the brevity of the judgments has relaxed somewhat 
over the years, Lasser's comment indicates that their format is too restrictive to convey the details 
of the legal arguments presented to the Court.49 
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46 Article 82 of the Rules of Procedure (n 1). 
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The Advocates General's Opinion and the text of the judgment are made available in electronic 
form on the day they are delivered. The original judgment is deposited at the Registry of the 
Court, and certified copies are served on the parties, the referring court or tribunal and the 
interested persons referred to in Article 23 of the Statute.50 Various print and electronic forms 
follow, including a notice containing the date and the operative part of the judgment, in print and 
electronic form, in the Official Journal of the European Union;51 and on the European Union's 
database of legal texts, EUR-Lex52 and the Court's website.53 The latter includes biographical data 
about each case, including the sources of any observations. 
An evaluation of the sources of information on observations offered by the 
preliminary reference procedure 
The procedure before the Court of Justice discloses six potential sources of information about 
observations submitted to the Court of Justice. 
1. The number and source of observations submitted to the Court are listed among the 
biographical data attached to each case in the Curia and EUR-Lex databases. However, it 
is not specified whether these were written briefs, oral arguments before the Court, or 
both. 
2. The Reports for the Hearing that were distributed before each hearing included a 
summary of the written arguments. Up to 1993, they were published with the case reports. 
Between 1993 and 2012 they were not made generally available, although Reports from 
this period may be consulted at the Court's library. From 2013 onwards, no Reports were 
prepared. 
3. The position of the Court is that '[t]he current practice of the Court is to treat all 
documents lodged by parties as strictly confidential; such documents are never disclosed 
to third parties.'54 The pleadings may, however, be disclosed by the parties themselves;55 
                                                   
50 Article 88 of the Rules of Procedure (n 1). 
51 Article 92 of the Rules of Procedure (n 1); up to 30 June 2013 the print edition of the Official Journal is the 
authentic document that produces legal effects; thereafter the electronic version is authentic. 
52 <http://eur-lex.europa.eu/> accessed 31 July 2020; since September 2011, it has been possible for chambers 
sitting with three or five judges to decide, exceptionally, not to publish a judgment on a request for a preliminary 
ruling: see <http://eur-lex.europa.eu/collection/eu-law/eu-case-law/reports.html> accessed 31 July 2020. 
53 <http://curia.europa.eu/juris/recherche.jsf?language=en> accessed 31 July 2020. 
54 Email from Lynn Hewlett of the Registry of the Court of Justice to author (4 March 2013). 
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in the case of member-state governments, this is likely to be in response to a freedom of 
information request. These pleadings may then be released into the public domain.56 
4. Advocate Generals' Opinions frequently summarise the positions of the participating 
states on the legal issues under consideration. However, they do not invariably do so, nor 
do they necessarily analyse each Member State's arguments in detail. 
5. In principle, the institutions of the EU may be required to give access to their own 
pleadings under the rules on access to documents, namely Article 15(3) TFEU and 
Regulation 1049/2001.57 The Court endorsed this requirement in API58 but has 
emphasised that in its own case, the requirement only applies to its administrative 
functions,59 and 'does not apply to documents concerning cases'.60 
6. The oral arguments (which often reiterate the written pleas despite the Court's disapproval 
of this practice) are given in open court61 and can be noted down, although not recorded, 
by anyone attending the hearing.62 
Each of these sources will now be evaluated in terms of what information it potentially offers, 
how this might be extracted, and its limitations.  
1. The biographical data 
Biographical data on each case are published on EUR-Lex. 
                                                                                                                                                              
55 Notably in Case C-370/12 Pringle EU:C:2012:756 
<https://www.asktheeu.org/en/request/5598/response/18154/attach/2/Obs%20ecrites%20THOMAS%20PRING
LE%20EN%20Redacted.pdf > accessed 31 July 2020 and Case C-362/14 Schrems EU:C:2015:650 
<www.europe-v-facebook.org/CJEU_subs.pdfa> accessed 31 July 2020; see also Case C-376/98 Germany v 
Parliament and Council EU:C:2000:181. 
56
 For instance, the observations in Gambazzi (Case C-394/07 Gambazzi EU:C:2009:219) were released to 
researcher Marta Requejo and published online: < http://conflictoflaws.net/2009/the-written-observations-
submitted-in-the-gambazzi-case/> accessed 31 July 2020. 
57 Regulation (EC) No 1049/2001 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 30 May 2001 regarding 
public access to European Parliament, Council and Commission documents [2001] OJ L 145/43. 
58 Case C-514/07 P Sweden v API and Commission EU:C:2010:541, paras 131-134. 
59 Decision of the Court of Justice of the European Union of 11 December 2012 concerning public access to 
documents held by the Court of Justice of the European Union in the exercise of its administrative functions 
[2013] OJ C 38/02. 
60 Court of Justice website, ‘Access to Documents’ < http://curia.europa.eu/jcms/jcms/P_92910/> accessed 31 
July 2020. 
61 The Court of Justice can close a hearing ‘for serious reasons’ (Article 31 of Protocol (No 3) on the Statute of 
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The overwhelming limitation of this source of information is that the biographical data for each 
case record only that a Member State submitted observations, not their content. 
2. Reports for the Hearing 
Until 1 November 2012, the judge rapporteur prepared a Report for the Hearing which contained 
a summary of the written observations. For cases up to 1993, this was published in the case 
reports of the Court. From 1993 to 2012, Reports for the Hearing were only made for internal use, 
in the language of the case plus French. Theoretically, these Reports may be obtained from the 
Registry for individual cases.63 Fortunately, there was nothing to prevent those present at the 
hearing, or who otherwise received copies of Reports, from copying and distributing them. 
Sweden's Ministry of Foreign Affairs systematically archived Reports for the Hearing and has 
made those from 1997 to 2008 available for a project undertaken by the Centre for European 
Research at the University of Gothenburg (CERGU), entitled The European Court of Justice as a 
political actor and arena: Analysing member states' observations under the preliminary reference 
procedure. The first results from this project were presented at a conference in May 2013, and 
they include valuable information on member-state observations.64 The terms under which the 
information was released forbade it from being placed online or distributed outside the research 
team, but I was able to spend two weeks at CERGU as a visiting researcher in 2013 and make use 
of the material. 
Although in most cases the information contained in a Report for the Hearing is the best one can 
get, it may be no more than an outline of the Member States' positions. However, it may 
sometimes contain much more: for instance, in Case C-192/99 Kaur the Report for the Hearing 
devotes eleven pages to the arguments of the five Member States that submitted observations, as 
compared with two paragraphs in Advocate General Léger's Opinion.65  
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The chief limitation of Reports for the Hearing as a source of information is the difficulty of 
access to Reports after 1992, and their abolition at the end of 2012. Where Reports can be 
accessed, they reveal inconsistencies in the reporting of Member States' positions—which, 
admittedly, vary in length and complexity themselves. At their best, Reports can contain detailed 
analysis of the legal arguments. 
3. Pleadings released by the parties 
These are the ideal source of information, limited only by the fact that they are unlikely to have 
been translated from the language of the case.66 As occurred in Schrems and Pringle, the 
instigators of some politicised cases may be highly motivated to release their arguments to the 
public.67 In other cases, governments may respond positively to freedom of information requests 
as the UK did in, for instance, Cases C-394/07 Gambazzi and C-521/12 Briels.68 The Information 
Commissioner's Office (ICO) has, however, made it clear (concerning a request to the 
Department for Work and Pensions for the UK's observations in Case C-67/14 Alimanovic69) that 
pleadings fall within an exemption in the Freedom of Information Act covering information 'held 
only by virtue of being contained in any document filed with, or otherwise placed in the custody 
of, a court for the purposes of proceedings in a particular cause or matter.'70 The ICO argued that 
a previous decision by another public authority not to rely on the exemption did not fetter the 
Commissioner or the DWP.71 The Irish government has likewise refused an attempt to gain 
access to its submissions via the Irish Freedom of Information Act.72 
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68 Case C-394/07 Gambazzi EU:C:2009:219, <http://conflictoflaws.net/News/2009/11/UK-Written-
Observations_P1.pdf> accessed 31 July 2020; Case C-521/12 Briels EU:C:2014:330, 
<https://www.gov.uk/government/publications/uk-submissions-to-the-briels-case> accessed 31 July 2020. 
69 Case C-67/14 Alimanovic EU:C:2015:597. 
70 Freedom of Information Act 2000, s 32(1)(a). 
71 <https://ico.org.uk/media/action-weve-taken/decision-notices/2016/1623740/fs_50587685.pdf> accessed 31 
July 2020. 
72 Elaine Fahey, ‘On the Assessment of the Operation of EU Law in the Irish Courts since Accession (UACES 
Conference, 40 Years since the First Enlargement, London, 7-8 March 2013) 




The chief limitations of this source of information are rarity and inconsistency. Observations may 
be released privately to researchers or put in the public domain via the internet, but they are 
extremely thin on the ground, and in the latter case, the lack of consistency in their description 
makes them elusive. As noted above, politically motivated parties may advertise their arguments 
as part of a process of strategic litigation and in order to stimulate debate: an example is the data 
privacy activist Max Schrems. Where companies are parties, there can be assumed to be a 
commercial disincentive to their releasing documents that may expose a company's workings to 
scrutiny. Governments as litigants do not share (or, frequently, have) policies on the release of 
their arguments and even within a Member State the inconsistent approach by different 
departments demonstrates a lack of legal certainty. 
4. The Advocate General's Opinion 
The Advocate General's Opinion is the most significant source of information on the legal 
arguments applicable to a case, as well as what may be the only discussion of legal doctrine. 
Advocates General make 'reasoned submissions': careful and detailed arguments for the solutions 
they wish to put forward to the Court.73 The more complex and doctrine-heavy the case, the more 
the Advocate General might be expected to grapple explicitly with conflicting arguments from the 
interested parties. Lasser draws attention to Advocate General Mischo's Opinion in Francovich, 
in which he assessed the member-state governments' and the Commission's arguments and even 
distinguished the pleadings put forward at the oral hearing from those given in written 
observations.74 However, the amount of information about the interested parties' legal arguments 
differs from case to case, and from Advocate General to Advocate General, the 'formal freedom' 
of Opinions affording scope for a degree of individual variation in style that cannot be found in 
the collegiate Court judgments. 75 Broadly, the length and detail of Opinions have increased 
steadily over time. Several of the early Advocates General were drawn from the French courts 
and employed a typically succinct style.76 As Clément-Wilz notes, greater numbers of academics 
have been appointed to the roles of both judge and Advocate General in recent years, which may 
have contributed to a more comprehensive style of assessing the legal arguments and presenting 
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their reasoning.77 It has undoubtedly led to a proliferation of useful footnotes. The effect is still 
subject, however, to individual Advocate Generals' personal styles and might be regarded as, at 
best, a rule of thumb. 
References to Member States' arguments (and by implication their policy preferences) may form 
a small part of an Opinion, but insofar as they contribute to the reasoning, they make a permanent 
impression on EU law. This applies even if it does not appear that the judges followed the 
Advocate General's argument. Tridimas makes the case that Opinions, even if the solution they 
proffer is not followed in a given dispute, contribute to the development of EU law and form a 
permanent part of the acquis jurisprudentiel.78 In that sense, whatever is included of Member 
States' legal arguments might also be said to acquire a permanent place in the acquis.79 Hinarejos 
likewise says that ‘[t]he Opinion, regardless of whether it is followed by the Court or not, may 
contribute to the deliberative nature of the judicial process and foster trust among the citizens by 
making part of these deliberations accessible and understandable.' She applies the term 'discursive 
legitimacy' to the production by a court of reasoning that is 'explicit, transparent and convincing' 
and argues that such discursive legitimacy as the Court of Justice achieves can partly be attributed 
to the 'discursive space' offered by the Opinion80—within which Member States' contributions are 
included.  
Limitations 
First, the Advocate General's Opinion is not necessarily comprehensive. The purpose of the 
Opinion is not primarily to provide an account of the governments’ positions, and the Advocate 
General may not mention all the Member States that submitted observations or analyse their 
positions on each legal issue.81  
                                                   
77 Laure Clément-Wilz, ‘The Advocate General: A Key Actor of the Court of Justice of the European Union’ in 
Catherine Barnard, Marcus Gehring and Iyiola Solanke (eds), CYELS Vol 14 2011–2012 (Hart 2012) 600; see 
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78 Tridimas (n 29) 1386. 
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80 Hinarejos (n 42) 16. 
81 See for example Case C-475/03 Banca popolare di Cremona EU:C:2006:629, in which fifteen Member States 
submitted observations for the reopened hearing: only six of these are discussed by AG Stix-Hackl in her 187-
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Secondly, it is important not to assume that, even if the Advocate General describes the Member 
States' positions, the judges take them into account. Although the Advocate General lays out the 
legal background to a case, appraises the submissions and often reviews academic discussion on 
an area of the law, the Opinion and its logic do not necessarily form the basis of the Court's 
judgment even when the Court's decision is the same. 
A comprehensive discussion of the role and influence of the Advocate General is outside the 
scope of this thesis, but this particular point is highly relevant. Knowledge of the content of 
Member States' arguments is only a beginning; the next (and large) step is to discover whether the 
Court listens to the arguments and takes them into account. This question is analogous to the 
often-debated question of whether the Court follows the Advocate General's Opinion, and the 
methods of answering it are similar. The question may be addressed from both theoretical and 
empirical viewpoints.82 These may overlap, as they frequently include case studies: Burrows and 
Greaves, for example, consider the contributions of three Advocates General to the development 
of specific areas of substantive law.83 Empirical studies include both quantitative and qualitative 
approaches: for example, an econometric study by Arrebola, Mauricio and Portilla concluded that 
in annulment cases, the Court is 67 per cent more likely to annul a measure if the Advocate 
General so advises,84 while Zakharenko's qualitative analysis of a sample of infringement cases 
revealed that in over 75% of cases, the wording used in the concluding statements of both the 
Advocates General and the Court was identical.85 This finding is particularly interesting given the 
difficulty of diagnosing whether the Advocate General's Opinion was followed in early cases, 
where the Court did not refer to the Opinion at all. To some extent this omission may still occur: 
several authors draw attention to cases where the Court makes no reference to points that were 
raised by Advocates General of their own accord, or raised by interested parties and regarded as 
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important by Advocates General. Ćapeta, for instance, notes that in Dominguez86 the Court's 
judgment does not refer to an argument that was put forward by the Commission, the 
participating member-state governments and Advocate General Trstenjak.87 
Thirdly, nearly half of judgments are now delivered without an Opinion. It can be argued that this 
has prejudiced the usefulness of judgments—to courts faced with the same or a similar question 
of EU law; to interested parties who may want to know if a particular argument is likely to fly; to 
companies operating within a particular area of the substantive law; to researchers and the public, 
and above all to their primary audience, the national courts. In HMRC v Aimia, Lord Hope 
observed that the absence of an Opinion 'places the reader at a disadvantage' and Lord Carnwath 
said, 'Experience shows that the Advocate-General's Opinion can often provide a fuller discussion 
of the principles and their practical application, against which the sometimes sparse reasoning of 
the judgment can be easier to understand and apply. In this case … as the present controversy 
demonstrates, it was an unfortunate omission.'88 The decision to proceed to judgment without an 
Opinion also cuts out what may be the only source of information on Member States' legal 
arguments and policy preferences in a case.  
Nevertheless, in the absence of Reports for the Hearing, the Opinion is the most useful source of 
information on Member States' legal arguments. 
5. Article 15(3) TFEU and Regulation 1049/2001 
Article 15(3) of the TFEU gives EU citizens, residents and businesses the right of access to 
documents of the EU institutions, bodies, offices and agencies—subject to some principles and 
conditions. Regrettably, one of those conditions is that the Court is required to grant access to 
documents only when exercising administrative tasks. Despite several challenges,89 it has been 
established that the entire contents of the case file, including observations that were discussed in 
open court, fall outside the scope of the Court's administrative tasks. There is much to criticise in 
this state of affairs, especially as the General Court and, in its day, the Civil Service Tribunal 
                                                   
86 Case C-282/10 Dominguez EU:C:2012:33. 
87 Ćapeta (n 82) fn 96. See also Case C-34/09 Ruiz Zambrano EU:C:2011:124 , with reference to the Charter of 
Fundamental Rights. 
88 HMRC v Aimia [2013] UKSC 15. 
89 Most notably in the appeal cases collectively known as API (Joined Cases C‑514/07 P, C‑528/07 P and 
C‑532/07 P Sweden v API and Commission EU:C:2010:541). 
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have not interpreted the requirement for openness and transparency so parsimoniously.90 The 
conclusion for this particular research, however, is that the provisions for access to documents are 
a dead end. 
6. The oral arguments 
While (absent a successful freedom of information request) written submissions are available in 
summary or not at all, oral submissions are available to those who attend the hearing. Attending 
cases of interest is not entirely unfeasible, as the source and subject-matter of pending cases are 
searchable on the Court's website, as is the Court's diary.91 Professional and special-interest 
bodies also monitor some areas of the law: the Intellectual Property Office, for instance, has 
procedures for monitoring relevant EU cases and informing its subscribers.92 Rarely, for reasons 
connected to security or in cases concerning children, the public may be barred from hearings,93 
but an energetic researcher with sufficient resources might succeed in attending the majority of 
oral hearings. 
Limitations 
The primary limitations, apart from lack of practicality, are that perhaps one-third of cases do not 
have an oral hearing and that Member States which have submitted written observations do not 
invariably attend if there is. 
7. The assumption that governments' pleadings will support their own departments 
In the absence of information from any of the sources discussed above, or for the sake of 
convenience, an alternative assumption has been that a government's observations will be in 
support of the ministry (or 'emanation of the state') that is a party to the proceedings. Stone 
Sweet, for instance, argues that this assumption was the basis of Carrubba's reasoning when he 
used data on member-state observations in support of an intergovernmentalist model of EU legal 
                                                   
90 Alemanno and Stefan (n 16); Päivi Leino, ‘Just a Little Sunshine in the Rain: The 2010 Case Law of the 
European Court of Justice on Access to Documents’ (2011) 48 CML Rev 1215; Steve Peers, ‘Case Law 
Summary: EU Access to Documents Regulation’ (Statewatch, 2010) <https://www.statewatch.org/analyses/no-
116-eu-case-law-summary-access-regulation.pdf> accessed 31 July 2020. 
91 <http://curia.europa.eu/jcms/jcms/Jo2_17661> accessed 31 July 2020. 
92 <https://www.gov.uk/government/publications/references-to-the-court-of-justice-of-the-european-
union/references-to-the-court-of-justice-of-the-european-union-2015> 31 July 2020. 
93 Article 79 of the Rules of Procedure (n 1). 
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integration.94 Such an assumption is rarely better than a general guideline and can be shown in 
some cases to be unsafe: for instance in Larsson, in which the Danish government in its 
observation suggested that a Directive precluded the operation of Danish law as it then stood.95 
 
It is clear that, while it is possible to discover their number and sources, there is no single, 
consistent source of information on the content of legal arguments put before the Court in the 
form of observations. It can be argued that the Court's position on access to judicial files is 
inconsistent with the principles of open justice. Much the same might be said of the position of 
many governments. The normative implications of this lack of openness are outside the scope of 
this thesis. However, an immediate consequence is that both legal scholars and political scientists 
studying the Court have tried to maximise the information that can be extracted by reworking the 
statistics that they can obtain. The effort has not been unfruitful, as will be seen. However, it 
should be noted that this thesis is not another attempt to use statistics directly either to explain the 
decision-making of the Court or to deduce governments' motivations. Instead, statistics will serve 
to raise questions that may be addressed more qualitatively. There will be two angles of attack: 
firstly to look at the frequency and (as far as is possible) the contents of states' observations, and 
then to consider what factors contribute to the differences between the Member States, with 
particular emphasis on the contrasting behaviour of Denmark, Ireland and the UK.  
Methods 
This section deals with the methods used to extract information on member-state submissions 
from a hierarchy of sources:  
 Biographical information available from the Court itself: i.e. which Member States 
submitted observations on each case 
 Reports for the Hearing: summaries of Member States' arguments 
 Possible methods of obtaining detailed information on the contents of Member States' 
submissions. 
The section first describes the method used to compile the dataset that was used to demonstrate 
national variations in government submissions to the Court of Justice. This is followed by a 
                                                   
94 Alec Stone Sweet and Thomas Brunell, ‘How the Legal System of the European Union Works - and Does Not 
Work: Response to Carrubba, Gabel, and Hankla’ (Faculty Scholarship Series, Yale Law School 2010). 
95 Case C-400/95 Larsson EU:C:1997:259. 
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description of the information obtained from the Reports for the Hearing compiled by the Centre 
for European Research at the University of Gothenburg (CERGU), along with an introduction to 
CERGU's own project and results and the use made of them in this thesis. 
Compiling the dataset of member-state observations 
The data collected by Stone Sweet and Brunell for their research on European integration up to 
2006 were used as the basis for the further analysis carried out for this research. For their first 
paper, published in 1998, Stone Sweet and Brunell compiled information on every Article 267 
TFEU reference filed with the Court of Justice from 1961 to 1995, although their published 
dataset did not include any information on the observations submitted.96 The dataset was 
extended to 2006 for research they undertook for the European Commission's New Modes of 
Governance Project (NewGov), which was published in 2007.97 
Information added: 2007-2013 and observations 
For this thesis, biographical data from the Curia database were used to code the preliminary 
reference cases from 2007 to 2013, using Stone Sweet and Brunell's methodology and codes 
(below) with the addition of new codes for some areas whose importance was not envisaged 
when the Court's classification system was designed. The sources of all the observations 
submitted by the EU institutions, the Member States, EFTA members and third parties were then 
added for each case, amounting to 16,964 separate submissions in 5,562 cases. It should be noted 
that most of these are best described as sets of observations: most submissions do not confine 
themselves to a single question. Naurin, Cramér and others discuss the complications that this 
adds to the study of member-state behaviour, and the results of their more detailed question-by-
question analysis have been employed in later chapters.98 
                                                   
96 Alec Stone Sweet and Thomas L Brunell, ‘Constructing a Supranational Constitution: Dispute Resolution and 
Governance in the European Community’ (1998) 92 APSR 63, 67. 
97 Alec Stone Sweet and Thomas L Brunell, ‘The European Court and National Courts: Dataset on Preliminary 
References in EC Law (Art 234), 1961-2006’ <http://www.eu-
newgov.org/datalists/deliverables_detail.asp?Project_ID=26> accessed 31 July 2020. 
98 Daniel Naurin, Per Cramér, Olof Larsson, Sara Lyons, Andreas Moberg and Allison Östlund, ‘Coding 
observations of the Member States and judgments of the Court of Justice of the EU under the preliminary 
reference procedure 1997-2008 Data report’ (2013) CERGU Working Paper Series 2013:1. 
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Choice of cases 
Only cases for which the Court has published a judgment were added to the dataset. Cases that 
ended in an order of the Court were excluded, as orders typically state either that a case is 
inadmissible or that no interpretation of EU law is necessary.  
Coding 
Stone Sweet and Brunell's dataset records the following information in the form of numerical 
codes: 
• The originating country 
• The year the case was filed 
• The case number 
• The status of the case (ended by a judgment, ended by an order, pending, removed 
from the register or joined to another case) 
• One or more codes indicating the subject matter(s) of the case (see Appendix A) 
• The substantive area(s) of EU law being litigated, coded as 1 (one of the subject 
matters falls into the substantive area) or 0 
For this thesis, further information was added: 
• A code to indicate the accession group to which the originating country belongs 
• EU institutions, member and non-member states and other organisations submitting 
observations in each case 
• For selected years, the level of the national court from which the reference originated, 
the status of the parties (both private, one party a government body or 'emanation of 
the state', criminal case), whether there was an oral procedure and/or an Opinion of 
the Advocate General, and the presidency 
For example, Metock,99 which considered the scope of the right of residence of nationals of non-
member countries who are family members of a Union citizen, is coded thus (excluding columns 
for Member States not making observations): 
  
                                                   
99 Case C-127/08 Metock EU:C:2008:449. 
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country 8 Ireland 
filedate 2008  
case 127  
decision 1 Case ended by a judgment of the Court 
matter 1 339 European citizenship 
matter 2 376 Free movement of workers 
movework 1 Free movement of workers and persons 
accession 9 1973 accession group 
Commission 1 Observations submitted by Commission 
Germany 1 Observations submitted by Germany 
Netherlands 1 Observations submitted by the Netherlands 
Denmark 1 Observations submitted by Denmark 
UK 1 Observations submitted by the UK 
Greece 1 Observations submitted by Greece 
Austria 1 Observations submitted by Austria 
Finland 1 Observations submitted by Finland 
Cyprus 1 Observations submitted by Cyprus 
Malta 1 Observations submitted by Malta 
Czech 1 Observations submitted by Czechia 
Before analysing the database, cases coded as joined to a primary case were dropped so as to 
avoid multiple counting of cases involving the same legal dispute or decision. 
Subject matters and substantive areas 
The subject-matter codes used by Stone Sweet's group refer to the classification system 
developed by the Court of Justice, which forms part of the biographical information available for 
each case. For example, Stone Sweet took cases classified by the Court as concerning the 
environment and coded them 355; those on the free movement of capital were coded 366, and so 
on. The majority of cases are classified as having more than one subject; some may have more 
than the five allowed by the database, in which event closely allied subjects have been joined. 
Some inconsistency in the use of these codes was found. To take two cases on selling 
arrangements as examples, in Keck100 the single code for measures having equivalent effect was 
                                                   
100 Cases C-267 and 268/91 Keck and Mithouard EU:C:1993:905. 
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used; in Gourmet International101 the group used the three codes for free movement of goods, 
quantitative restrictions and measures having equivalent effect. In practice, this rarely affects the 
analysis, because closely related subject matters are grouped into substantive areas of the law (or 
'meta-categories'), and it is the number of cases with at least one entry in a given substantive area 
that has been used for the charts above. 
The substantive areas listed in the table above reflect most of the main areas of EU law: 
agriculture, the four freedoms, competition and so on. In 2007, Stone Sweet and Brunell 
calculated that the meta-categories covered around 90% of the subject matters referred.102 New 
categories may readily be added as required: fundamental rights, intellectual property and public 
procurement come to mind. Over the full period of the expanded database, only 9% of cases had 
no subject matters that fell into any of the original meta-categories; most had one or two and a 
handful of more complicated cases had three to five. 
Subject classifications 
For most cases, the subject classification could be derived directly from the subject matter given 
in the biographical information published on EUR-Lex. The example in Figure 1 is for Case C-
127/08 Metock.103  
 
Figure 1: Screenshot of Classifications section of biographical information 
However, some cases were found in which the subject matter listed in the biographical 
information did not match the keywords given therein. For those, the summary information, the 
                                                   
101 Case C-405/98 Konsumentombudsmannen v Gourmet International Products AB EU:C:2001:135. 
102 Alec Stone Sweet and Thomas L Brunell, ‘The European Court and National Courts: Data Set on Preliminary 
References in EC Law, NEWGOV Project’ (2007) 1 <http://www.eu-
newgov.org/database/DELIV/DLTFIID04a-Data_Set_Preliminary_References_Art234_1961-2006.pdf> 
accessed 31 July 2020. 
103 Case C-127/08 Metock EU:C:2008:449. 
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'notes de doctrine' provided by the Court's Library and Documentation Service,104 and 
occasionally the full judgment were consulted to decide on the coding. In addition, some cases 
are classified as 'Approximation of Laws': most of these are on a limited range of topics that have 
assumed greater importance over the years. For these, new subject codes were created. 
                                                   
104 <http://curia.europa.eu/jcms/jcms/Jo2_7083/> accessed 31 July 2020. 
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Chapter 3: Member States’ observations as a measure of engagement 
with EU law 
Introduction 
In the introductory chapter, it was contended that a great deal of information about Member 
States’ perception of their role in the European Union might be obtained by examining their 
interactions with the Court of Justice—specifically, the interactions of their executive branches 
with the Court. This chapter will demonstrate that preliminary reference cases provide the main 
opportunity for such interactions. It will then examine the developing importance that 
governments have attached to their participation in the preliminary reference procedure, before 
looking at some variations in Member States’ levels of engagement with the Court. The chapter 
will conclude with a survey of the explanations for those variations offered in the literature. 
A Member State’s interactions with the Court can arise in several different circumstances, some 
sought out by the member-state government and others not. There is at least as much information 
to be obtained from a government’s voluntary participation in court proceedings as when a 
government is a party to the court action. A government may be a party if it is the subject of a 
direct action brought by the Commission for failure to fulfil a Treaty obligation,1 if the 
government appeals a case at the General Court, or if a ministry or public body is a party to a 
national case that gives rise to a preliminary reference.2 Strictly speaking the proceedings in 
preliminary references are non-contentious, the Court only ruling on the interpretation of EU law 
and not on the national case, but the government body in question will usually feel obliged to be 
represented in Court. 
Governments’ freely submitted legal arguments to the Court arise in three circumstances: firstly 
where a government intervenes—as opposed to being a party—in a direct action; secondly, where 
it makes observations in a reference from one of its national courts in which it is not a party; and 
thirdly and arguably most interestingly, in preliminary reference cases from the courts of other 
Member States. To varying degrees, all these submissions are voluntary and proactive rather than 
perforce and reactive. Their status is slightly different depending on the type of case. In direct 
actions and appeals, a government must request leave to intervene and may only do so in support 
                                                   
1 Or, rarely, brought by another Member State. 
2 Case C-188/89 Foster v British Gas EU:C:1990:313. 
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of the form of order sought by one of the parties; 3 a wish to intervene in support of the legal 
arguments of one of the parties is insufficient.4 The submission of observations in preliminary 
reference cases needs no such leave and is indeed invited, with the opportunity for states to 
submit observations being explicitly safeguarded by the Court.5 Equally, the observations need 
not be in support of any legal arguments of the parties, although they must address the questions 
referred. Thus the scope of the legal arguments in preliminary reference cases, as well as the 
opportunity to put them forward, is more extensive. 
A Member State’s rationale for submitting observations in other states’ cases is one of the main 
focuses of this thesis, particularly as it is evident that they may do so in cases where the result has 
no immediate national implications. This will be examined in detail in a Chapter 5. The present 
chapter will explore, in general terms, explanations of Member States’ participation in 
preliminary reference cases that suggest the parameters that Member States may take into account 
when deciding whether to engage with the Court. 
The following two sections will look at member-state government submissions to the Court in 
historical terms. The first will demonstrate the current importance of this avenue of 
communication with the Court via a snapshot of all such communications in a single year; the 
second will examine the historical development of governments’ use of observations. 
Member States’ engagement with the Court of Justice: the importance of 
observations in preliminary references 
Preliminary references form the majority of cases that come before the Court of Justice, thereby 
fostering a strong link between the legal system of the EU and the implementation of that legal 
system in the jurisdictions of the Member States. Not only are preliminary references the active 
link between the national courts of the Member States and the legal system of the EU, but they 
offer a crucial opportunity for communication between the governments of the Member States 
and the legal system of the EU. Both can be demonstrated by looking at the Court statistics for a 
single year (2013).6  
                                                   
3 Article 40 of Protocol (No 3) on the Statute of the Court of Justice of the European Union, para 4. 
4 Case C-116/77 Amylum v Council and Commission EU: C:1978:81, Order of the Court of 12 April 1978, para 
7. 
5 Case C-322/15 Google Ireland and Google Italy EU:C:2016:672, para 17. 
6 2013 was chosen as the latest year analysed for this database. 
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Preliminary references made up 450 of 699 of new cases coming before the Court (Figure 2).7 
These numbers ignore subsequent joinder: one case number equates to one case. Each represents 
an approach by a national court that finds itself unable to reach a judgment without a ruling from 
the Court of Justice. 
To calculate governments’ contacts with the Court, it is necessary to look instead at completed 
cases since these are the records for which the numbers of interventions and observations are 
available. The number of completed cases can again be obtained from the Annual Report and 
ignores joinder (Figure 3). The number of interactions between member-state governments and 
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Figure 2: New cases coming before the Court 2013 
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Figure 3: Completed cases 2013 
judgments using the Curia website, as described in Chapter 2. From these, it is possible to obtain 
the number of cases in which each Member State was a party, intervened in a direct action or 
submitted observations in a preliminary reference case, for both the Court of Justice and the 
General Court.8 The full results, broken down by Member State, may be found in Appendix B, 
Table 1; they are summarised in Figure 4. 
                                                   
8 Information obtained from the Curia database <http://curia.europa.eu/juris/recherche.jsf?language=en> 
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Figure 4: Governments’ interaction with the CJEU 2013 
Figure 3 shows that, in 2013, 413 of the 1,403 completed cases at the Court of Justice and the 
General Court were preliminary references. But Figure 4 shows that observations in these 
preliminary reference cases made up 638 out of 924 contacts with the Court of Justice and the 
General Court. In other words, government observations in preliminary reference cases 
represented 69% of all such communication: 65% in cases that went to a judgment and 4% in 
cases that resulted in an Order of the Court. As noted in Chapter 2, the database only counts the 
observations submitted in cases that produced a judgment. It is rare for observations to be made 
in cases that result in an Order of the Court (2013 was unusual in that one case, Intelcom, 
attracted observations from nine states) and the amount of information available about such cases 
is both less and inconsistently recorded.9 This demonstrates clearly that, at least in numerical 
terms, these observations are the main avenue of communication between the Court and the 
governments of the Member States. In an additional 8% of cases at the Court of Justice, a 
Member State was a party to the proceedings—the vast majority of these being infringement 
                                                   
9 Case C-600/13 Intelcom EU:C:2014:609. 
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proceedings under Article 258 TFEU—and a further 13% were interventions in direct actions in 
which another Member State was a party. Notably, these interactions with the Court of Justice 
make up fully 90% of member-state governments’ interactions with the Court as a whole, even 
though the General Court handled slightly more than half of all the cases brought in 2013. In only 
7% of cases, a Member State’s interaction with the Court consisted of it being a party in a case 
heard before the General Court; observations in such cases made up a mere 3% of all interactions. 
Based on these findings, the remainder of this thesis will assume that trends and patterns in the 
submission of observations in preliminary reference cases that proceed to a full judgment are a 
useful measure of Member States’ interactions with the Court as a whole. 
Member States’ interactions with the Court of Justice: the developing 
importance of preliminary references over the history of the EU 
This section will examine the historical development of Member States’ submission of legal 
arguments in preliminary references. 
In the beginning, governments were not offered much opportunity to interact with the Court 
because their courts were slow to avail themselves of the preliminary reference procedure. The 
Court of Justice received its first reference in 1961, more than three years after the entry into 
force of the Treaty of Rome: it celebrated the arrival of Bosch10—a reference from the Court of 
Appeal in The Hague—with champagne.11 Of the thirteen preliminary references up to the end of 
1964, ten came from courts in the Netherlands. Those thirteen cases garnered sixteen submissions 
in total from Member States—four in Bosch,12 three each in Van Gend and Albatros, six further 
cases getting one and four getting none—from five of the six Member States.13 The sixth Member 
State, Luxembourg, submitted no observations to the Court until 1971—and indeed has done so 
in only one per cent of cases in the 53 years covered in this thesis. In comparison, Germany has 
submitted observations in over twenty per cent of cases, despite not doing so in many references 
from its own courts. It is immediately apparent that the governments and courts of the Member 
States display varying degrees of engagement with the Court of Justice. 
                                                   
10 Case 13/61 De Geus en Uitdenbogerd v Bosch EU:C:1962:11. 
11 Catherine Barnard and Eleanor Sharpston, ‘The Changing Face of Article 177 References’ (1997) 
34 CML Rev 1113, 1117. 
12 Dennis Thompson, ‘The Bosch Case’ (1962) 11 International and Comparative Law Quarterly 721. 
13 Case 26/62 Van Gend & Loos EU:C:1963:1; Case 20/64 SARL Albatros v SOPECO EU:C:1965:8. 
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As noted in the introductory chapter, nearly half the cases in the 1960s received no observations 
from national governments. Of the most significant early cases to come before the Court, Van 
Gend received observations from three out of six governments and Costa did so only from Italy.14 
But from the mid-1970s, the proportion of cases that received input from national governments 
began to rise, reaching nearly 70% in the 1980s, over 80% in the 1990s and 93% in the period 
from 2007 to 2013 (Table 1, Figure 5).15 This rise is not merely a result of there being more 
Member States, because the bulk of observations still come from the older members. In fact, in 
the period since the fifth enlargement in 2004, 40% of the observations have come from the 
founding six Member States, and 75% from the pre-existing fifteen. 
A small number of cases have attracted very many observations: two—BASF and Banca 
Popolare di Cremona16—received observations from 14 of 15 states; four—Meng, Reiff, Ohra 
and Schindler17—received observations from 11 of 12 and two—EMI and Terrapin v 
Terranova18—from 7 of 9. Nevertheless, by 2013 and with 27 Member States, the average 
number of submissions per case remained at two, and the maximum, in Hirvonen, was eight.19 
                                                   
14 Case 6/64 Costa v ENEL EU:C:1964:66. 
15 The decrease in observations after 2011 appears to be the beginning of a genuine trend. 
16 Case C-44/98 BASF EU:C:1999:440 (free movement of goods, IP); Case C-475/03 Banca Popolare di 
Cremona EU:C:2006:629 (VAT). 
17 Case C-2/91 Meng EU:C:1993:885, Case C-185/91 Reiff EU:C:1993:886, Case C-245/91 Ohra 
Schadeverzekeringen EU:C:1993:887 (competition); Case C-275/92 HM Customs and Excise v Schindler 
EU:C:1994:119 (free movement of services, gambling). 
18 Case 96/75 EMI Records v CBS Schallplatten EU:C:1976:87; Case 119/75 Terrapin v Terranova 
EU:C:1976:94 (free movement of goods, competition, IP). 
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Member State observation 





Decade % with 
MS obs 
1961-1972 (6) 52 1961-1970 58 
1973-1980 (9) 54 1971-1980 53 
1981-1985 (10) 64 1981-1990 67 
1986-1994 (12) 75 1991-2000 84 
1995-2003 (15) 88 2001-2010 90 
2005-2006 (25) 89 2011-2013 94 
2007-2013 (27) 93   





Figure 5: Preliminary references 1961-2013 
The average proportion of the Member States making observations in a given case increased up 
to the 1990s but was already falling slightly before the 2004 enlargement (Figure 6). This was 
true for all the accession groups. The only group of countries that collectively submitted 
observations in an increasing proportion of cases during the 2000s was, unsurprisingly, the 
newest Member States (Figure 7)—and as will be seen in the next section, that is mostly down to 
the enthusiasm of just two of the ten new members, Czechia and Poland. Since the accession of 
Bulgaria and Romania in 2007, the average proportion of the 27 Member States making 
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Ratio of observations to number of cases, by accession group
Original Six
Dk, Ir, UK 1973
Gr 1981
Por, Sp 1986
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Figure 7: Ratio of observations to number of cases by accession group
20
 
A distinction should be drawn here between two types of average: the mean (the average number 
of states interceding), which for 2013 is two, and the mode (the most common number of 
submissions), which is one. The typical case has a single member-state submission, which is 
usually from the government of the referring state. However, in 18%, that submission was from 
another state.21 And across all cases, 63% of all submissions by member-state governments have 
been in other Member States’ cases. 
Just as there proved to be a broader significance to the preliminary reference procedure beyond 
that indicated by Article 267’s wording, Member States’ participation in the Court’s proceedings 
has motives beyond the justification of national legislation, the protection of domestic revenue 
and the settling of technical points in states’ own favour. In particular, their submission of legal 
arguments in cases originating in other Member States indicates that they have come to recognise 
preliminary reference cases as opportunities for influencing EU law in general. 
                                                   
20 The high ratios of the 1960s are an artefact of the very small number of rulings: in 1961, for instance, the only 
case received four observations. 
21 For 104 cases with only a single government submission in 2013, that submission was from another Member 
State in 19 cases. One case also received a submission from the EFTA Surveillance Authority. 
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Member States’ interactions with the Court of Justice: variation between 
states  
A corollary of the above argument is that, without the opportunity to have such a general 
influence, Member States’ contributions to preliminary reference cases would not go beyond 
technical arguments from whichever government ministry was a party. Still less would they 
trouble to present legal arguments in other states’ cases. In fact, many Member States take 
submissions to the Court so seriously that they continuously monitor upcoming cases and 
government responses are coordinated centrally. However, it can be shown that not all Member 
States aspire to the same degree of influence on EU law, or at least that some are unable to fulfil 
such an aspiration. Their differences in behaviour are important to our understanding of what 
governments perceive to be the benefits of submitting observations, and why some countries 
struggle to realise these benefits. 
The cumulative influence of Member States 
The overall trends conceal a wide variation between the participation rates of different Member 
States. This variation may be illustrated in several ways. Figure 8 indicates the total number of 
submissions each Member State has made over the entire period of this study, ordered according 
to the date of accession of each state. The figures are not adjusted for length of membership, so 
they could be regarded as an absolute measure of the opportunity each country has had to 
influence EU law via the Court. Figure 8 also draws attention to the degree to which governments 
have used other states’ cases to exert this influence. 
The newer members have inevitably submitted fewer observations, but what stands out is the 
anomalies within groups that joined at the same time. Among the foundational six Member 
States, Luxembourg has made few submissions and Granger noted in 2010 that Luxembourg had 
only one civil servant in charge of EU litigation.22 Although it has submitted more observations 
per head of population than any other Member State, this is simply reflects its diminutive size. 
Belgium’s relative lack of participation is surprising, but might be accounted for by its 
                                                   
22 Marie-Pierre Granger, ‘Governments in Luxembourg: How Do Governments Use EU Litigation to Protect 
National Policies or Influence EU Policy and Law-Making (Paper Presented at ECPR Fifth Pan-European 
Conference on EU Politics, Porto, 24-26 June 2010)’ (2010) <https://www.semanticscholar.org/paper/Paper-
1596%3A-Governments-in-Luxembourg%3A-How-Do-Use-
Granger/d95b6c5e9d3014db20e65728bc7fc66a5063c42a> accessed 31 July 2020; Ministère des Affaires 




constitutional structure. It has historically had difficulty in putting structures in place to anticipate 
which cases will be significant, and its decentralised government places the initiative on 
individual ministries to respond to cases within the short time-frame allowed. Granger observes 
that, while Belgium has a body that coordinates all the country’s international litigation, its role in 
respect of the Court of Justice is mainly reactive.23  
 
Figure 8: Submissions by Member State 1961-2013 
By contrast, Germany, France, Italy and the Netherlands have been frequent participators in 
preliminary reference proceedings. Germany, in particular, has made the highest number of 
submissions to the Court of any Member State: 1,360 as compared with Luxembourg’s 66, 
despite its having submitted observations in fewer than half of the cases referred by German 
national courts.24 Germany’s submission rate from the 1970s onwards mirrors the pattern of 
Figure 6, with a gradual increase in the percentage of cases in which it made submissions until 
the 1990s, peaking at 41% in 1993, and then a decline to an average of 24% of cases. Granger has 
a possible explanation for this trend: that countries came to recognise that ‘frequent observations 
                                                   
23 Marie-Pierre Granger, ‘Member States’ Governments and the European Court of Justice: Governments as 
“Repeat Players” in Judicial Decision Making at EU Level' (EUSA’s Eight Biennial Conference, Nashville, 
Tennessee, March 26-29, 2004) 12. 
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do not systematically equal greater influence’, and points to a French government report which 
suggested that France’s propensity to express a position on every subject had the perverse effect 
of reducing the visibility of its priorities.25 Granger observes that a low rate of making 
observations in national cases may, paradoxically, be an indicator of an active litigation strategy 
with clearly defined priorities.26 
The three states of the first enlargement—Denmark, Ireland and the UK—differ a great deal. The 
UK was the second-highest contributor, at 24% of cases from 1973-2013, Denmark tenth at 6.4% 
and Ireland sixteenth at 4.5%. These results will be discussed in Chapter 6. There is also 
considerable variation among the states that joined the EU in 2004. Poland and Czechia between 
them accounted for 59% of their submissions. Standing out most of all is Poland, which not only 
participated in a third more cases than Czechia but participated in more cases in its nine years of 
membership up to the end of 2013 (341) than Portugal in its 28 years of membership (334). 
Engagement with the Court of Justice 
Having looked at the absolute number of cases as a measure of each state’s (potential) cumulative 
influence over EU law, we now turn to a more realistic measure of member-state governments’ 
active engagement with EU law, taking each state’s length of membership into account. This is 
illustrated in two different ways: Figure 9 shows the proportion of cases in which a Member State 
has made submissions during its membership, ordered by length of membership, and Figure 10 
gives the average number of submissions per year of membership. The latter does not account for 
the increase in the number of cases over time and therefore gives more weight to those countries 
which joined later when the Court’s case-load was higher (see Figure 5). It should also be noted 
that neither takes into account variations in individual governments’ behaviour throughout their 
membership; a comprehensive diachronic analysis is outside the scope of this thesis. Despite 
these reservations, both charts yield interesting results in terms of national differences. 
                                                   
25 Commissariat Général Du Plan, ‘Organiser La Politique Européenne et Internationale de La France’ (2002) 
37. 
26 Marie-Pierre F Granger, ‘States as Successful Litigants before the European Court Of Justice: Lessons from 
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Some points may immediately be picked out to exemplify the diversity of national behaviour. No 
Member State has made submissions in more than 24% of cases. The Member State that has 
submitted observations in the highest proportion of cases during its membership is Germany,27 
followed closely by the UK. The smallest states, Malta and Luxembourg, have been the least 
active. Unsurprisingly, the size and wealth of a Member State are important factors in a Member 
State’s decision as to whether to take part. But it is clear that other factors are also at work: these 
will be touched upon below. 
Sources of national variation: size and wealth 
While the highest levels of engagement with the Court are from the larger and wealthier countries 
and the lowest from smaller and poorer ones, these are not the only factors that determine the 
likelihood of a Member State submitting legal arguments to the Court. This may readily be 
illustrated by comparing Czechia and Portugal, both of which have about 10.5m inhabitants. 
Czechia has submitted observations in twice as many cases, proportionately, as Portugal. The 
sizes of their economies do not account for the difference: Portugal and Czechia have very 
similar-sized economies as measured by nominal gross domestic product (GDP).28 Neither size 
nor wealth accounts on its own for the degree of a Member State’s participation. It is nevertheless 
important to bear in mind the effect of wealth when discussing other factors that influence the 
Member States. 
The size of the Member State’s economy 
The effect of the size of a Member State’s economy can be examined via a simple plot of 
observation rate against nominal gross domestic product (GDP) (Figure 11). Unsurprisingly, there 
is a relationship between GDP and how likely the state is to submit observations to the Court.29 
The correlation is marked among the larger economies and less so amongst the smallest. If the 
lowest third of the economies are separated out, it can be seen that there is little or no relationship 
between their GDPs and their participation in the Court (Figure 12).30  
                                                   
27 Although the UK’s participation rate fell in the last decade. 
28 International Monetary Fund World Economic Outlook Database October 2013 
<http://www.imf.org/external/pubs/ft/weo/2013/02/weodata/weoselco.aspx?g=995&sg=All+countries+%2f+Ad
vanced+economies+%2f+Euro+area> accessed 31 July 2020. 
29 r2 = 0.6917. 































































Observations by wealth of Member State
 
Figure 11 Observations by Gross Domestic Product (top two-thirds of economies) 
The fact that relative wealth is not the sole determining factor is illustrated by Portugal and 
Czechia, as discussed above. It may also be demonstrated by looking at Member States that are 
significantly more, or less, active than a simple correlation with GDP would predict. Poland, 
which is the eighth largest economy but which, because of its large population, has only the 23rd 
highest GDP per head, is the most notable example of a state that is more active than its wealth 
would suggest. Sweden, on the other hand, has the 15th largest economy and the 7th largest GDP 
per head but makes only half as many submissions to the Court. 
These observations remind us that correlation is not cause: a lack of resources would appear to be 
a limiting factor on participation, certainly, but governments vary in their motivations, strategies, 
policies and constitutional histories, all of which affect their choices of how much of their 











































Smallest third of economies
 
Figure 12 Observations by Gross Domestic Product: smallest third of economies 
An economic measure that is more specific to EU membership and which might equally be tested 
as a partial explanation for national variations in observations is implied by Stone Sweet and 
Brunell’s empirical studies on neofunctionalism.31 Stone Sweet and Brunell found that the 
average number of Article 267 references made per year was strongly—and for the period 1960-
1993 almost perfectly—correlated with Member States’ amounts of intra-EU trade. This is a 
logical outcome of the neofunctionalist model, which argues that integration is the inevitable 
outcome of the Court’s resolution of trade disputes.32 Whether or not the neofunctionalist model 
is accepted, the link between a Member State’s level of intra-EU trade and the number of 
preliminary references made by the state’s courts might also be recruited as an explanation for the 
marked variation in member-state governments’ eagerness to submit observations. 
 
                                                   
31 Alec Stone Sweet and Thomas L Brunell, ‘The European Court and Integration’ in Martin Shapiro and Alec 
Stone Sweet (eds), On Law, Politics and Judicialization (OUP 2002). 





































Aggregate imports & exports, bn Euros
Observations by state, cases 1/5/2004 to 31/12/2013
 
Figure 13 Observations by average intra-EU trade 2004-2013
33
 
Figure 13 demonstrates that the number of observations a Member State made in the period since 
the 2004 enlargement is strongly correlated with its amount of intra-EU trade, but this is not 
unexpected. A Member State’s prosperity is inextricably linked to its trade with its neighbours. 
Germany, for instance, makes about 67% of its considerable exports to its co-Member States and 
33% internationally.34 Only three Member States—Greece, the UK and Malta—make more 
external than intra-EU exports. A link between a state’s prosperity and its number of submissions 
would be expected whether this is direct—the state can afford to participate often—or whether 
more import and export transactions lead to a more frequent need for dispute resolution. As with 
GDP, the correlation is good for the group of Member States that have medium-to-high levels of 
intra-EU trade and poor for the mostly smaller and less wealthy nations with lower levels of intra-
EU trade. For this group, their length of membership seems to be more relevant (Figure 14).  
It is also notable that of the three Member States that make more external than intra-EU imports, 
Greece and the UK both make more, not fewer, observations than the graph would predict. 
                                                   
33 Trade figures from Eurostat < https://ec.europa.eu/eurostat/databrowser/view/tet00047/default/table?lang=en> 
accessed 31 July 2020. 
34 Eurostat chart <http://ec.europa.eu/eurostat/statistics-
explained/index.php/File:Intra_EU_exports_compared_with_Extra_EU_exports_by_Member_State,_2013_(%2



















































Aggregate imports & exports, bn Euros
Observations by state, cases 1/5/2004 to 31/12/2013
 
Figure 14 Observations by average intra-EU trade 2005-2013 (lower 15 countries by aggregate intra-EU trade) 
Analysis 
Broadly, the larger and more prosperous a state is, the more likely it is to dedicate the necessary 
resources to submit legal arguments to the Court. Wealth is, therefore, expected to be a 
confounding factor when other influences are being examined. This can largely be taken into 
account by picking out pairs of countries with similar GDPs; this can only be ‘largely’ because 
there is no entirely satisfactory measure of wealth. Two states with the same nominal GDP may 
have different financial resources because of, among other things, their types of welfare provision 
and their levels of national debt. Nevertheless, just as Portugal was compared with Czechia 
above, Poland may usefully be compared with Belgium and Sweden. The three Member States 
have similar GDPs, but while Belgium and Sweden have similar participation rates to each other, 
Poland has made more than twice as many submissions to the Court in the period since it joined 
the EU. It is, of course, a great deal larger, but it also seems to have hit the ground running in 
terms of its participation, submitting observations in 16 cases in its first eight months35 of 
membership and an average of 34 per year since; indeed, Poland has provided observations at the 
highest rate of all Member States (see Figure 10). This is not merely down to the number of cases 
referred by Polish courts, although they have been quite active, referring 58 cases in the period 
                                                   
35 The accession date of the 2004 enlargement was 1st May. 
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from 2004 to 201336. Poland has submitted observations in cases from every Member State 
except Malta, the most being in German cases (68, or 20% of its total). In that respect, Poland 
may be contrasted with Hungary: Hungarian courts have referred somewhat more cases over the 
same period—76 to Poland’s 5837—but the Hungarian government has submitted observations to 
the Court on only 120 occasions, as compared with Poland’s 341. 
Both Poland and Hungary follow the general pattern observed in the introduction to this chapter, 
in that the majority of their interactions with the Court consist of submitting observations—in 
their own cases or those of others—rather than of being parties to direct actions.38 Only three 
Member States have not made observations in more cases than they have referred. One is 
Germany, which, as noted above, has submitted observations in less than half of its plethora of 
cases. Germany has a policy of leaving the task of submitting observations in cases concerning 
the day-to-day operation of competition law and the Single Market to the Commission.39 The 
second is Bulgaria, which up until the end of 2013, had never submitted observations in another 
state’s case (see Figure 15). Bulgaria, despite a constitutional commitment to ‘participate in the 
construction and development of the European Union', has been reluctant to refer to the Court.40 
This has been criticised both by academic writers41 and by the Court itself.42 Bulgarian reluctance 
(or lack of administrative capacity43) seems to extend to government involvement in EU law in 
                                                   
36 47 of which ended in a judgment and 11 in an order of the Court. 
37 55 of which ended in a judgment and 21 in an order of the Court. 
38 Infringement actions under Article 258, brought by the Commission; extremely rarely, actions under Article 
259 brought by another Member State. Between 2007 and 2013, Hungary was a party in 12 infringement actions 
and Poland—in recent years the worst-offending Member State—in 59 (Court of Justice of the European Union, 
‘Annual Report 2014’ (2015); Court of Justice of the European Union, ‘Annual Report 2007’ (2008)). 
39 M Seidel, ‘Experiences of the Government of the Federal Republic of Germany with Article 177 References’ 
in Henry G Schermers and others (eds), Article 177: Experiences and Problems - Asser Institute Colloquium on 
European Law (The Hague, TMC Asser Instituut 1987) 243. 
40 Article 4(3) of the Constitution of the Republic of Bulgaria <http://www.parliament.bg/en/const> accessed 31 
July 2020. 
41 With respect to its Constitutional Court: Mihail Vatsov, ‘European Integration Through Preliminary Rulings? 
The Case of the Bulgarian Constitutional Court’ (2015) 16 German Law Journal 1591; cf Emiliya Drumeva, 
‘Prejudicial Inquiries from the Bulgarian Constitutional Court’, Constitutional Justice Journal: International 
Conference ‘Classical and Modern Trends in the Development of the Constitutional Review’ dedicated to 20th 
anniversary of the Constitutional Court of the Republic of Bulgaria (2011). 
42 Case C-681/13 Diageo Brands EU:C:2015:471 para 27. 
43 Carl Dahlström and others, ‘The QoG Expert Survey Dataset II’ 
<http://qog.pol.gu.se/data/datadownloads/qogexpertsurveydata> accessed 31 July 2020; Aneta Spendzharova 
and Esther Versluis, ‘Issue Salience in the European Policy Process: What Impact on Transposition?’ [2013] 
Journal of European Public Policy 1, 10. 
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general44 and to its having low ‘network capital’ in the legislative process.45 The third Member 














































































































































































Own cases Other cases
 
Figure 15 Member States ranked by observations per year of membership; own and other states' cases 
Sources of national variation: non-economic factors influencing EU 
litigation 
The difficulty of measuring non-economic factors 
Unfortunately, many resources are less readily quantifiable than wealth, a difficulty exacerbated 
by the fact that economic and non-economic factors are not entirely separable. The vital resource 
of administrative capacity is particularly tricky: what, for instance, might be taken as a unit of 
administrative capacity? The observation that Luxembourg has only a single civil servant with 
responsibility for EU litigation might suggest ‘size of EU litigation department’ as a measure of 
administrative capacity, but it also points to the difficulty of separating factors over which a state 
has little short-term control, such as wealth, from those which reflect choices—in this case, a 
                                                   
44 Although the Bulgarian National Assembly has issued four Reasoned Opinions on subsidiarity and 
proportionality to date. 
45 Daniel Naurin and Rutger Lindahl, ‘Out in the Cold? Flexible Integration and the Political Status of Euro Opt-
Outs’ (2010) 11 European Union Politics 485 Fig 2. 
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conscious decision by Luxembourg to devote only a small proportion of its administrative 
capacity to EU law.46 
In order to discuss non-monetary factors affecting Member States’ relationships with the Court of 
Justice, it is first helpful to discuss how these factors may be tackled. An immediate question 
concerns a difference of approach that goes to the heart of academic debate about the Court of 
Justice: as was pointed out in the Introduction, this field is multidisciplinary, involving political 
scientists and scholars of international relations, economists, historians and lawyers. There is 
accordingly no agreement about the appropriate methodology to be applied to the study of EU 
integration in general or the Court of Justice in particular. Notably, a substantial proportion of 
those putting forward explanations for Member States’ involvement in proceedings at the Court 
of Justice have been political scientists rather than black-letter lawyers. This has led to an 
emphasis on empirical research—some argue, at the expense of an appreciation of the legal logic 
of individual cases.47 That point will be returned to later. 
In the context of the empirical approach of this thesis, however, the point to note is that the 
empirical research falls into two distinct clusters, the political-science backgrounds of many 
scholars inclining them towards quantitative, statistical methods,48 while others have taken a 
qualitative and descriptive approach.49 These methodologies will be introduced briefly here to set 
the stage for a review of the factors that influence the likelihood of a Member State submitting 
observations to the Court of Justice. 
The first, and better known, group of theories are those that centre on statistical analyses of the 
content of observations and is primarily aimed at proving—or disproving—the assertion that 
                                                   
46 Granger (n 22) 10. 
47 Kenneth A Armstrong, ‘Legal Integration: Theorizing the Legal Dimension of European Integration’ (1998) 
36 JCMS 155; Lisa Conant, ‘Review Article: The Politics of Legal Integration’ (2007) 45 JCMS 45, 46; 
Anthony Arnull, ‘The Americanization of EU Law Scholarship’ in Anthony Arnull, Piet Eeckhout and Takis 
Tridimas (eds), Continuity and Change in EU Law: Essays in Honour of Sir Francis Jacobs (OUP 2008) 425. 
48 E.g. Stone Sweet and Brunell (n 31), Clifford J Carrubba, Matthew Gabel and Charles Hankla, ‘Judicial 
Behavior under Political Constraints: Evidence from the European Court of Justice’ (2008) 102 American 
Political Science Review 435; Daniel Naurin and others, ‘Coding Observations of the Member States and 
Judgments of the Court of Justice of the EU under the Preliminary Reference Procedure 1997-2008' University 
of Gothenburg Centre for European Research Working Paper Series (2013) 2013:1. 
49 Rebecca Adler-Nissen, ‘The Diplomacy of Opting-out: A Bourdieudian Approach to National Integration 
Strategies’ (2008) 46 Journal of Common Market Studies 663; Marie-Pierre Granger, ‘When Governments Go 
to Luxembourg... the Influence of Governments on the Court of Justice’ (2004) 29 European Law Review 1; 
Floris van Stralen, ‘The Member States and the Court of Justice: Why Do Member States Participate in 
Preliminary Reference Proceedings?’ (MA thesis, University of Gothenburg 2015). 
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Member States submit observations to constrain the Court’s decision-making. The most noted 
exponents of the former are the intergovernmentalists Garrett, Kelemen and Schulz, and 
Carrubba, Hankla and Gabel.50 Meanwhile, the most prominent advocates of the latter are the 
neofunctionalists Stone Sweet and Brunell.51 Both factions used an earlier version of the same 
database analysed here, but in support of opposing theories. It could be argued that the work of 
these scholars seeks to find a single uniting principle behind member-state governments’ 
behaviour rather than to gain any enlightenment from their differences. Other quantitative studies 
of Member States’ interactions with the Court include those of Golub,52 Cichowski,53 Kilroy,54 
Kelemen,55 Nyikos,56 and Alter;57 these contributions were reviewed by Conant in 2007.58 De la 
Mare and Donnelly’s 2011 contribution to Craig and de Búrca’s The Evolution of EU Law is a 
rare legalist contribution to empirical research.59  
Recent quantitative work by the Centre for European Research at the University of Gothenburg 
(CERGU), based on a detailed analysis of the content of Member States’ submissions, might be 
argued to bridge the gap between the political-science approach and legal analysis. However, it 
                                                   
50 Geoffrey Garrett, R Daniel Kelemen and Heiner Schulz, ‘The European Court of Justice, National 
Governments, and Legal Integration in the European Union’ (1998) 52 International Organization 149; 
Carrubba, Gabel and Hankla (n 49); Clifford J Carrubba, Matthew Gabel and Charles Hankla, ‘Understanding 
the Role of the European Court of Justice in European Integration’ (2012) 106 APS Rev 214. 
51 Alec Stone Sweet and Thomas L Brunell, ‘How the Legal System of the European Union Works - and Does 
Not Work: Response to Carrubba, Gabel, and Hankla Alec’ [2010] The Selected Works of Alec Stone Sweet 1 
<http://works.bepress.com/alec_stone_sweet/36> accessed 31 July 2020; Alec Stone Sweet and Thomas L 
Brunell, ‘The European Court of Justice, State Noncompliance, and the Politics of Override’ (2012) 106 APS 
Rev 204. 
52
 Jonathan Golub, ‘The Politics of Judicial Discretion: Rethinking Interactions between National Courts and the 
European Court of Justice’ (1996) 19 West European Politics 360. 
53 Rachel A Cichowski, ‘Integrating the Environment: The European Court and the Construction of 
Supranational Policy’ (1998) 5 Journal of European Public Policy 387. 
54 Bernadette Ann Kilroy, ‘Integration through the Law: ECJ and Governments in the EU’ (PhD Thesis, UCLA 
1999).  
55 R Daniel Kelemen, ‘The Limits of Judicial Power: Trade-Environment Disputes in the GATT/WTO and the 
EU’ (2001) 34 Comparative Political Studies 622. 
56 Stacy A Nyikos, ‘Strategic Interaction among Courts within the Preliminary Reference Process – Stage 1: 
National Court Preemptive Opinions’ (2006) 45 European Journal of Political Research 527. 
57 Karen J Alter and Laurence R Helfer, ‘Nature or Nurture? Judicial Lawmaking in the European Court of 
Justice and the Andean Tribunal of Justice’ (2010) 64 International Organization 563. 
58 Conant (n 48).  
59 Thomas de la Mare and Catherine Donnelly, ‘Preliminary Rulings and EU Legal Integration: Evolution and 
Stasis’ in Paul Craig and Gráinne de Búrca (eds), The Evolution of EU Law (2nd edn, OUP 2011). 
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confines itself to analysing the content of submissions in terms of ‘more Europe’ or ‘less 
Europe’.60 CERGU’s results will be discussed in more detail later. 
There is, however, a small cluster of studies reflecting a largely qualitative empirical approach. 
Chief among these is the work of Granger, quoted above, who has studied governments’ 
participation strategies via questionnaires and interviews with Member States’ legal agents. 
Another useful study is that of van Stralen at CERGU. Van Stralen makes a comparison of the 
litigation strategies of the governments of the Netherlands and Sweden, drawing in particular on 
the questionnaire filled in by Dutch government ministries when they decide whether to submit 
observations (see Appendix C).61 These studies will be discussed later, but one point implied in 
Granger’s methodology, and emphasised by van Stralen, might usefully be made here. Their 
enquiries have two, albeit overlapping, aspects: why do governments decide to devote resources 
to submitting observations to the Court of Justice (at all), and how do civil servants within those 
governments decide whether to submit observations to the Court of Justice (in a given case)? 
Granger mainly attempts to answer the ‘why’ question. She makes a detailed analysis of the 
observations submitted by ten states between 1995 to 1999, noting that there were wide variations 
in the extent of their participation and offering persuasive reasons for the differences.62 Granger’s 
findings suggest that a Member State’s degree of involvement with the Court reflects its 
government’s attitude towards the EU—a complex phenomenon that again defies statistical 
analysis. She does, however, attempt to break it down, noting that governments vary in their 
motivations, strategies, policies and resources—financial and otherwise. These will be considered 
in sequence, bringing in other scholars’ findings where appropriate. 
Member States’ motives in submitting observations to the Court 
Granger suggests that there are three main types of motivation: the defence of national financial 
or strategic interests, the promotion of the government’s view of Europe and the altruistic 
clarification of EU law. She discusses these motivations in terms of groups of states that 
emphasise these to different extents, arguing for instance that the UK exhibited all three, seeking 
                                                   
60 Naurin and others (n 49); Olof Larsson and others, ‘Speaking Law to Power: The Strategic Use of Precedent 
of the Court of Justice of the European Union’ (2016) 50 Comparative Political Studies 879; Per Cramér and 
others, See You in Luxembourg? EU Governments´ Observations Under the Preliminary Reference Procedure 
(Swedish Institute of European Policy Studies 2016). 
61 Stralen (n 50). 
62 Marie-Pierre F Granger, ‘When governments go to Luxembourg…the influence of governments on the Court 
of Justice’ (2004) 29 ELR 1. 
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to promote a particular view of EU law both to defend national interests and to promote the 
government’s view of how EU law should develop, but also out of an impulse to expound the 
law.63 Because the bulk of Granger’s qualitative survey was undertaken before the 2004 
enlargement, not all of the Member States picked out for comparison above (Portugal vs Czechia, 
Poland vs Belgium and Sweden) are considered in her analysis. To summarise Granger’s detailed 
exposition, she regards Portugal as being a state that makes submissions with the motive of 
promoting a particular view of EU law as well as that of defending its national legislation.64 
Granger’s Belgian sources suggested that Belgium’s prime motivation was the ‘defence of 
national interests’.65 Her Swedish respondents indicated that Sweden’s policy was broader: the 
defence of ‘national or Community’ interest[s] … such as free trade, safe environment or 
transparency, or to explain the national law or system to the Court.’66 Despite these different self-
perceptions, the three states have similar rates of participation in the Court (Figure 15). 
Within the scope of her survey, Granger did not have the opportunity for an in-depth discussion 
of the national characteristics and histories—the national identities—that form the background to 
Member States’ motivations. Schmidt, in a more general discussion of states’ attitudes to 
integration, says that‘[n]ational identities, in the sense of national frames based on history, 
culture, and interests ... have a significant impact on how member states construct their identities 
in the EU’. She identifies four discourses about the EU—as a free market, a values-based 
community, a rights-based union, and a strategic global actor—which form the basis of the 
various states’ attitudes to integration.67 Schmidt focuses on Germany, France and the UK, 
describing the UK’s approach as having been pragmatic, in that it evaluated the EU very much in 
terms of its promotion of free trade and security, and contrasts this with France’s more 
ideological view of European integration. Germany, she argues, is—under Chancellor Merkel—
in the process of moving from a normative view of the EU to a more pragmatic one based on 
national interest. 
                                                   
63 Granger, ‘Governments in Luxembourg: How Do Governments Use EU Litigation to Protect National 
Policies or Influence EU Policy and Law-Making’ (n 23) 12. 
64 Marie-Pierre F Granger, ‘The Influence of Member States’ Governments on Community Case Law: A 
Structurationist Perspective on the Influence of EU Governments in and on the Decision-Making Process of the 
European Court of Justice’ (University of Exeter 2001) paras 2.1.1.8 and 2.1.2.1, fn 83. 
65 Granger (n 64) para 2.1.1.4. 
66 Granger (n 64) para 2.1.1.10 (emphasis added). 
67 Vivien A Schmidt, ‘European Member State Elites’ Diverging Visions of the European Union : Diverging 




It is possible to argue that, if states regarded their relationship with the EU solely in pragmatic 
terms, they would only be motivated to make observations with the intention of maintaining or 
improving their economic position. Alternatively, they might submit observations in cases that 
had no direct economic impact in an attempt to limit the EU’s influence in those substantive areas 
of law and preserve their sovereignty; in the words of Larsson et al., to argue for ‘less Europe’.68 
National sovereignty seems a less-than-pragmatic consideration, but (and this is an area where 
motivation is hard to separate from strategy) it could be argued that the preservation of 
sovereignty might be perceived as the preservation also of a Member State’s long-term economic 
autonomy. Economically motivated legal arguments may, however, clash with those for the 
protection of national sovereignty.69 Where motivations clash, a decision as to whether and how 
to intervene may be a strategic one, as will be seen in the next section. 
Accepting for the moment Schmidt’s opinion that the UK took a solely pragmatic view of its EU 
membership, its pattern of participation in the Court did not invariably seem to support either of 
these arguments. The UK’s position on participation will be discussed in detail later, but the 
government’s position, evidenced by Granger and reiterated in interviews undertaken in the 
course of this research, was that it was occasionally motivated by nothing more than a desire to 
clarify the law, with no apparent economic benefit.70  
More generally, the overall pattern of intervention by the Member States in preliminary 
references—particularly in other states’ cases—does not support the view that most states only 
submit observations if there is an economic benefit to doing so, although that may be the position 
of a minority. While there is a correlation between the level of intra-EU trade of a Member State 
and its number of submissions (Figure 13), it is difficult to distinguish between a state’s greater 
financial ability to invest in influencing EU law in general from its having a financial stake in the 
outcomes of a higher proportion of the Court’s cases. 
It is helpful at this point to reiterate the distinction made above between a Member State’s 
political decision to invest money and administrative capacity in making observations beyond the 
necessary minimum of cases referred by a national court—which may be motivated by an 
expectation of shorter- or longer-term economic advantage—and the decisions made by, usually, 
legally trained civil servants about whether to submit observations in a given case. 
                                                   
68 Naurin and others (n 49) 16; Larsson and others (n 61). 
69 See the Nouvelles Frontières case, Case C-209/84 Asjes EU:C:1986:188. 
70 Granger, ‘Governments in Luxembourg: How Do Governments Use EU Litigation to Protect National 
Policies or Influence EU Policy and Law-Making’ (n 23) 8.  
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The question, and perception, of Member States’ motivations in submitting observations to the 
Court is not purely a matter of theoretical classification. In a talk given in 2014, Judge Arabadjiev 
(who shares Granger’s threefold grouping of Member States’ motives into the narrow defence of 
national interests, the promotion of national visions of ‘what Europe is and where Europe should 
be heading’ and acting as amicus curiae) said: 
It is obviously not for the Court to examine what motivated a Member State to 
intervene in a given case. Nevertheless, the perceived motivation of a Member State 
to intervene may play a role in the way its observations are likely to have an impact 
upon the Court … [I]n some cases—rare cases, I admit—Member States seek neither 
to defend a given national measure, nor to promote a particular national vision of 
Europe, but rather to help the Court and to act as its ‘neutral’, ‘unbiased’ advisors. 
This type of observations is particularly well regarded by the Court since they tend to 
bring into the debate purely legal arguments untainted by national interests.71  
It is important to note that Arabadjiev is referring to the Court’s perception of a Member State’s 
motivations in the particular case, rather than of the political background to a Member State’s 
participation in general.72 
As examples of cases in which the UK government’s observations were ‘guided precisely by the 
idea that preliminary references offer an excellent opportunity for influencing the development of 
EU law and the way Europe is being constructed’, Arabadjiev gives the cases of O, and S and 
G.73 These cases originated in the Netherlands and concerned the much-litigated question of the 
citizenship rights of third-country nationals who are partners of EU citizens—in this case, 
whether movement between Member States for holidays was sufficient to cause Treaty provisions 
on EU citizenship to kick in. Judge Arabadjiev acknowledges that the UK government’s long-
term vision on this point was for a conservative reading of citizenship questions—not least 
because these cases formed part of a series that includes the UK cases of Carpenter and 
McCarthy.74 
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Arabadjiev finally mentions a case in which he believes the UK government’s legal arguments 
were purely neutral: Melloni, a Spanish case which concerned the, again much-litigated, question 
of whether a Member State could apply the standard of protection of fundamental rights 
guaranteed by its constitution when that standard was higher than that deriving from the EU 
Charter.75 The UK argued in this case for the primacy of EU law. Sadly neither the Opinion nor 
the Court’s judgment detailed the content of any of the nine contributions by member-state 
governments except insofar as they touch on admissibility. 
Carnelutti also offers an example of neutral, or altruistic, observations in Levin,76 in which both 
France and Italy set aside what appeared to be their national interests in favour of an expansive 
interpretation of free movement provisions.77  
These cases illustrate the point that a Member State’s motivation is not something that lends itself 
easily to quantitative investigation. The exercise of statistical analysis necessarily favours factors 
that are easy to measure and operationalise over those that are empirically testable only in a 
qualitative sense. Thus, considerations that a legal scholar would consider to be material may be 
disregarded, not because they are not theoretically informed, but because they are not susceptible 
to being quantified. Thus while the overall figures on Member States’ participation in Court 
proceedings are relevant when considering their motives at a political level, an assessment of 
their day-to-day influence on the Court requires consideration of their purposes for making 
observations in individual cases. It is unfortunate that the specific content of states’ legal 
arguments is difficult or impossible to obtain, but this may not always be necessary to be able to 
assess their motives. This will be returned to when looking at some individual Member States. 
Strategic considerations governing the frequency of Member States’ submissions to the 
Court 
The Repeat Player strategy 
As regards strategy, Granger observes that those governments that make use of the opportunity to 
influence EU law provided by participation in the preliminary reference process seek to gain the 
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strategic advantages of being ‘repeat players’.78 The concept of repeat players—parties that use 
their greater experience of a legal process to obtain more favourable outcomes—was introduced 
in reference to courts in a 1974 paper by Galanter and can refer to any experienced litigants, from 
individuals to governments.79 In the context of the Court of Justice, the repeat player concept 
seems first to have been applied to the Court of Justice by Mattli and Slaughter in 1996, 
concerning litigants displaying tactical behaviour. However, a government’s decision to position 
itself as to be able to do this may be argued to be a long-term strategic decision.80 De la Mare and 
Donnelly also observe that member-state governments may become repeat players by raising 
issues before national courts with the active intention of their giving rise to preliminary 
references.81 By contrast, Lasser appears to imply that governments may achieve the status of 
repeat players not as a consequence of national strategy but because of their political clout, 
somewhat controversially describing repeat players as litigants ‘whose very importance offers a 
certain practical assurance of the Court’s interpretive good behaviour.’82 
The UK is widely recognised to have been a repeat player; Granger notes that it was the second 
most frequent submitter of observations in the late 1990s (after France) and third (after the 
Netherlands and Germany) in the early 2000s. In the period after that covered in Granger’s 
paper—and after the accession of Bulgaria and Romania—the UK remained the third most 
frequent participant with 315 submissions, after Germany (448) and Italy (381) (Table 2). 
Another state has joined the repeat players: Poland, now lying fifth with 282 but submitting 
observations at the highest rate of all. Czechia might also be considered a repeat player, with 226 
interventions. Even Member States that submit relatively fewer observations, such as Denmark 
and Ireland (in thirteenth and sixteenth positions in recent years), may nonetheless be displaying 
the repeat player strategy by steadily intervening in other states’ cases. 
                                                   
78 Granger, ‘When Governments Go to Luxembourg... the Influence of Governments on the Court of Justice’ (n 
50) 3. 
79 Marc Galanter, ‘Why the “ Haves” Come out Ahead : Speculations on the Limits of Legal Change’ (1974) 9 
Law & Society Review 165. 
80 Walter Mattli and Anne-Marie Slaughter, ‘Constructing the European Community Legal System from the 
Ground up: The Role of Individual Litigants and National Courts’ (1996) NYU Jean Monnet Working Papers 
6/96. 
81 Thomas de la Mare and Catherine Donnelly, ‘Preliminary Rulings and EU Legal Integration: Evolution and 
Stasis’ in Paul Craig and Gráinne de Búrca (eds), The Evolution of EU Law (2nd edn, OUP 2011), 384. 
82 Mitchel de S O-l’E Lasser, On Judicial Transparency, Control, and Accountability: A Comparative Analysis 
of Judicial Transparency and Legitimacy (OUP 2009) 319. 
85 
 
Some Member States have neither the experience of the Court nor the political weight to be 
described as repeat players. Some individual litigants, on the other hand, might be so described: 
companies within the animal feed group Denkavit, for example, have been parties in 24 cases that 
were referred for preliminary rulings between 1977 and 2009, demonstrating more experience of 
the Court than three of the Member States. They may be contrasted with interest groups, who 
seem to have seized the opportunity to challenge national public policies less than some models 
of European integration have expected.83 
An alternative view of Member States’ strategic considerations is that of Greer and Iniesta. They 
regard states as pursuing a strategy of risk management, in which they keep a watching brief on 
preliminary references and direct actions in order to identify domestic legislation that would be 
indefensible while being prepared to submit legal arguments to the Court if they think there is a 
chance of a decision that would save the national provision—and at the same time avoiding 
drawing attention to legislation that might provoke action from the Commission.84 The points that 
need to be considered in pursuance of such a strategy are laid out explicitly in the 
interdepartmental checklist used by the government of the Netherlands to determine whether 
making an observation is desirable (Appendix C). It can be seen that the required analysis 
includes whether not just current, but anticipated, legislation would be affected by an upcoming 
case, whether the matter is politically sensitive, whether the Court’s decision could limit 
departmental discretion, whether there are financial implications for the Netherlands and whether 
any of these considerations clash. 
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Total submissions in preliminary reference cases 
2007-2013 
Germany 448 Finland 103 
Italy 381 Ireland 100 
UK 315 Sweden 89 
Netherlands 311 Estonia 63 
Poland 282 Latvia 45 
Greece 263 Lithuania 43 
France 261 Bulgaria 38 
Austria 236 Slovakia 36 
Belgium 227 Romania 32 
Czech Republic 226 Cyprus 24 
Spain 205 Luxembourg 14 
Portugal 168 Slovenia 10 
Denmark 118 Malta 8 
Hungary 105     
 
Overall strategy towards EU legislation 
Granger also observes that, as governments have come to have less control over the EU 
legislative process, the Court has become ‘an increasingly attractive alternative forum to bear 
influence on law-making in the EU’ and thus appearances before the Court may become part of 
Member States’ overall legislative strategy.85 Member States’ view of court proceedings as one of 
the many aspects of EU decision-making that they might seek to control will be discussed in 
Chapter 7. 
In summary, one explanation for the frequency with which some Member States make 
submissions in cases before the Court is that they are deliberately pursuing a strategy of 
positioning themselves as experienced litigants and partners of the Court. This improves their 
success-rate in litigation and as part of a multilevel approach to influencing EU legislation. 
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Policy considerations governing the frequency of Member States’ submissions to the 
Court 
The issue of the effect that member-state governments’ policies may have on their interactions 
with the Court of Justice is obviously too extensive for the scope of this thesis. What can be done 
here is to mention some aspects of government policy that have been argued to influence states’ 
participation. In this context, it is hard to separate government behaviour that is the result of a 
government’s policy towards the EU from behaviour that is the consequence of its constitutional 
arrangements and variety of capitalism. It should also be emphasised that the structures and 
procedures with which states manage their relationships with the EU are still, to some extent, 
subject to political change. 
Governments’ participation policies have varied over time and are dependent on the policy areas 
under consideration by the Court. Participation rates can be regarded as a measure of the salience 
of each policy area to the particular Member State. It is possible to look at the relative 
participation rates of Member States in two ways. Firstly, the total number of submissions to the 
Court made by each Member State over the life of the EU could be regarded as a measure of the 
cumulative influence each state has had over a substantive area of EU law. To the extent that it 
measures the amount of influence a country has tried to have, it is an approximate indication of 
the political and economic importance of each subject to the Member State. Secondly—and a 
better measure of the salience of each subject area to Member States—is the number of 
submissions per year of membership made by each state: its submission rate. In cases on 
agriculture, for example, Italy made both the largest number of submissions over the period from 
1973 to 2013 and the most observations per year of membership. Contrast cases on freedom of 
services and establishment, where the Member State with the highest number of submissions is 
Germany, but the highest submission rate is by Austria. 
Different Member States’ contributions via the submission of observations to the main subject 
areas of EU law—agriculture, the four freedoms, the environment, tax and so-on—were surveyed 
during this research but are not detailed here. However, some trends may be mentioned. 
To deal with submission rates in the most frequent subject areas one at a time, Italy—as noted—
dominated submissions in agriculture cases, followed by Greece, France, the UK, Germany and 
Poland. The UK and France had the highest submission rates in free movement of goods cases, 
followed by Czechia and Italy. Cases on the freedom of services and establishment saw the 
highest levels of participation from Austria, followed by Czechia and Poland; it is probably 
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significant that the most active participants were newer Member States that might wish to expand 
their services sectors into other states. Austria was also the most frequent participator in freedom 
of movement of workers cases, followed by the UK and Germany. Poland had the highest 
submission rate in competition cases, followed by France and Italy. The UK dominated cases on 
social policy with over twice the submission rate of the next nearest states, Austria and Germany. 
Austria, the UK and the Netherlands participated most frequently in cases on social security. 
Poland dominated tax cases, followed by the UK and Germany. The biggest contributor in 
environment cases was Austria, then Poland and the UK (surprisingly, the Scandinavian countries 
were only 8th, 9th and 12th). 
These figures conceal fluctuations over the period, but the dominance of older Member States 
suggests that these figures tell only part of the story. It is difficult to believe that agriculture 
policy, for instance, is less critical to Romania (which has the most agricultural holdings in the 
EU) than Italy (with the second most).86 Again, wealth and organisational resources are 
confounding factors: it is possible to say that states’ intervention rates are affected by the 
importance of different policy areas to each state, but not that they are indicative of an issue’s 
relative salience to different Member States. Neither do these figures indicate each issue’s relative 
importance for any given Member State, because they are not corrected for the number of cases in 
which each topic is raised. Member States’ submission rates relative to the number of cases in 
each area will be indicative of their areas of interest and will be considered later for selected 
Member States. 
State intervention policy is also influenced by more complex constitutional and historical factors. 
Granger suggests that the founding Member States’ relatively slow start in taking part in Court 
proceedings can be attributed to their lack of understanding of the Court’s reasoning process, 
itself the consequence of ‘a…still persistent…continental belief in Montesquieu’s myth 
portraying the judge as the “mouth of the law” and therefore incapable of influencing its 
formation’.87 Thus, she argues, the civil law Member States were slow to see case law as 
influencing legal development and initially failed to pursue a policy of intervention. But, while 
this is an attractive explanation of the late start in general, matters are not that simple at the level 
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of individual Member States. There was more variation in participation rates among the civil law 
countries—say between Germany and France in the period before the first enlargement—than 
between France and the UK in the period from 1973 to 1975 and even more between the UK and 
Ireland in the same period. 
Lasser observes that the French legal system was unfamiliar with the degree of public 
argumentation displayed by the Court of Justice.88 It might be argued that this made France 
particularly slow to take advantage of the opportunity to influence the Court’s decision-making. 
Although the concise style of early Court decisions was very French, the court procedure was not, 
and the chance that it offered for non-parties to intervene was far from French tradition.89 Thus 
the French government was slow to form a policy of intervening. 
An aspect of government policy that affects states’ interaction with the Court is the extent to 
which government departments are primed to listen to the Court: the extent to which they ‘pay 
attention, lobby and comply’.90 It will be seen that the UK, in particular, recognised the 
importance of paying attention to cases coming before the Court and their policy implications. 
Greer and Iniesta note that those bureaucracies which have a policy of keeping a listening watch 
on the Court are not just better placed to argue their positions before the Court in ongoing cases 
but also to adjust their domestic practices to avoid litigation in the future.91 
Another possible source of differences between the civil law countries might be found in their 
constitutional traditions as regards the law. Wind notes that national policy towards participation 
in EU legal proceedings is affected by states’ receptivity to supranational rules and institutions in 
general, and hence by each state’s form of democracy.92 Although there may be a common origin 
to the legal traditions of the civil-law Member States, there is no one pattern of implementation. 
Instead, comparative law recognises three traditions within the civil law Member States of the 
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EU—French, German and Scandinavian civil law—and this distinction looks to be an intriguing 
possible source of variation.93  
Scandinavian constitutional tradition—majoritarian and suspicious of judicial review—offers a 
useful hypothesis as to why the Scandinavian countries are faithful implementers of EU law but 
have a low frequency of intervention. Denmark, in particular, is said to have a policy of 
submitting intended preliminary references to executive scrutiny.94 Wind concentrates on the 
states she classifies as majoritarian democracies, noting that judicial review of primary legislation 
is almost unheard of in Denmark and Sweden, was illegal in Finland until 2000 and is still 
domestically unavailable in the UK. She argues that policy considerations and constitutional 
traditions have kept this as the status quo in Scandinavian countries, while in the UK, the 
preliminary reference procedure empowered the courts in the face of parliamentary sovereignty.95 
Wind’s detailed analysis centres on referral rates rather than the submission of observations, so 
she does not question how it is that the UK developed a policy of frequent intervention despite 
this constitutional tradition. 
Several authors’ reflections on differentiated European integration may also point to the effect of 
constitutional tradition on Member States’ policy towards EU law and the Court. Schimmelfennig 
and Winzer, for instance, analyse European integration in terms of actual differences in the legal 
rules applied to states, such as the UK and Irish opt-outs on the Schengen zone and the AFSJ. 
They regard such ‘constitutional differentiation’ as mirroring real distinctions in states’ attitudes 
to European integration, which they attribute to different concerns about national sovereignty and 
identity. Jachtenfuchs and Kraft-Kasack stress the importance of the ‘federal balance’ between 
different levels of government—in this case between the Member States and the EU—arguing 
that each state establishes a pattern of shared decision-making between the levels.96 This pattern, 
which includes the interaction between member-state ministries and the Court of Justice, can be 
argued to be an aspect of both a state’s constitutional arrangements and its government policy. 
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Jachtenfuchs and Kraft-Kasack’s paper uses another concept, first applied to EU law by Weiler:  
that of Exit and Voice.97 Voice is represented by a Member State’s expression of its policies to 
the EU, including via the Court. What balance a Member State may choose to maintain between 
Exit and Voice is very much a matter of policy, both of longer-term national policy that stems 
from a country’s history and constitution, and of the policy preferences of the government in 
power at any one time. The expression of national policy need not be described in these terms; as 
has been noted, academics working in Europeanisation theory do not necessarily use Weiler’s 
model, instead referring to the uploading of domestic policies to the EU and the downloading of 
EU policy to the Member States.98 
Sources of variation – resources 
States’ levels of participation demonstrate the policy preoccupations of the Member States and 
indicate the extent to which they might influence the legal evolution of the Court’s jurisprudence. 
All things being equal, the variations would depend entirely upon motivation, strategy and the 
importance that each state ascribes to different policy areas. The matter of resources, however, 
cannot be neglected: in summary, wealthier and larger countries interact more with the Court, but 
the relationship is not strong for the smaller and poorer states. The variation among this group can 
be attributed to a relative scarcity of the organisational, procedural and judicial resources needed 
for full participation in Court proceedings. 
Granger discusses national variations in these less tangible assets in some detail, concluding that 
these factors are critical but difficult to assess. She divides such assets, which she describes as 
‘governments' unequal endowment’ into three not-entirely-distinct categories: human resources, 
organisational features and procedural resources.99 The human resources available to a member-
state government include not just lawyers and civil servants, but their training and experience. 
Training, in particular, differs both within and between groups of Member States of varying 
length of membership. Many senior lawyers and civil servants of the Eastern European members 
of the 2004 enlargement were trained under Soviet judicial regimes, which themselves were far 
from uniform. The degree to which this affected current attitudes towards the EU legal system 
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and supranational review would be an interesting subject for research. Meanwhile, their younger 
colleagues entered the law at a time of transition, some having been trained in other Member 
States or via schemes such as the British Law Centre in Warsaw.100 This again contributes a 
degree of unevenness in training. 
Several authors note wide variations in the judiciaries of the Member States101 and the amount of 
money devoted to national judicial systems.102 These differences affect both courts’ readiness to 
refer cases to the Court of Justice and a Member State’s ability to react to notifications from the 
Court Registry and assemble appropriate observations.  
This effect can be illustrated by considering the experience of Portugal. Despite joining the EU in 
1986, Portugal was slow to develop a practice of submitting observations in other states’ cases. In 
the decade from 1986 to 1995, it submitted observations in all of its own cases but only in 0.7% 
(1995) to 7.3% (1987) of those originating in other Member States – an average of 3.3% across 
the decade. 1996 was the lowest year, with only one observation submitted in the 157 non-
Portuguese cases (0.6%). Across the following decade, the number of submissions rose slightly to 
an average of 5.6%. From 2007 onwards, there is evidence of a more targeted strategy, with 
fewer observations in Portuguese cases while the percentage of observations in other states’ cases 
rose to a peak of 11.2% in 2011. Judge da Cruz Vilaça explained that he and others, concerned at 
Portugal’s low level of interaction with the Court, had put together a network of EU law 
academics in Portugal who could monitor upcoming cases, inform the government if they felt that 
Portugal could usefully intervene, and draft outline legal arguments to present to the Court.103 
Thus a task usually performed by civil servants has, in the absence of government coordination, 
devolved upon the judiciary and academics. 
Granger’s last category of less tangible resources is that of procedural resources, which she 
describes as pertaining to ‘decision-making on the opportuneness and content of observations.’104 
                                                   
100 E.g. members of the Court of Justice Michal Bobek and Maciej Szpunar; <https://britishlawcentre.co.uk/> 
accessed 31 July 2020. 
101 John Bell, Judiciaries within Europe: A Comparative Review (CUP 2006); Maartje de Visser and Monica 
Claes, ‘Courts United? On European Judicial Networks’ in Antoine Vauchez and Bruno de Witte (eds), 
Lawyering Europe: European Law as a Transnational Social Field (Hart 2013); European Commission, 
‘European Judicial Training’ (2012) 4; European Commission for the Efficiency of Justice (CEPEJ) 292. 
102 European Commission for the Efficiency of Justice (CEPEJ) (n 102). 
103 Conversation with JL da Cruz Vilaça, 5 October 2014. 




This includes the ability of government departments to work together to coordinate their 
responses to upcoming cases. It also relates to low-level policy, insofar as governments have to 
have a plan about what to do if two government departments disagree. Such disagreement may be 
about the implications of a legal provision, in which case it is important for there to be a 
sufficient level of coordination for an expert opinion to be sought and the content of the 
observations finalised within the short time-frame available. More critically, two departments 
may disagree upon their policy goals. In the UK, a central government department would attempt 
to negotiate a solution.105 If the ministries’ differences were irreconcilable, the UK did not submit 
observations in the case.106 In Germany, however, although there is a single department with 
overall responsibility for coordinating the government’s response to preliminary references,107 the 
current procedure is that if ministries disagree, there will automatically be no brief submitted by 
the government.108 Historically, this was not always the case; Davies notes that in Van Gend there 
was both furious disagreement between the German ministries, and between the junior officials 
who wrote Germany’s submission and their political seniors who favoured the principle of direct 
effect.109 Granger notes that in some Member States, cabinet approval is required before 
observations are submitted, either where there is such a disagreement between departments 
(Sweden, the Netherlands and France) or invariably (Denmark and Luxembourg).110 In the latter 
case, having to seek such approval (or appeal to the cabinet as a referee) must make meeting the 
deadline for written observations very challenging. 
There is not just potential for disagreement between government departments about the 
appropriate content for observations, but between different levels of government within federal or 
devolved systems. Granger observes that the use of a cabinet-level decision as a tie-breaker in 
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disputes could not operate in federal systems such as Germany and Belgium. The situation was 
different in the devolved structure of the UK. A devolved administration could only participate 
directly in proceedings before the Court if it was a party to the case from which the referral 
stemmed. If a devolved administration wished to comment in a preliminary reference, it had to 
persuade the EU Litigation Unit of the need for the UK government to take the case.111 This had 
the advantage of using the central government’s greater expertise but could be unhelpful if a 
situation arose in which the devolved administration and the UK government were in 
disagreement. 
The detailed consideration of whether to submit observations, and what to include, may be less or 
more formalised. The comprehensive checklist used in the Netherlands is both illuminating and 
evidence of perhaps the most formal procedure. In other Member States, the system may differ 
from ministry to ministry, as van Stralen finds to be the situation in Sweden.112 This appears to 
have been the case in the UK, which Bulmer and Burch identify as a weakness.113 Some 
departments may, however, have robust procedures for identifying cases of importance and may 
harness the power of non-governmental sources. In the UK, for instance, the Intellectual Property 
Office identified upcoming cases on IP matters and solicited comments and suggestions from the 
members of a mailing list consisting of practitioners and academics.114 This was a useful 
supplementary procedure, as opposed to Portugal’s use of a network of academics in default of 
action by government departments. 
Conclusion 
This chapter has examined the wide variation in Member States’ use of their opportunity to take 
part in proceedings at the Court of Justice. Authors have offered several explanations, but it could 
be argued that the causes could only fully be characterised with respect to each Member State 
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individually, contingent as they are on unique politico-economic, constitutional, historical and 
contextual factors. Nevertheless, some patterns can be observed. Economic factors are of 
importance in determining what resources a Member State can deploy to defend its national 
interests and influence EU law via the Court of Justice. However, governments with similar 
levels of wealth may differ in their policies towards the EU, in their strategies for influencing EU 
law and in their organisational and procedural resources. It is important to recognise that the 
resources, financial or otherwise, that are available to a state for making observations at the Court 
of Justice are not immutable, but to a significant extent a matter of choice based on the degree of 
influence a state seeks to have.  
These factors and choices will be examined with regard to Denmark, Ireland and the UK in 
Chapter 6. Before this, Chapters 4 and 5 will consider the benefits that may accrue not just to a 
Member State but to the Court of Justice from states’ observations. 
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GDP per capita 
index (EU28 = 
100)  2013
Belgium 507                120 Sweden 552 124
France 2,739             108 Cyprus 22 84
Germany 3,593             124 Czech Republic 199 83
Italy 2,068             98 Estonia 24 75
Luxembourg 61                  264 Hungary 131 66
Netherlands 801                132 Latvia 30 62
Denmark 324                126 Lithuania 47 73
Ireland 221                131 Malta 9 86
UK 2,490             108 Poland 514 67
Greece 243                74 Slovakia 97 76
Portugal 219                77 Slovenia 47 80
Spain 1,356             91 Bulgaria 54 46
Austria 418                131 Romania 184 54





Chapter 4: Taxonomy and conceptual framework - the benefit of 
observations to the Court 
Introduction 
The previous chapter concentrated on the reasons for national variations in the extent to which the 
Member States invest resources in submitting their observations to the Court of Justice. Before 
those reasons are brought together, it will be useful to look at observations from the point of view 
of the Court: that is, whether and how the Court makes use of Member States’ observations. 
Since the establishment of the Court of Justice of the European Coal and Steel Community, 
the rules of procedure have included a provision for the Member States to provide written 
observations.
1
 The Notes for the Guidance of Counsel issued by the Registry of the Court of 
Justice make it clear that these observations are intended to be functional. 
The purpose of the written observations is to suggest the answers which the Court 
should give to the questions referred to it, and to set out succinctly, but completely, 
the reasoning on which those answers are based. It is important to bring to the 
attention of the Court the factual circumstances of the case before the national court 
and the relevant provisions of the national legislation at issue.2 
The Notes state that the purpose of oral testimony is to clarify issues, allow further 
exploration of points that the Court feels were not adequately covered and to enable the 
Member States to respond to each other’s written observations, even if they did not take part 
in the written procedure. The Notes emphasise that oral arguments acquire a greater 




This matter-of-fact statement of the purposes of observations stands in marked contrast with the 
intentions attributed to them by some schools of thought. It is important to stress that the Court of 
Justice, as Larsson expresses it, ‘routinely carries out the task allocated to it, i.e. the solution of 
                                                   
1 Rules of Procedure of the Court of Justice of the ECSC (1974) Art 103. 
2 Registry of the Court of Justice of the European Communities, Notes for the Guidance of Counsel (Court of 
Justice of the European Communities 2009) s 9. 
3 Registry of the Court of Justice of the European Communities (n 2) 18. 
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legal conflicts that have arisen within the EU, without provoking either conflict with the other 
branches of government, or leaps towards further European integration.’4 In other words, it can be 
argued that the majority of cases do not have broader implications than their immediate subject-
matter, and neither do Member States’ observations in those cases. Most interventions merely 
serve the purpose envisaged since the Court’s inception and not as an opportunity for political 
leverage.5 Member States are expected to explain their national rules and to provide information 
that is useful to the Court—and also to make clear their preferred positions on the questions 
referred. Such procedures put the Member States on an equal footing with the institutions from 
which EU legal provisions emanate; those institutions are allowed to respond to a request for 
clarification or a challenge to EU rules, and the Member States to do the same for their national 
provisions. The fact that the Court may make specific requests for information underlines this. 
The assumption that underlies academic discussion of member-state governments’ motives in 
making observations is that the Court of Justice takes account of Member States’ arguments. This 
assumption encompasses three different situations: first, where the Court makes use of the 
information provided to it in answer to specific questions; second (but closely related), where the 
Court makes use of unsolicited factual and contextual information related to the case, and third, 
where the Court takes account of unsolicited arguments from Member States, whether about 
national or EU law, or matters of jurisdiction and admissibility. 
The first two assumptions seem straightforward. The Court Registry’s Notes for the Guidance of 
Counsel indicate that such contributions are welcomed.6 The Court not infrequently refers in its 
judgments to national governments’ submissions that clarify national law,7 and it can be argued 
that the information provided may be of use to the Court even if it is not explicitly cited—if it 
merely confirms the Court’s understanding, for instance. The position concerning clarifications of 
fact is somewhat more problematic since the Court has indicated that it feels bound to accept the 
facts as they are laid out in the order for reference; as Broberg and Fenger discuss, clarifications 
                                                   
4 Olof Larsson, ‘Minoritarian Activism: Judicial Politics in the European Union’ (PhD Thesis, University of 
Gothenburg 2015) 9. 
5 Indeed, Articles 41 and 41* of the Treaty establishing the European Coal and Steel Community (1951) 
provided for similar intervention, although preliminary references under that Treaty were limited in scope to 
ruling upon the validity of acts of the High Authority and of the Council, with no overt interpretative function. 
6 Registry of the Court of Justice of the European Communities (n 2) s 9. 
7 See e.g. Case 33/88 Allué EU:C:1989:222, para 12; Case C-224/02 Pusa EU:C:2004:273, para 36; Case C-
40/05 Lyyski EU:C:2007:10, para 44; Case C-64/08 Engelmann EU:C:2010:506, para 41. 
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may be accepted but revisions may not.8 Nevertheless, such contributions are debated, even if 
they are eventually rejected.9 
The third assumption, that the Court is influenced by Member States’ legal reasoning to reach 
certain conclusions (whether by force of legal argument or by political threat) is more challenging 
to assess. Firstly, the same problem arises as in studies of whether Advocate Generals’ Opinions 
influence the Court. It is difficult to distinguish the situation in which the Court is persuaded to 
reach a decision that it would not otherwise have done, from that in which it independently 
arrives at the same decision.10 Assuming for the moment that the Court is so persuaded, the 
second problem is that of distinguishing between possible methods of persuasion. Do member-
state governments sway the Court via political pressure or by the force of their legal 
argumentation? Researchers are divided on this question, typically but not exclusively on the 
basis of academic discipline. The hypothesis that, in what Lupu calls ‘an uncertain compliance 
environment’,11 Member States exert pressure on the Court to achieve a ‘strategic 
accommodation of national interests’,12  finds its main home among political scientists, 
particularly those that characterise the EU as an intergovernmental organisation.13 Carrubba et al., 
for instance, suggest that ‘When a court hears a case involving the interests of those controlling 
the executive and legislative institutions [of Member States], those interests can threaten to 
obstruct the court's intended outcome.’14 This encompasses some debatable suppositions: that the 
Court has an ex-ante intended outcome; that it allows political, as well as legal, considerations to 
inform its judgments; that governments are single entities that speak with one voice; and that 
                                                   
8 Morten Broberg and Niels Fenger, Preliminary References to the European Court of Justice (OUP 2014) ch 
103.3.3. 
9 See e.g. Case 99/83 Fioravanti EU:C:1984:360, para 10. 
10 Alan Dashwood, ‘The Advocate General in the Court of Justice of the European Communities’ (1982) 2 
Legal Studies 202, 211; Takis Tridimas, ‘The Role of the Advocate General In the Development of Community 
Law: Some Reflections’ (1997) 34 CMLR 1349, 1362; Albertina Albors-Llorens, ‘Securing Trust in the Court 
Of Justice of the EU: The Influence of the Advocates General’ (2012) 14 Cambridge Yearbook of European 
Legal Studies 509; Carlos Arrebola, Ana Julia Mauricio and Héctor Jiménez Portilla, ‘An Econometric Analysis 
of the Influence of the Advocate General on the Court of Justice of the European Union' (Legal Studies 
Research Paper Series 3/2016) (2016). 
11 Yonatan Lupu and Erik Voeten, ‘Precedent in International Courts: A Network Analysis of Case Citations by 
the European Court of Human Rights’ (2012) 42 British Journal of Political Science 413, 414. 
12 Lisa Conant, Justice Contained: Law and Politics in the European Union (Cornell University Press 2002). 
13 See also Karen J Alter, The European Court’s Political Power: Selected Essays (OUP 2009); Mark Dawson, 
Bruno de Witte and Elise Muir, Judicial Activism at the European Court of Justice (Edward Elgar Publishing 
2013). 
14 Clifford J Carrubba, Matthew Gabel and Charles Hankla, ‘Judicial Behavior under Political Constraints: 
Evidence from the European Court of Justice’ (2008) 102 APS Rev 435. 
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governments’ contributions to the Court’s proceedings are in some sense unwelcome external 
interventions. 
An alternative view is that the Court is persuaded to reach certain conclusions by the quality of 
Member States’ legal arguments. It can be argued that this view is supported by evidence that the 
Court benefits from member-state governments’ observations in several ways that cannot be 
accommodated within a simple political-pressure model. These ways will be discussed below, but 
it should be made clear at this point that there is no intention of suggesting that Member States’ 
influence can only be characterised as legal persuasion or political pressure. There is no reason 
why there should not be elements of both; as Cramér says, member-state governments’ 
observations ‘counsel, guide, or, perhaps, push the CJEU.’15 What will be argued is that 
acknowledging only Member States’ inclination to push is, at best, a gross oversimplification of 
both Member States’ intentions and the effect on the Court of their observations. 
The dual utility of member-state governments’ observations—both to indicate political realities 
and to convey legal arguments—is discussed with respect to two formal models of the interaction 
between member-state governments and the Court of Justice in Chapter 7. In addition to these 
two elements, however, there is one further effect of Member States’ interventions: the mere 
arrival of written observations in a case may influence the Court in its assessment of the 
procedural treatment that the case requires, as will be seen below. 
The usefulness of Member States’ observations to the Court 
The ways in which member-state governments’ observations might be of use to the Court can be 
divided into eight categories: 
1. the provision of factual information 
2. the clarification of political implications 
3. the clarification of issues of national identity 
4. ‘sounding out’ Member States’ reactions to envisioned legal changes; 
5. the identification of the legal principles governing a case, including any broader legal 
implications 
6. identifying points of disagreement between the Member States to press for more 
European integration 
                                                   
15 Per Cramér and others, See You in Luxembourg? EU Governments´ Observations Under the Preliminary 
Reference Procedure (Swedish Institute of European Policy Studies 2016). 
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7. assisting in case management 
8. improving the Court’s legitimacy and status in the Member States 
1. The provision of factual information 
As noted above, the Court Registry’s Notes for the Guidance of Counsel make clear that 
observations are intended to set out the factual circumstances of the case before the national 
court, and the relevant national legislation.16 As Arabadjiev notes, ‘a good submission [helps] the 
Court get a fuller picture of the facts of the case and the applicable national law’.17 Member State 
submissions regarding national provisions not only assist the Court in reaching its conclusions 
but may, as Broberg and Fenger point out, help the Court give ‘a precise judgment that avoids 
examining hypothetical issues.’18 
In the most straightforward situation, Member States are conveying neutral facts rather than 
expressing an opinion. However, as Broberg and Fenger point out, even statements of fact and 
national law may not be genuinely disinterested but must be assessed with an eye to the 
possibility of ‘spin’.19 A case which does not raise any general issue of principle may, after all, 
have the potential to deprive a government of revenue or require national legislation to be altered, 
not necessarily only in the country of origin of the reference. Larsson and Naurin give the 
example of Imexpo Trading,20 which turned on which of two customs tariff headings should be 
used for plastic chair-mats.21 The potential cost to Imexpo—and benefit to the Danish 
exchequer—was the difference between 8.9% and 0% customs duty.22 The Danish government’s 
observations, as recounted in the Report for the Hearing, merely supported the former 
                                                   
16 Bill Davies, Resisting the European Court of Justice: West Germany’s Confrontation with European Law, 
1949-1979 (OUP 2012). 
17 Alexander Arabadjiev, ‘Influencing Luxembourg : UK Interventions in Preliminary Ruling Proceedings' 
(Speech given at University of Cambridge, 5 October 2014) 4. 
18 Broberg and Fenger (n 8) 349. A submission may also attempt to raise hypothetical issues; see, for instance, 
AG Geelhoed’s comments on the UK’s observations in Test Claimants in the FII Group Litigation, in which he 
rejected the UK’s introduction of a new argument at the oral hearing as conjectural (Case C-446/04 Test 
Claimants in the FII Group Litigation EU:C:2006:240, Opinion of AG Geelhoed, paras 142-147). 
19 Broberg and Fenger (n 8) 349. 
20 Case C-379/02 Imexpo Trading EU:C:2004:595. 
21 Daniel Naurin, Per Cramér, Olof Larsson, Sara Lyons, Andreas Moberg and Allison Östlund, ‘Coding 
observations of the Member States and judgments of the Court of Justice of the EU under the preliminary 
reference procedure 1997-2008 Data report’ (2013) CERGU Working Paper Series 2013:1 
<http://cergu.gu.se/digitalAssets/1438/1438554_2013-1.pdf> accessed 31 July 2020. 
22 See also Case C-338/95 Wiener v Hauptzollamt Emmerich EU:C:1997:552 in which the Court, somewhat 
reluctantly, ruled on the characteristics of a nightdress. 
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classification, while the legal aspects were confined to considering how to classify items that 
could fall into either of two headings. 
Imexpo illustrates a feature of many preliminary references: that they involve technical matters 
concerning which the Court cannot be expected to have pre-existing expertise. A similar case in 
the same year, DFDS, found the Court examining line-drawings of different kinds of tipper truck; 
earlier Van Sillevoldt had them considering the dimensions of broken rice-grains.23 In Sayn-
Wittgenstein, member-state governments explained national naming customs.24 In such cases, 
Member States’ submissions may supplement those of the Commission in providing necessary 
factual analysis for the Court. Submissions from Member States may also give the Court 
(including the Advocate General) a head start in terms of comparative analysis; indeed, as 
Carnelutti observes, the Court may at times request comparative material from a Member State 
that has not sent written observations.
25
  
There is a subtle distinction to be borne in mind here, which is that the Court may request 
clarification of specific facts to allow it to draw conclusions, but it must not—in principle, at 
least—challenge the facts provided in the order for reference. The determination of the veracity 
of these facts is a matter for the national court alone.26 In practice, these situations can be difficult 
to distinguish. 
Another circumstance in which the Court may ask for information is where there is a question 
over the admissibility of the reference: see, for example, AG Tizzano’s Opinion in Bacardi-
Martini.27 This is discussed further in section 5. 
The benefit to the Court of receiving Member States’ observations of fact, in terms of labour-
saving and technical knowhow, should not be underestimated. Arguably, such circumstances are 
as close to ‘neutral’ as is possible while still motivating governments to make any observations at 
all. 
                                                   
23 Case C-396/02 DFDS EU:C:2004:536 ; Case C-159/88 Van Sillevoldt EU:C:1990:232. 
24 Case C-208/09 Sayn-Wittgenstein EU:C:2010:608, Opinion of AG Sharpston, particularly para 70. 
25 A Carnelutti, ‘The Role of Government Representatives in Article 177 References: The Experience of France’ 
in Henry G Schermers and others (eds), Article 177: Experiences and Problems - Asser Institute Colloquium on 
European Law (TMC Asser Instituut 1987) 237. 
26 See e.g. Case 104/77 Oehlschläger v Hauptzollamt Emmerich EU:C:1978:69, para 4. 
27 Case C-318/00 Bacardi-Martini EU:C:2003:41, para 19. 
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2. The clarification of political implications 
Although several authors suggest that it is the Commission, rather than the Member States 
themselves, that conveys Member States’ political preferences to the Court, it is clear that 
Member States’ submissions may seek to convey the possible political consequences of the 
Court’s decisions. A conventional view is that courts take no account of politics. They are held to 
decide a case on purely legal grounds and, if this produces an unpopular or unfair result, to insist 
that politics and legal reform are matters for the legislature. This principle could be argued, 
however, to take the form of the Court not allowing the political consequences of a decision to be 
its primary consideration. In rare cases, the Court has been unable to escape the socio-political 
consequences that flow from its decisions. Referring to the line of cases that balanced free 
movement against labour rights, from Mazzoleni through Laval and Viking, Judge von Danwitz 
said, ‘There was also a political compromise, which the CJEU had to consider… [which 
consisted of] a balancing of interests between new and old Member States.’28 Such overt 
balancing of the political priorities of Member States is nevertheless the exception. 
Less blatant political considerations can be identified. Firstly, the propensity of technical 
questions to raise related questions of constitutional principle is one of the joys of studying EU 
law, and it can hardly be said that a case with constitutional implications is apolitical. Secondly, 
although the Court may not usually consider politics in the strict sense, it certainly takes into 
account policy, primarily where there are explicit references to public policy exceptions in EU 
legislation, but also as being (hypothetically) capable of being subject to general principles of EU 
law. Reed also notes that whenever the judges choose to limit the retroactive effect of a ruling, 
they implicitly recognise the political implications of their decisions at both EU and national 
levels.29 
The circumstances under which national policy may be considered were discussed in the Opinion 
in Gazprom, in which AG Wathelet says: 
According to Advocate General Kokott, the Court’s case-law implies that the concept 
of public policy ‘protects legal interests, or in any event interests expressed in a rule 
                                                   
28 Case C-165/98 Mazzoleni EU:C:2001:162; Case C-341/05 Laval EU:C:2007:809; Case C-438/05 Viking 
EU:C:2007:772; Thomas von Danwitz, ‘Der EuGH und das (Un)Soziale Europa – “Kritik ist nicht 
berechtigt”’Die Tageszeitung (Berlin, 12 September 2008) (translated in Larsson (n 4) 35. 
29 JWR Reed, ‘Political Review of the European Court of Justice and Its Jurisprudence’ (Jean Monnet Center at 
NYU School of Law, 1995) <http://www.jeanmonnetprogram.org/archive/papers/95/9513ind.html> accessed 31 
July 2020.  
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of law, connected with the political, economic, social or cultural order of the Member 
State concerned’. On that basis, the Advocate General considered that ‘[p]urely 
economic interests, such as the threat of pecuniary damage — however high’, cannot 
be characterised as public-policy interests. 
In my view, the emphasis should be placed not essentially on the legal nature of the 
interests protected by public policy, but rather on whether the rules and values 
involved are among those the breach of which cannot be tolerated by the legal order 
of the place in which recognition and enforcement are sought because such a breach 
would be unacceptable from the viewpoint of a free and democratic State governed 
by the rule of law. It is therefore a question of the body of ‘principles that form part 
of the very foundations of the [EU] legal order’. 30 
In this view, the Court may find itself in the position of assessing the public policy of a Member 
State in the light of those principles, and may, therefore, require guidance from that state. Granger 
suggests that governments assist the Court at this point by expressing their policy interests in a 
‘legal format’ that helps the Court incorporate those interests into its decisions without 
threatening the Court’s legitimacy.31 
Granger points out another respect in which the Court may make use of political information 
from Member States: that is, when it finds itself policing ‘the uncertain borders between EU and 
national levels of actions’: matters of competence, subsidiarity, specific financial arrangements 
and the principle of sincere cooperation. Many such cases draw a large number of submissions 
from member-state governments and their observations are alluded to in the Opinions and, 
occasionally, the judgments (Pringle, OMT).32 When these questions are adjudicated, they are 
presented as issues of law, but they may be received at the national level as political decisions. 
As Dumon pointed out in 1976, ‘a political decision should not be confused with a decision 
which entails political consequences.’33 The Court’s being alerted to the political implications of 
                                                   
30 Case C-536/13 Gazprom EU:C:2014:2414, Opinion of AG Wathelet, paras 176-177. 
31 Marie-Pierre Granger, ‘When Governments Go to Luxembourg... the Influence of Governments on the Court 
of Justice’ (2004) 29 EL Rev 1, 19. 
32 Case C‑370/12  Pringle EU:C:2012:756; Case C-62/14 Gauweiler EU:C:2015:400. 
33 Marie-Pierre Granger, ‘Governments in Luxembourg: How Do Governments Use EU Litigation to Protect 
National Policies or Influence EU Policy and Law-Making (Paper Presented at ECPR Fifth Pan-European 
Conference on EU Politics, Porto, 24-26 June 2010)’ (2010) <https://www.semanticscholar.org/paper/Paper-
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a case does not imply that those implications cause it to change its decision. Instead, the most 
likely outcome is that the judgment will use what Hamson describes as ‘the ritual formula’, 
pointing out that it is for the national court to decide on the facts, taking into account any 
allowable policy considerations.34 The Court made this clear in Palacios de la Villa, in which it 
said (in the context of employment policy versus non-discrimination on the grounds of age) ‘it is 
for the competent authorities of the Member States to find the right balance between the different 
interests involved’.35 In practice, references by the Court to political context are more likely to 
appear in an Advocate General’s Opinion than in the judgment. Such references are rarely 
explicit, though there are exceptions: in Wencel, for instance, the Advocate General cites the 
German government’s comments on the political history of the legislation in question.36 In 
Festersen, the Advocate General discusses the national political context in which agricultural 
legislation was initially passed.37 It is helpful for the Court to know the political context of a case, 
even if it does not contribute to its legal reasoning as such. 
Pratt observes that the Court benefits from seeing the difference between the view of the 
institutions and that of the Member States on an issue: ‘The Commission puts in observations 
giving the Community view and it is clearly desirable that, in difficult and controversial cases, 
these should be balanced by observations from the Member States.’38 In this context, it is 
interesting that Moravcsik, arguing for a mainly intergovernmental analysis of the EU, argues that 
lack of knowledge of Member States’ preferences has weakened the Commission vis-à-vis the 
Member States, which ‘were in fact better informed about each other’s preferences and about the 
intricacies of agricultural policy than was the Commission’.
39
 
Finally, a Member State may spot a politico-legal issue lurking behind the facts of a case—
especially given the Court’s history of uncovering important legal principles in quotidian cases—
or force into the open an issue that the Court did not intend to discuss. 
                                                                                                                                                              
1596%3A-Governments-in-Luxembourg%3A-How-Do-Use-
Granger/d95b6c5e9d3014db20e65728bc7fc66a5063c42a> accessed 31 July 2020. 
34 CJ Hamson, ‘Methods of Interpretation - A Critical Assessment of the Results’, Report of the Judicial and 
Academic Conference 27-28 September 1976 (Court of Justice of the European Communities 1976) II–8.  
35 Case C-411/05 Palacios de la Villa EU:C:2007:604,  para 71. 
36 Case C-589/10 Wencel EU:C:2012:304, Opinion of AG Cruz Villalón. 
37 Case C-370/05 Festersen EU:C:2006:635, Opinion of AG Stix-Hackl, paras 36-37, 47. 
38 Hamson (n 34) II–8. 
39 Andrew Moravcsik, The Choice for Europe: Social Purpose and State Power from Messina to Maastricht 
(Cornell University Press 1998) 230-2. 
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All of the above reasons for the Court to find Member States’ submissions helpful apply whether 
or not the Court promotes what Pescatore famously describes as ‘a certain idea of Europe’ or 
engages in deliberate activism.40 Some of the Court’s decisions, while ostensibly intended to 
ensure the effectiveness of the Treaty, have had such marked political consequences that many 
authors have argued that they are evidence of an integrationist agenda on the part of the members 
of the Court.41 Some argue that the Court seeks to further such an agenda at every opportunity. If 
the Court is indeed making decisions based on its own political preferences, it would be logical 
for the Court to find out how far the Member States would allow it to go before seeking to block 
legal developments via legislation. 
Larsson and Naurin base their conception of the Court’s behaviour on empirical evidence of a 
link between the content of member-state governments’ observations and whether the Court’s 
decision reflects a willingness to make politically controversial judgments. They propose that 
‘judges are both concerned with—and uncertain of—what the political reactions to their decisions 
will be… As a consequence, judges … with policy preferences are likely to be attentive to, and 
act on, signals that contain political information that relates to the probability of override’.42 They 
argue that the Court takes the opportunity to further integration when its analysis of the Member 
States’ positions suggests, not that a majority of Member States support its position, but that there 
will be a sufficient minority of states in favour to block any attempts to override it at the Council. 
In this scenario, member-state governments’ submissions are not just helpful to the Court, but 
essential to its strategy.
 
Finally, it has been suggested that the Court may benefit from knowing whether domestic courts 
are going to be implementing its decisions in a hostile executive environment, not in order to 
change its judgments but to decide how to express its reasoning. In other words, the content of 
member-state observations may affect the way in which judgments are written.43 
                                                   
40 Pierre Pescatore, ‘The Doctrine of “Direct Effect”: An Infant Disease of Community Law’ (1983) 8 European 
Law Review 155, 157.  
41 Allan Rosas, ‘Separation of Powers in the European Union’ (2007) 41 The International Lawyer 1033, 1037; 
Andreas Grimmel, ‘Judicial Interpretation or Judicial Activism? The Legacy of Rationalism in the Studies of the 
European Court of Justice’ (2012) 18 European Law Journal 518; Olof Larsson and Daniel Naurin, ‘Judicial 
Independence and Political Uncertainty: How the Risk of Override Affects the Court of Justice of the EU’ 
(2016) 70 International Organization 377. 
42 Larsson and Naurin (n 41) 403. 
43 Lupu and Voeten (n 11) 414 (referring to the ECtHR); Olof Larsson and others, ‘Speaking Law to Power: The 
Strategic Use of Precedent of the Court of Justice of the European Union’ (2016) Comparative Political Studies 
online edn April 2016, 163. 
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3. Issues of national identity 
A related situation in which the Court may be assisted by information from the Member States is 
when issues of national identity or national values are raised. This occurred in Torresi, in which 
Italy argued that the requirement under Article 3 of Directive 98/5 to recognise other states’ 
professional qualifications conflicted with the requirement to respect ‘national identities, inherent 
in their fundamental structures, political and constitutional’ under Article 4(2) TEU. AG Wahl 
notes in his Opinion that he agrees with the observations of the Spanish and Polish 
governments.44 In this instance, Italy’s appeal to the constitutional nature of its restriction was 
rejected. However, Wahl notes that the Court is willing to weigh to such concerns in some 
circumstances, citing Omega and Sayn-Wittgenstein, in which national values were weighed 
against the free movement of goods and freedom of movement respectively.45 In Omega, the 
German government’s argument that games which involved simulated killing were incompatible 
with the system of values enshrined in German law was accepted by the Court.46 Sayn-
Wittgenstein—on the Austrian government’s refusal to recognise titles of nobility—is a rare case 
where the six intervening Member States’ observations are laid out in the judgment. However, its 
chief relevance to this discussion is that it explicitly equates a state’s reference to national 
constitutional values with reliance on public policy.47 It can be argued that the two are not 
identical. As these examples suggest, national identity issues can be idiosyncratic and are less 
likely to be invoked as EU-wide principles than, say, public morality.  
Cloots argues that there is a distinction between national identity and constitutional identity.48 
Both are cited—without a clear distinction necessarily being drawn—in the cases mentioned 
above, but the information provided by the Member States under each of these guises is used in 
the same way by the Court. 
4. Sounding out Member States’ reactions to possible legal changes 
The Court may invite interested parties to submit observations if it anticipates an important 
change to EU law. The advisability of this, both in terms of the clarity and coherence of the 
                                                   
44 Joined cases C-58/13 and C-59/13 Torresi EU:C:2014:265, Opinion of AG Wahl, para 104. 
45 Case C-36/02 Omega EU:C:2004:614; Case C-208/09 Sayn-Wittgenstein EU:C:2010:806. 
46 ‘[I]ncompatible avec le système de valeurs de la loi fondamentale allemande’: Report for the Hearing held at 
University of Gothenburg, para 53. 
47 Sayn-Wittgenstein EU:C:2010:806, para 84; see also Case C-353/06 Grunkin and Paul EU:C:2008:559. 
48 Elke Cloots, ‘National Identity, Constitutional Identity, and Sovereignty in the EU’ (2016) 45 Netherlands 
Journal of Legal Philosophy 82. 
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law and its acceptance by the Member States, can be illustrated by looking at two cases in 
which the Court explored the scope of the direct effect of Directives, Pfeiffer and Mangold.
49
 
The Trailers case shows the same process in a direct action.
50
 
In Pfeiffer, a case on the Working Time Directive, the Court received no written observations 
from the Member States and initially decided that the questions referred could be dealt with 
without an oral hearing. During their deliberations, it became clear that one of the questions 
referred raised the question of whether Article 6 of the Directive could be invoked in 
proceedings between individuals: that is, in a horizontal situation. The Court decided to 
reopen the oral procedure and give a second opportunity for the parties, the Member States, 
the Council and the Commission to make observations. In the event, four Member States did 
so, ‘quite openly show[ing] their dismay at the possibility of a change of direction in the 
case-law.’
51
 The Court reaffirmed that there could be no horizontal direct effect for Directives 
that govern only private law.
52
 Pfeiffer has been cited as an example of a case where member-
state government submissions may have prevented the Court from ‘taking the wrong route’.
53
 
The UK is alleged to have been aggrieved that the same procedure was not followed in the 
German case Mangold, in which the Court departed from the principles that it had been 
developing in the line of cases that included Pfeiffer.
54
 In effect, the Court argued that the 
general principle of non-discrimination found in the Treaties was sufficient to establish the 
horizontal direct effect of a Directive, in this case the Equal Treatment Directive which, at the 
time, had not been implemented in Germany.
55
 As Dashwood says, this reasoning was ‘so 
much out of the blue that no Member State other than Germany had seen the need to make 
                                                   
49 Joined cases C-397/01 to C-403/01 Pfeiffer EU:C:2004:584; Case C-144/04 Mangold  EU:C:2005:709. 
50 Case C-110/05 Commission v Italy (Trailers) EU:C:2009:66. 
51 Joined cases C-397/01 to C-403/01 Pfeiffer EU:C: 2004:227, second Opinion of AG Ruiz-Jarabo Colomer, 
para 22. 
52 Joined cases C-397/01 to C-403/01 Pfeiffer EU:C:2004:584, paras 1-5; Alan Dashwood, ‘From Van Duyn to 
Mangold via Marshall: Reducing Direct Effect to Absurdity?’ [2007] Cambridge Yearbook of European Legal 
Studies 102; Olof Larsson and others, ‘Speaking Law to Power: The Strategic Use of Precedent of the Court of 
Justice of the European Union’ (2016) 50 Comparative Political Studies 879. 
53 Conversation with UK legal agent, January 2014. 
54 Case C-144/04 Mangold EU:C:2005:709. 
55 Council Directive 2000/78/EC of 27 November 2000 establishing a general framework for equal treatment in 
employment and occupation. 
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written or oral submissions.’
56
 Mangold has been widely criticised; it can be argued that the 
Court might have benefited in two ways from following the same procedure as in Pfeiffer:  it 
would have had the observations of several Member States, and its decision would have 
gained legitimacy from the open consideration of Member States’ legal arguments.
57
 
The Court’s respect for member-state observations is underlined by the fact that it may be 
willing to accept submissions from states that are not currently affected by the legal measures 
concerned but may become so in the future. In Tessili, the UK and Ireland were allowed to 
submit observations—with the agreement of all parties except France—apparently on the 
principle that, although not then a party to the Brussels I Convention, they were expected to 
become parties in the future.
58
 There is no case law on whether the Court would allow 
submissions from a state that could never be concerned by the subject matter of a case, and 
would not, for instance, have voted on it in Council. Broberg and Fenger argue that such 




5. The identification of the legal principles governing a case, including any broader 
legal implications 
Submissions from the Member States may shine a light on the legal principles governing a 
case at two scales. At the smaller scale, Member States may contribute by clarifying a 
confused order for reference, by picking out the ‘right’ questions and focusing the case on the 
most relevant issues, by making a case against (or for) justiciability and by helping the Court 
to categorise the case. They may also uncover recondite issues that had eluded the national 
court. At the larger scale, Member States may alert the Court to broader issues that may not 
be apparent from an order for reference that is only concerned with the facts of a particular 
national case. One anonymous interviewee described this as ‘doing the Court’s homework’ 
and argued that the Court should not be encouraged to rely on it. 
                                                   
56 Dashwood (n 52) 102. 
57 Legal and political criticisms of the Mangold judgment are listed in Tamara Ćapeta, ‘The Advocate General: 
Bringing Clarity to CJEU Decisions? A Case-Study of Mangold and Kücükdeveci’ [2012] CYELS Vol 14 
2011–2012 563 fns 13 and 14. 
58 Case 12/76 Tessili EU:C:1976:133; Hjalte Rasmussen, ‘A New Generation of Community Law? Reflections 
on the Handling by the Court of Justice of the Protocol of 1971 Relating to the Interpretation of the Brussels 
Convention on Jurisdiction and Enforcement of Judgments’ (1978) 15 CML Rev 249. 
59 Broberg and Fenger (n 8) 343. 
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Both a government agent and a retired Advocate General who were interviewed during this 
research argued that member-state observations might assist the Court by making an unclear 
order for reference intelligible.
60
 The same is implied in AG Jacobs’ Opinion in Vaneetveld.
61
 
The degree to which this is feasible is, however, limited. At one time, the Court appeared to 
be willing to extract answerable questions from unsatisfactory references, and a non-party 
submission might have drawn the Court’s attention to such questions. The possibility was, 
however, circumscribed by the rule that no questions of EU law may be addressed in the 
observations that were not raised by the national court itself.
62
 This willingness was, in any 
event, retracted in 1993, when the Advocate General in Telemarsicabruzzo suggested that: 
[I]t is unsatisfactory both on principle and in practical terms for the Court to have to 
extract from the parties’ observations in the main proceedings the information which 
it requires on the factual and legal background to the questions in a reference. Such 




It must be even more the case of other non-parties’ observations. Attempts to amend the 
questions or change the scope of the reference have therefore been resisted: see, for instance, 
Design Concept, in which the Court explicitly rejects such an attempt by, among others, the 
French government.
64
 Writing in 1997, Barnard and Sharpston argue that the Court should 
not be required to ‘wait and see whether the combination of the national court file deposited 
at its registry and the written observations which it receives enable it to piece together the 
jigsaw’ but should insist on the order for reference containing sufficient information to start 
                                                   
60 Interviews with Sir Francis Jacobs February 2014 and with Professor Sir Alan Dashwood March 2014; see 
also Takis Tridimas, ‘Knocking on Heaven’s Door: Fragmentation, Efficiency and Defiance in the Preliminary 
Reference Procedure’ (2003) 40 Common Market Law Review 9.  
61 Case C-316/93 Vaneetveld EU:C:1994:32, Opinion of AG Jacobs, paras 5-10. 
62 See e.g. Joined cases 141 to 143/81 Holdijk EU:C:1982:122,  paras 4-8. 
63 Tridimas (n 60) 9; Joined cases C-320 to 322/90 Telemarsicabruzzo EU:C:1992:373, Opinion of AG 
Gulmann, para 20. 
64 Case C-438/01 Design Concept EU:C:2003:325, paras 13-15; Denis Batta, ‘The Relation Between National 
Courts and the European Court of Justice in the European Union Judicial System' (Report for European 





 There is considerable case law to the effect that only the national court can determine 
the questions to be answered. 
Nevertheless, the Court has relied upon observations in order to understand the factual and 
legal background in at least one case since Telemarsicabruzzo. In Wilson, the Court—after 
noting that the defendant was arguing that there was insufficient information in the reference 
for the Court to answer the questions—said, ‘the Court considers that the information 
contained in the order for reference and the observations submitted to it is sufficient to enable 
it to reply usefully to the questions referred.’
66
 Conversely, in Wijsenbeek a challenge to the 
admissibility of the case was rejected partly because a factual statement was not contested in 
any of the observations.
67
 
The opposite position, in which a Member State argues in its observations that a reference is 
not admissible, is quite common. In Heinrich, for instance, three Member States did so, but 
the Court decided that the order for reference contained sufficient information for it to 
respond to the questions.
68
 It might be argued that there is a logical problem here: part of the 
rationale for finding a case inadmissible on the grounds of an inadequate order for reference 
is that those entitled to submit observations will not have sufficient information to do so.
69
 
The Court does not seem to have treated this point with consistency, and the possibility seems 
to remain that a Member State’s interpretation of an order for reference might uphold a case’s 
admissibility. 
A clear distinction must be made here between matters of admissibility and of justiciability. 
Observations relating to admissibility usually involve member-state governments arguing that 
a case is deficient on procedural grounds. Arguments relating to justiciability, on the other 
hand, are often expressed in terms of competence and subsidiarity (in the general sense: the 
judicial subsidiarity boundary—i.e. between deciding a case at the EU and national court 
levels—is one that the Court repeatedly acknowledges and that does not appear to trouble 
Member States). In Omega, for instance, AG Stix-Hackl discussed the justiciability of human 
                                                   
65 Catherine Barnard and Eleanor Sharpston, ‘The Changing Face of Article 177 References’ (1997) 34 
Common Market Law Review 1113, 1151. 
66 Case C-506/04 Wilson EU:C:2006:587, para 41 (emphasis added). 
67 Case C-378/97 Wijsenbeek EU:C:1999:439, para 21. 
68 Case C-345/06 Heinrich EU:C:2009:140, paras 25-35. 
69 Case C-176/96 Lehtonen EU:C:2000:201, paras 21-23. 
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dignity versus that of measures taken to ensure it. By contrast, the German government 
framed its observations in terms of whether its national rules fell within the margin of 
appreciation.
70
 But although governments might be pictured as seeking to prevent some 
issues coming within the Court’s influence at all, the increasing jurisprudence on national 
identity, discussed above, demonstrates that the Member States may also seek to include new 
issues within the scope of justiciability. 
Member States may draw attention to matters that are not raised explicitly in an order for 
reference but which may be inferred or may arise by implication and which the Court needs 
to address.
71
 Granger found that the government legal agents of several Member States saw 
themselves as ‘true amici curiae’, a role that included expounding the legal issues raised in 
the reference.
72
 Van Stralen was told by a Swedish civil servant that ‘we see it as our duty to 
help the Court get as clear a picture as possible, even if we don’t have any particular interest 
in the outcome or it’s not politically interesting.’
73
 From the Court’s side, Arabadjiev says, 
‘sometimes Member States act as unbiased counsel to the Court, assisting us in clarifying 
questions of common interest.’
74
 He cites the UK’s contribution in Melloni:
 
 
Although the narrow national interest would have favoured an interpretation of the 
Charter that would give priority to national constitutions over EU law, even where 
the matter has been the subject of harmonization, the position defended by the United 
Kingdom did not seem to be influenced by any such interests. Rather, it added 
valuable arguments in favour of a more balanced position that respects the primacy 
of EU law. It thus acted as a special ‘neutral’ counsel to the Court.75 
Arabadjiev’s ‘questions of common interest’ include the elucidation of competing legal 
principles and EU rules. As Arabadjiev points out, the government of the Member State from 
which a reference comes ‘is in the best position to provide the relevant legal arguments in 
                                                   
70 Report for the Hearing held at University of Gothenburg, paras 53-61. 
71 See e.g. Case C-239/02 Douwe Egberts EU:C:2003:668, Opinion of AG Geelhoed, para 24; Joined cases C-
402/07 and C-432/07 Sturgeon EU:C:2009:416, Opinion of AG Sharpston, para 38. 
72 Hjalte Rasmussen, ‘Docket Control Mechanisms, the EC Court and the Preliminary References Procedure’ in 
Mads Andenas (ed), Article 177 References to the European Court: Policy and Practice (Butterworths 1994) 91. 
73 Floris van Stralen, ‘The Member States and the Court of Justice: Why Do Member States Participate in 
Preliminary Reference Proceedings?’ (MA thesis, University of Gothenburg 2015). 
74 Arabadjiev (n 17) 4. 
75 Arabadjiev (n 17) 8; Case C-399/11 Melloni EU:C:2013:107. 
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terms, for example, of justification, necessity and proportionality.’
76
 While the Court stresses 
that balancing these is ultimately for the national court, it nevertheless discusses such issues 
extensively; indeed, Bengoetxea, MacCormick and Moral Soriano regard the Court’s 
decisions as representing ‘policy expressed in principles, and particularly in a choice between 
rival principles.’
 77
 Such Reports for the Hearing as are available make it clear that the 
Member States frequently raise these competing issues in their observations, most commonly 
balancing legal principles on the one side against their national public interest on the other. 
Few cases do not involve some kind of balancing exercise. In Betfair, for instance, the ten 
member-state observations include references to the principles of equal treatment, 
transparency, proportionality, national public interest and a general EU interest in controlling 
the harm caused by gambling, as well as to competition and the freedom to provide 
services.
78
 In Briels, for which both the UK’s written and oral observations are available, 
scientific considerations form part of the legal arguments.
79
  
In the rare circumstances that a Member State’s full observations are available—usually in 
response to a Freedom of Information request—it can be seen that, in addition to discussion 
of the legal issues raised by the case, they frequently include a survey of the case law.
80
 This 
is difficult to discern from Reports for the Hearing and such accounts of member-state legal 
arguments as are given in Opinions and judgments. However, in Emmott, Advocate General 
Mischo refers explicitly to Member States’ citation of case law, saying ‘Like the respondent 
Irish authorities, the Governments of the United Kingdom and the Netherlands and the 
Commission, I consider it possible to apply here the Court’s established case-law.’
81
 
AG Mischo’s words raise an interesting point, which is that—although it is possible to 
assume that, even if the Advocate General’s conclusions are not followed, his or her sources 
                                                   
76 Arabadjiev (n 17) 4. 
77 Joxerramon Bengoetxea, Neil MacCormick and Leonor Moral Soriano, ‘Integration and Integrity in the Legal 
Reasoning of the European Court of Justice’ in Gráinne de Búrca and Joseph HH Weiler (eds), The European 
Court of Justice (OUP 2001) 83. 
78 Case C-203/08 Sporting Exchange EU:C:2010:307, (information on observations from University of 
Gothenburg collection of Reports for the Hearing). 
79 Case C-521/12 Briels EU:C:2014:330; FOI release UK submissions to the 'Briels' case 
<https://www.gov.uk/government/publications/uk-submissions-to-the-briels-case> accessed 31 July 2020. 
80 See Briels (n 79) and particularly the UK’s arguments in Case C-394/07 Gambazzi EU:C:2009:219,  
<http://conflictoflaws.net/2009/the-written-observations-submitted-in-the-gambazzi-case/> accessed 31 July 
2020. 
81 Case C-208/90 Emmott EU:C:1991:164, para 16. 
113 
 
and reasoning contribute to the Court’s deliberation—the Member States’ legal arguments 
must inevitably act primarily on or through the Advocate General. AG Sharpston 
acknowledges the fact that member-state observations are considered in detail by Advocates 
General (or their référendaires) in El Kott.
82
 Advocates General have occasionally explicitly 
conceded the influence of a Member State’s observations in changing their minds, as AG 
Jacobs does of the Netherlands government’s arguments in Bettray.
83
 
6. Identifying points of disagreement between the Member States  in order to press 
for more European integration 
Larsson proposes a controversial hypothesis, which is that if the Court of Justice becomes 
aware via member-state observations that the Member States disagree on the interpretation of 
a provision of EU law, the Court may seize the opportunity to opt for the reading that furthers 
European integration.
84
 The hypothesis supposes that the Court has a pre-existing agenda to 
promote European integration, envisaged as a preference for disputes to be settled at the EU 
level (‘more EU’) rather than via conflicting national legislation (‘less EU’). It also assumes 
that if Member States disagree with a ‘more EU’ judgment, they will seek to overrule the 
Court’s decision by introducing new legislation at the Council. According to Larsson’s 
theory, the agreement of a majority of Member States is not needed for the Court’s view to 
prevail: all that is required is for there to be evidence of a blocking minority. In these 
circumstances, any legislative challenge to the Court’s decision is likely to fail. 
Larsson and Naurin performed an empirical study of Reports for the Hearing archived by the 
Swedish foreign ministry from 1997 to 2008, comparing the net position of the Member 
States in terms of ‘more EU’ and ‘less EU’ with the Court’s decision in each case, where 
such positions could be identified.
85
 The level of agreement between the Member States’ 
stated views and the Court’s judgment was found to be significantly higher in areas where 
legislation to override the Court’s decision would require a qualified majority, rather than 
                                                   
82 Case C-364/11 El Kott EU:C:2012:569, para 26. 
83 Case 344/87 Bettray EU:C:1989:113, para 26 (Opinion of AG Jacobs) and at interview. 
84 Olof Larsson, ‘Minoritarian Activism: Judicial Politics in the European Union’ (PhD thesis, University of 
Gothenburg 2016). 
85 Larsson and Naurin (n 41). 
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unanimity, at the Council.
86
 Larsson and Naurin argue strongly that the Member States’ 
influence on the Court’s development of EU law is not a majoritarian one; their analysis 
demonstrates that, far from acting with one voice, the Member States rarely agree on their 
suggested answers to the questions referred to the Court. Instead, the Court’s opportunity to 
develop the law is afforded precisely by those disagreements. 
Larsson and Naurin’s theory is based on the assumption that when the Member States 
particularly dislike a judgment of the Court of Justice, they have it within their power to 
reverse the Court’s decision by promoting and passing new legislation. Thus the preferences 
of the governments do set boundaries to the Court’s discretion. In Larsson and Naurin’s 
model, however, the Court is not merely the passive recipient of the Member States’ 
preferences but a sophisticated player in the system of law-making. An interesting feature is 
that this tactic can be argued to depend on the Member States being unaware that their 
submissions are being used in the way postulated. 
7. Assisting in case management 
As described in Chapter 2, the Court has several procedural choices to make before a case 
reaches the judges for their deliberation. The Judge-Rapporteur makes proposals on each of 
these choices in consultation with the Advocate General, which are presented to the Court at 
a general meeting. The choices are: 
i. the formation of the Court required 
ii. whether there should be an oral hearing 
iii. the likely duration of the pleadings 
iv. whether the Court should send any questions for written or oral responses 
v. whether the participants in a hearing should be asked to concentrate on specific issues 
vi. whether there should be an Advocate General’s Opinion and 
vii. whether to request a research note from the Court’s research service. 
Items (iv), (v) and (vii) relate to the information required for the Court to reach its 
conclusions. If necessary information that was not supplied by the referring national court can 
be obtained from Member States’ submissions, additional measures may not be required. The 
                                                   
86 Olof Larsson and Daniel Naurin, ‘National Interests and Member State Participation in the European Court of 
Justice' (Swedish Network for European Studies in Political Science Spring Conference, 14-15 March 2013) 
(2013) Fig 3. 
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effect of member-state governments’ submissions on (i) and (ii)—the choice of formation of 
the Court and whether there should be an oral hearing—is less clear. The decision must be 
most strongly influenced by the legal points at issue; nevertheless, a case’s perceived 
importance can, at least, not be diminished by the arrival of written observations from 
Member States. 
Equally, where the Advocate General is undecided as to whether an Opinion is necessary, the 
arrival of written observations, particularly from certain Member States, may be sufficient to 
tip the balance in favour of an Opinion. This definitely occurs,
87
 but it is difficult to confirm a 
general effect because of the possibility of a third-cause fallacy: that is, that the arrival of 
written observations and the decision to have an Opinion are independently inspired by the 
importance of the issues in the case. It is nevertheless interesting to consider some numbers. 
Table 4 shows the percentage of cases that merited an Opinion in 2012 and 2013.
88
 
Table 4 Percentage of cases with an Opinion 
0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 12 Total
Opinion (nos) 12 80 78 51 29 16 16 6 5 1 294
No opinion (nos) 29 101 57 44 16 9 2 1 259
Opinion (%) 29% 44% 58% 54% 64% 64% 89% 100% 83% 100% 53%
No opinion (%) 71% 56% 42% 46% 36% 36% 11% 0% 17% 0% 47%
Number of submissions from Member States, 2012-13
 
These percentages bear out the observation that, ever since the Advocate General’s Opinion 
became optional in cases that raised no new issue of law in 2003, the proportion of cases with 
an Opinion has dropped to about half. For cases with no submissions from Member States, 
this falls to 29%; those with only one merited an Opinion in 44% of cases. As the number of 
submissions from Member States rises, so does the proportion of cases receiving an 
Opinion.
89
 The figures do not, however, distinguish between a situation in which the decision 
to have an Opinion is influenced by member-state submissions and that where the decision is 
based entirely on the Court’s assessment of the legal importance of a case, with which the 
Member States happen to agree. 
                                                   
87 My own experience when present at an Advocate General’s planning meetings, 2015. 
88 The 2013 figures were incomplete at the cut-off date of this thesis; if this analysis were to be pursued further 
the remaining cases would have to be included to ensure that no bias resulted from the exclusion of cases that 
took longer to decide.  
89 There is one anomaly: Case C-632/13 Hirvonen EU:C:2015:765, a case on income tax that had greater 
revenue than EU law implications and received submissions from eight Member States. 
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A more useful question is whether the identity of the Member State has any effect on the 
likelihood of an Opinion. To answer this question, it must be assumed that as a general rule, 
the submissions that Member States make in their national cases are a matter of routine and 
are less likely to influence the Court than their observations in other states’ cases. The 
majority (82%) of cases which garnered only one submission in the period 2012-13 fall into 
the former category. 
There were 331 cases with more than one member-state submission, of which 61% had an 
Opinion. Considering only submissions in other Member States’ cases, states are listed in 
Table 5 in order of the ratio of their submissions in cases with an Opinion to their 
submissions in those without. For example, Greece made 66 submissions in cases other than 
its own, and 2.3 times as many of those cases had an Opinion than did not. For some Member 
States, the number of submissions made in the period was so small that their results could not 














Lithuania 7 6 Ireland 14 1.8
UK 59 3.21 France 52 1.74
Latvia 4 3 Poland 78 1.52
Netherlands 45 2.75 Czech R 58 1.32
Germany 79 2.43 Spain 43 1.26
Austria 41 2.42 Slovenia 2 1
Italy 54 2.38 Hungary 23 0.92
Estonia 20 2.33 Bulgaria* 0
Greece 66 2.3 Romania* 4
Finland 13 2.25 Slovakia* 2
Sweden 16 2.2 Cyprus* 2
Denmark 18 2 Luxembourg* 1
Portugal 40 1.86 Malta* 1
Belgium 31 1.82 Total/ave 773 1.72
Cases with 2+ submissions, 2012-13 (331 cases)
*These countries either made no submissions in cases without Opinions, or in 
the case of Malta, none in cases with an Opinion.  
                                                   




For those states that made significant numbers of submissions (bolded in Table 5) a 
comparison between pairs of countries that made similar numbers of submissions shows that 
it is possible to say that (for instance) submissions from the UK are more likely to occur in 
cases with an Opinion than is the case for the Czech Republic, submissions from Germany 
more likely to occur in cases with an Opinion than those from Poland, and those from the 
Netherlands than from Spain. But, as noted above, it is not possible—without more detailed 
investigation—to say whether this is because the governments of the UK, Germany and the 
Netherlands have more influence over the Court than those of the Czech Republic, Poland 
and Spain, or because the former governments are better at identifying (or more interested in) 
cases that raised novel issues of EU law. The meticulous technique used by the Netherlands 
for identifying situations in which it should submit observations was mentioned in Chapter 3 
and suggests an avenue for further research. At present, the best that can be said is that the 
arrival of member-state submissions occasionally influences the Court’s choice of whether to 
have an Advocate General’s Opinion, and there is sufficient evidence to justify further 
research into whether member-state submissions have a systematic effect on that choice. 
A further opportunity for a Member State to influence the Court’s procedure arises in 
principle when a state requests that a hearing be reopened after the oral procedure has 
concluded—usually, in the hopes of arguing with an Advocate General’s Opinion. As noted 
in Chapter 2, to date, the Court has only reopened hearings of its own initiative. This has 
usually occurred when the Court has decided that it requires further information to reach its 
judgment,91 but it may also do this in the light of a reassessment of the importance of the legal 
issues involved.92 It has refused all such applications from Member States.93 Refusal does not 
mean, however, that such an application is purposeless. The Court is made aware of the 
arguments the Member State uses to support its application, and while it cannot formally assess 
them in the same way as it does legitimate observations, it is only human nature for the judges to 
have them in mind while considering their decision, and in similar cases in the future.94 
                                                   
91 See e.g. Orders of the Court in Case C-134/13 Raytek and Fluke EU:C:2014:2355 and Case C-689/13 PFE 
EU:C:2015:521. 
92 Order of the Court in Case C-524/15 Menci EU:C:2017:64. 
93 See, notably, Order of the Court in Case C-17/98 Emesa Sugar EU:C:2000:69; also e.g. Order of the Court in 
Case C-446/04 Test Claimants in the FII Group Litigation EU:C:2006:761.  
94 Interview with référendaire, 23 April 2015. 
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There is also a possibly singular instance in which a Member State’s observations affected 
not just the procedural choices for a particular case, but the Court’s procedural rules. 
Arabadjiev states that the UK government’s observations in ZZ were taken into account when 
the Court drafted amendments to its own Rules of Procedure.
95
 The UK’s arguments in ZZ, 
on the extent to which a court was entitled to withhold its reasoning from the defendant in 
cases that touched on national security, acted, he says, as a ‘sort of inspiration for the Court’ 
and the UK’s observations had ‘thus been invaluable in revealing new aspects and possible 
solutions to this very delicate issue.’
96
 
The effect of Member States’ observations on the procedural treatment of preliminary 
references impacts almost entirely on matters of pure law. A case that receives an Advocate 
General’s Opinion because of member-state governments’ observations is more likely to take 
a place in the academic canon, but any influence on the Court’s judgment is difficult to 
attribute to anything other than the legal merits of the case. 
8. Improving the Court’s legitimacy and status in the Member States 
The previous headings have considered the influence of Member States’ observations on the 
Court’s decision-making in particular cases. A final way in which they might be of use to the 
Court, however, is by boosting the status of the Court’s decisions and reinforcing the 
legitimacy of the Court itself. 
A great deal has been written about the sources of the legitimacy of courts in general, and of 




detailed consideration of the literature is outside the 
scope of this thesis, but some points will briefly be considered below that are specific to the 
argument of this chapter—in particular, that allowing the Member States to intervene in the 
Court’s proceedings reinforces the legitimacy of both EU case law and the Court as an 
institution in the eyes of national executives. 
                                                   
95 Case C-300/11 ZZ EU:C:2013:363. 
96 Arabadjiev (n 17) 5. 
97 Among others, Hjalte Rasmussen, On Law and Policy in the European Court of Justice: A Comparative Study 
in Judicial Policymaking (Martinus Nijhoff 1986); Joseph HH Weiler, ‘The Transformation of Europe’ (1991) 
100 The Yale Law Journal 2403; Gregory A Caldeira and James L Gibson, ‘The Legitimacy of the Court of 
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119 
 
As Weiler notes, legitimacy is ‘one of the most underspecified concepts in political theory 
and social science.’
98
 What is under discussion here might be described as a sociological, 
rather than a normative, view of legitimacy—that is, legitimacy derived from the credibility 
of a court and its decisions, both to other courts and to the other branches of the state. What is 
important is to identify some factors that give authority to the Court of Justice and its 
decisions and which are—at least in principle—susceptible to influence by the governments 
of the Member States. 
In the first place, the Court’s procedural legitimacy derives from the fact that it was 
established by a treaty to which the Member States acceded.
99
 However, the consensus is that 
its ongoing legitimacy is maintained by the fact that its decisions are recognised and applied 
by the courts of the Member States; that is, they accept the legitimacy, both procedural and 
substantive, of its case law. This relationship is self-sustaining: the more national courts 
comply with the Court of Justice’s decisions, the greater the ‘reservoir of favourable opinion’ 
accruing to the Court’s jurisprudence and the greater its acceptability.
100
 In applying case law 
that is based on the interpretation of the EU’s primary and secondary legislation, Member 
States’ courts are also treating EU statutes as binding in the same way that they do national 
statute law. 
At the national level, the fact that courts apply domestic statutes (and where relevant, 
common
 
 law) in a procedurally correct manner gives them legitimacy in the eyes of the other 
branches of the state.
101
 This does not stem entirely from the fact that legislatures have been 
responsible for those domestic statutes—as have to a greater or lesser degree the 
executives—but also from respect for the constitutional relationships between the branches of 
the state. This customary respect can be argued to encompass the Court of Justice, if at a 
remove; the routine recognition by a Member State’s courts of the acquis communautaire 
lends it, and by extension the Court of Justice, legitimacy from the perspective of the 
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 Some evidence of this respect was noted by Rasmussen, who 
was unable to find any instance of a Member State challenging, in its observations, the 
Court’s reasoning in a previous case.
103
 
The situation is different as regards the element of legitimacy that stems from the application 
of legislation for which a government is responsible. A given Member State may have had 
much less input into legislation, even if (as is usually the case) it voted for the measure in the 
Council. Of course, even national legislation is the outcome of bargaining, but the 
intergovernmental nature of the EU’s legislative procedure means that governments are likely 
to feel less ownership of legislation and potentially less respect for any resulting case law. 
This is where the continuous discourse model of member-state observations is a better 
description of what takes place: the opportunity for the Member States both to have a second 
attempt to mould primary and secondary law to their satisfaction, and to be involved in the 
Court’s procedure, can be argued to restore some legitimacy to the Court in the eyes of 
national governments. There is a corollary: if it is accepted that the opportunity for the 
Member States to take part in the Court’s proceedings supports the legitimacy of the Court 
and its case law, it seems likely that the prestige of the Court will be higher in a Member 
State where the government regularly engages with the Court’s proceedings. This hypothesis 
would be challenging to test empirically owing to the difficulty of distinguishing cause and 
effect: does a Member State participate in the Court’s proceedings more frequently because 
that state respects the Court, or does frequent participation strengthen respect? Both are likely 
to be true. Nevertheless, the existence of the procedure may reinforce the Court’s legitimacy 
even if the Member States do not avail themselves of it. 
There is a further aspect to this. The legitimacy of a court’s case law depends on its 
procedural correctness in terms of coherence, the court’s methods of interpretation and its 
reasoning; this is what Lenaerts terms ‘internal legitimacy’.
104
 Unlike in domestic 
jurisprudence, these are all areas in which member-state governments may seek to influence 
the Court. Thus Member States’ input may improve judgments, making the decisions more 
                                                   
102 If possibly not the Fourth Estate. 
103 Rasmussen, On Law and Policy in the European Court of Justice: A Comparative Study in Judicial 
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104 Koen Lenaerts, ‘The Court’s Outer and Inner Selves: Exploring the External and Internal Legitimacy of the 
European Court of Justice’ in Maurice Adams and others (eds), Judging Europe’s Judges: The Legitimacy of the 
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usable by national courts in the future and adding to legitimacy. Lasser argues that the 
concise style of the Court of Justice’s judgments tends to provide an account of the Court’s 
reasoning that is insufficient to ‘generate an appropriate degree of … judicial legitimacy’, but 
that the more discursive style of Opinions tempers the problem.
105
 To the extent that a 
Member State’s legal arguments are laid out and dealt with by the Advocate General, they 
will contribute to legitimacy by that route also. 
Returning to external legitimacy, the influence that member-state governments might have 
over the Court’s legitimacy was described above in terms of the continuous discourse model. 
It may, however, also be described in terms of the Court’s need to find the limits of its ‘zone 
of discretion’. Garrett, Kelemen and Schulz express this thus: 
The Court’s legitimacy ultimately relies on the support of member governments and 
hence on its serving as an impartial interpreter of EU law. In order to maintain its 
legitimacy, the Court will seek to avoid making decisions that it anticipates 
governments will defy. In order to maintain its status as an independent arbiter, 
however, the Court must strive to maintain legal consistency and to minimize the 
appearance of succumbing to political pressures from interested parties.106 
It can be argued that that Member States’ interventions enable the Court to establish the 
boundaries of its ‘zone of discretion’, beyond which political pressures will come into play. 
This model of member-state intervention will be described in Chapter 7 but in the meantime 
might, barely, support an argument that Member States’ interventions aid the Court by 
reinforcing its legitimacy. 
The opposite argument might be made regarding the legitimacy of the Court of Justice in the 
eyes of the public. As Rossi and Vinagre e Silva point out of interventions in cases on access 
to documents, when a Member State ‘charges into pending proceedings’ to support 
institutions against applicants, or more generally governments against individuals, this ‘will 
hardly engender sympathy on the part of the public’ (towards the Member State) nor indeed 
towards the Court of Justice.
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The preceding arguments have, of necessity, been made in very general terms, but the 
usefulness of this hypothesis should not be underestimated. It is relevant to all the models that 
have been postulated to explain Member States’ interactions with the Court of Justice and, 
unlike the points deliberated in the other sections of this chapter, is not confined to individual 
cases but is a universal effect. 
Reciprocal benefits 
The reasons that the Court might benefit from Member States’ submissions given above include a 
number that benefit both Court and governments, but even those that are identified as being 
primarily of use to the Court—the contribution that observations may make to case management, 
for instance—benefit governments by promoting an expeditious and mutually agreed-upon 
dispute resolution system. It can be argued that the majority of the points highlighted are of 
mutual benefit: the provision of factual information; the clarification of political implications 
including issues of national identity, the provision of feedback from the Member States on 
possible legal changes and the more precise identification of the legal principles governing a case. 
As noted above, the primary role envisaged for observations is described in the Court Registry’s 
Notes for the Guidance of Counsel: ‘It is important to bring to the attention of the Court the 
factual circumstances of the case before the national court and the relevant provisions of the 
national legislation at issue.’108 Although the phrase implies that this would be of assistance to the 
Court, it is clear that such submissions of fact may also be of benefit to the Member State making 
them, and not merely by assisting the Court to reach a rapid and legally correct decision. 
Governments wish, among other things, to maximise their revenue from taxation, to avoid having 
to rethink policy and redraft legislation, and to preclude state liability; thus they may hope to spin 
even this most neutral-seeming provision.  
This reciprocal aspect to Member States’ observations is ignored in much academic argument 
about their significance, although it is implied, if rarely made explicit, by the Court itself. The 
notion that national courts and the Court of Justice acted in cooperation ‘to make direct and 
complementary contributions to the working out of a decision’ was articulated in Schwarze in 
1965.109 By contrast, the contribution of governments is merely implied in statements to the effect 
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that the Court’s interpretation is confined to the facts and national provisions as disclosed by ‘the 
documents before the Court’, which of course include the observations of the Member States.110 
The suggestion that Member States cooperate with the Court to their mutual benefit is not 
intended to imply that this cooperation does not have a contentious aspect, of course: Member 
States are rarely disinterested parties. Alter’s characterisation of the development of the European 
legal system as a ‘negotiated compromise’ between the Court of Justice and the national courts 





The stated purpose of Member States’ observations is to assist the Court in terms of factual 
information and, impliedly, legal argument. They may contribute to the chain of argumentation 
that enables the Court to reach its conclusions. As such, they have increasingly been discussed by 
the Court and cited—admittedly chiefly in the Opinions—as if they were conventional academic 
arguments.112 These primary purposes are easy to overlook when the emphasis is on the 
argument that observations may be used to threaten non-compliance or eventual override if 
the Court reaches unwelcome conclusions. The discussion in this chapter acknowledges that 
there is indeed scope for such threats. If Larsson is correct, the Court may perceive Member 
States’ submissions not just in terms of constraints, but in terms of opportunities. But even if 
this possibility is discounted, member-states’ submissions can be argued to be an essential 
tool in enabling the Court to assess how strongly the Member States feel about the issues 
raised. 
The main conclusion to be reached from this discussion is that there is a range of ways in 
which Member States’ submissions can be of use to the Court in addition to the provision of 
factual information, at one end of the spectrum, and the laying down of Member States’ red 
lines, at the other. In between those extremes, Member States may be of help to the Court in 
identifying the ‘correct’ questions from a reference, drawing attention to less obvious or long-
term legal implications and analysing relevant case law. Their submissions may assist in 
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deciding if an Opinion is needed and what formation of the Court is required. In addition, the 
fact that the procedure exists, and is used in the way that it is, can only support the Court’s 







Chapter 5: Why do Member States submit observations to the Court? 
Introduction 
This chapter and the next will consider Member States’ reasons for making submissions in 
preliminary reference cases. These reasons will be divided into those which unequivocally 
support the thesis that states’ submissions are intended purely to further their own interests, and 
those that are wider (or more ambiguous) in their intentions. 
As noted in Chapter 3 and discussed by Granger and van Stralen, a complete explanation must 
have two facets: governments’ reasons for putting in place the procedures and resources for 
intervening as a general policy, and government bodies’ reasons for submitting observations in a 
particular case.1 The first aspect was discussed in Chapter 3 in terms of how a government’s 
willingness to set aside resources for such interventions may be limited by, among other things, 
the Member State’s size and economic circumstances: in other words, how they balance policy 
and capacity. The second aspect is, of course, equally affected if there is a shortage of resources. 
Some Member States have a proactive participation policy, assessing each preliminary reference 
for its relevance to their strategic view of EU legal development. Others may be forced by 
limitations in capacity into a more reactive participation policy, usually submitting observations 
only in cases originating in their national courts. Lack of resources may even affect a 
government’s ability to respond tactically at the level of cases originating in a national court. 
This chapter considers how participation in cases at the Court might benefit Member States in 
general, whether or not they are in practice willing—and able—to take advantage of the 
opportunity to do so. It argues that the resulting taxonomy of reasons, alongside that developed in 
the previous chapter for the viewpoint of the Court, can be employed to test theoretical models of 
the relationship between the Court of Justice and Member States. A general point about member-
state observations is first discussed: the importance of recognising that decisions about making 
observations may be made at several different levels of a Member State. It then offers a possible 
classification of the benefits to the Member State of submitting observations. 
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Which part of government? 
The fact that a state may be treated as a legal person does not justify a reductionist view that it 
speaks with a single voice. Several different bodies may have an influence on whether a Member 
State submits observations, and those bodies may differ in their motivations and even be opposed 
to one another. Government ministries may have different interests and different constituencies 
and—particularly in federal structures—be under the influence of different political parties.2 The 
Dutch checklist (Appendix C) asks, ‘Is there agreement with other departments (in sight)?’. It 
thus parenthetically acknowledges that negotiation between ministries may be taking place. As 
was noted in Chapter 3, the effect of a difference between government departments may vary 
from country to country. In the UK, for instance, the EU Litigation Unit within the Cabinet Office 
attempts to broker an agreement, and if that fails, it may instruct its agent based on its own 
understanding of the issue.3 In Germany, in the absence of a consensus, the practice of the EU 
Litigation Unit within the Federal Ministry for Economic Affairs and Energy is that no 
submission will be made.4 
Regrettably, it is rarely possible to determine the reason for a government’s failure to submit 
observations in a case where, with hindsight, one might have been expected. A disagreement 
between ministries is a probable explanation when a government that is usually an active 
intervener neglects to submit observations in a case which has significant consequences, 
especially if other governments do intervene. One possible example is ABNA, in which seven of 
the then fifteen Member States—and both the Parliament and the Council—intervened in an 
argument about the proportionality of detailed labelling requirements for feedstuffs.5 France, 
Italy, the Netherlands, Denmark and Greece argued that the measure was proportionate to its 
public health aims and the UK and Spain that it was not. Germany’s absence from this debate 
seems inexplicable unless it can be argued that the ministries were unable to agree on a position.  
                                                   
2 Argued in a talk by Bjorn Beutler and Thomas Pickartz of the Federal Ministry for Economic Affairs and 
Energy (Bundesministerium für Wirtschaft und Energie), University of Münster, 14 November 2014. 
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It is harder to attribute to internal disagreement a failure to submit a government’s views in cases 
with few observations. The UK’s neglect of Mangold,6 in which the only brief was from 
Germany, is more likely to be attributable to inattention (or, as noted below, sheer disbelief) than 
to disagreement over the government’s line on the issue of horizontal direct effect.7 However, an 
interviewee reported that the UK legal agents were ‘disgruntled’ that no submission was made in 
Mangold, which points to the possibility of a lack of communication between the UK government 
and its independent counsel. 
Disagreements may also arise within government departments. Davies describes a celebrated spat 
that occurred in Germany when, post-van Gend, several ministry functionaries issued a statement 
to the Court rejecting the principle of direct effect, only for their actions to be described as 
‘politically extremely unseemly’ by their Secretary of State, who pointed out that this was 
contrary to Germany’s official position.8 
There may also be a difference of opinion between different levels of government. In the UK this 
may be manifested as a disagreement between the civil servants who work day to day in an area 
that is heavily dominated by EU law—and who may perceive themselves as working in 
cooperation with the EU institutions—and government ministers. Young and Sloman observe that 
‘for some departments, like the Foreign Office and the Ministry of Agriculture, [the EU] is the 
dominating premise of their professional lives.’9 Civil servants—who may have been involved in 
an area of legislation since it was shepherded through the Council of Ministers and the European 
Parliament—may have a different understanding of a matter from that held by ministers, who 
may be new to their portfolios and who may, in any case, understand the issues from a more 
political viewpoint.10 This difference of approach illustrates a more general theme that needs to 
be taken into account when considering governments’ approach to participation at the Court of 
Justice: that the proceedings may bring up issues with political, as well as legal, salience, and 
accordingly draw different responses from different parts of government. 
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Pierson and Leibfried, in arguing that competition between centres of political power has affected 
the development of EU social policy, also emphasise that governments are not monolithic.11 They 
acknowledge the Court’s role in the formulation of policy, especially where levels of government 
are in disagreement and there is gridlock at the national level.12 It could be argued that, where 
such competition exists, the content of government observations may depend upon their specific 
source and may convey different nuances of policy preferences to the Court. Unfortunately for 
researchers, without insider knowledge, it is usually impossible to determine the internal source 
of a Member State’s submission, but it should be borne in mind that different departments and 
levels of government may hold different views. 
The executive and the legislature may similarly have different understandings and objectives. 
National legislatures are given little opportunity to interact with the Court in their own right, only 
having the option of reacting to an unwelcome decision after the fact by attempting contrary 
legislative measures. Their only opportunity for influence is via their executives. In the UK, for 
instance, parliamentary committees might have been able to pressurise a government department 
at either the civil service or the ministerial level. Even this level of influence may be weakened in 
the case of devolved or federal legislatures, which may have to go through administrations which 
themselves have limited opportunity to express their views. The Scottish administration, for 
instance, was required to draft submissions in cases that concerned its implementation of EU 
legislation but the Cabinet Office had to agree on the contents.13 Thus the observations submitted 
by a Member State may be the outcome not just of negotiations between different departments 
but between executive and legislature. 
Summary of taxonomy 
It is more challenging to devise a taxonomy of reasons why Member States might submit 
observations than to offer reasons why the Court might find them useful. As such, this is simply 
one possible classification. Ten (non-exclusive) categories are suggested. In addition to the 
economic, political and structural disparities that contribute to differences in the states’ 
participation rates, the relative importance of these factors also varies. This latter point will be 
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expanded upon in the next chapter, in which a direct comparison will be made between Denmark, 
Ireland and the UK. 
1. A government has an immediate interest in the outcome of a case 
2. A government has a preferred answer on a technical issue 
3. A government has a preferred interpretation of a provision or principle of EU law 
4. A government is acting in support of another Member State 
5. A government feels the case is relevant to national constitutional interests 
6. A case is relevant to a government’s economic or policy preferences  
7. A government feels a case offers an opportunity to clarify the law  
8. A government wishes to guide the evolution of EU law  
9. A government sees domestic political benefits in being seen to participate 
10. A government sees the benefit of strengthening the EU’s dispute resolution system and 
the long-term health of the EU legal order 
In the context of the Member States, the list given in the previous chapter could be said to 
conflate types of information conveyed by a Member State to the Court and the Member State’s 
motives in conveying that information. For example, a Member State’s submission clarifying the 
factual circumstances of a case before its national court is of direct help to the Court in its 
deliberations but, for the Member State, conveying the information is usually not an end in itself 
but a step towards achieving its objectives. This logical distinction may not always be made 
explicit in this chapter, but it should be understood in the arguments that follow. 
1. A government has an immediate interest in the outcome of the national case 
In many instances, the government of a Member State may have an immediate interest in the 
outcome, either in terms of a direct fiscal impact or of having to redraft legislation or change 
national practices. This follows from the fact that a government department or agency is a party 
to around 80% of cases referred.14 The government may alternatively wish to avoid distributional 
outcomes or financial impacts on private companies. In Preston, for instance—a case on the 
extension of occupational pension schemes to part-time workers—the UK government expressly 
referred to the potential effects on employers and pension schemes.15  
                                                   
14 In 2006, for instance, 125 of 156 preliminary references (80%) had one or more governmental bodies as party. 
15 Case C-78/98 Preston EU:C:2000:247. 
131 
 
A member-state government also has an interest in the speedy resolution of national cases, 
particularly but not only those to which it is a party. That the efficiency of the Court in resolving 
preliminary references has become a concern for governments is evidenced by two reports issued 
by the UK House of Lords’ European Union Committee on the workload of the Court, and the 
associated parliamentary debates.16 Lord Howell of Guildford, then Minister of State at the 
Foreign and Commonwealth Office, stated that ‘the delay resulting from this backlog of cases is 
bad for British businesses’ while Lord Marks referred to ‘delay, inefficiency and frustration for 
litigants and for business.’17 It is evidently in a government’s interest to promote the efficiency of 
the Court by making clear the facts of a case in their written pleadings and, if necessary, at the 
hearing. Speed and accuracy may, however, conflict with each other. Absent the full facts of a 
case, the Court may confine its judgment to general remarks and remit consideration of the 
detailed facts to the referring national court—as, of course, it should. In UPC Telekabel Wien, the 
Advocate General made this clear: 
Having regard … to the incomplete clarification of the facts and lack of particulars 
regarding the specific measure in the present case, it is neither appropriate nor 
possible to undertake a full examination of the necessity and proportionality here. 
Rather, the national court can only be provided with a few considerations. Moreover, 
these by no means constitute an exhaustive list of the factors to be weighed. Rather, 
the national court must fully weigh up all the relevant facts and circumstances of the 
specific case.18 
In these circumstances, a less well-informed Court would seem to be a more efficient, or at least a 
speedier, Court. 
A Member State will commonly have a direct interest in national cases to which its government is 
a party, but also in other Member States’ cases because of the erga omnes effect of the Court’s 
rulings. An example of such a case, which raised not just issues of constitutional principle but the 
likelihood of legislative changes in every Member State, is Metock. 19 Advocate General Poiares 
Maduro observed, ‘The constitutional significance of the subject explains the liveliness of the 
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debate, with no less than ten Member States intervening … to challenge the interpretation put 
forward by the applicants in the main proceedings and the Commission.’20 As noted earlier, all 
ten did indeed have to alter national legislation as a result of the Court’s judgment. 
A case does not, of course, have to concern matters of principle to have consequences for the 
other Member States: a decision on a customs classification may affect the income of other 
Member States that manufacture similar goods, and a finding that a product violates a protected 
geographical designation may harm national producers. In Prosciutto di Parma, for instance, in 
which a British company was accused of violating the terms of the protected geographical 
designation for Parma ham by slicing and packaging it in the UK, the French and Spanish 
governments submitted observations agreeing with Italy’s position that Parma ham could only be 
packaged in its area of origin—on the face of it, a measure having equivalent effect to a 
quantitative restriction. This was presumably because both countries have national products that 
are similarly required to be packaged, as well as produced, in a defined geographical area.21 
There are also cases in which a Member State’s interest in a case arising in another Member State 
is more direct. In Gambazzi, for instance, a case on the recognition and enforcement in Italy of an 
English judgment, the Court appears to have relied on the UK’s observations to understand the 
relevant issues of English civil procedure.22 This is less than clear from the judgment but is 
evident from the UK’s observations, which clarify an unclear order for reference. The UK and 
Italian written observations in the case are among the rare examples that are available online, 
having been released in response to a Freedom of Information request.23 
Gambazzi is an example of a case where the direct interests of two Member States conflicted: 
Italy wished not to recognise the English court judgment as a matter of policy. Such conflicts of 
interest are not uncommon and lead to a difficulty with the simple political-pressure model: 
assuming that the Court’s decisions are indeed constrained by the expressed preferences of 
governments, from which Member State(s) should it take its cue? Alter suggests that the Court is 
most likely to follow those Member States from which it is perceived as getting the most support, 
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i.e. Germany and the Netherlands.24 Conant’s 2007 review article draws attention, however, to 
considerable controversy about the relative influence of different Member States, this controversy 
concerning everything from the validity of different statistical analyses of the case law to the 
overarching models chosen.25 The one thing that appears to be agreed upon is that Member 
States’ observations do stand as expressions of national interests. 
Arabadjiev comments that the Court fully expects Member States to defend their national 
interests in their observations, but also expects them not to depart from their duty of sincere 
cooperation under Article 4(3) TEU: ‘Thus, even if the government is expected to defend its 
national interests, it is also expected to act in good faith.’26 
2. A government has a preferred answer on a technical issue 
The term ‘technical issue’ is far from having a legal definition, but despite it having only been 
used twice by the Court (by AG Szpunar in a copyright case27 and by AG Cosmas in a case on 
acceptable terminology on food labels28) it can be taken to denote a detailed criterion against 
which an entity’s compliance with the law may be measured. It may be difficult to determine if a 
Member State genuinely has no financial interest in the resolution of a technical issue. As noted 
above, most apparently technical decisions do have immediate financial consequences for 
governments or effects on their companies. Even if there are no financial or political 
consequences, a government may simply defend its current procedures in the hopes of not having 
to change them: see, for example, the account of member-state observations (plus those of the 
parties and Commission) in AG Cruz Villalón’s Opinion in Bara, a case in which the Romanian 
government sought to defend its data-protection procedures.29 This equally applies to suggesting 
answers in other states’ cases where those states have similar national provisions. Nevertheless, 
just as it appears that Member States may make observations in support of clarifying the case law 
when there is no immediate benefit to them, states may proffer their understanding of a technical 
issue when they appear to have nothing at stake. 
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3. A government has a preferred interpretation of a provision or principle of EU law 
Situations where a government has (or probably has) an interest in a case’s outcome should be 
distinguished from those where the result of the case is unlikely to result in financial or legislative 
embarrassment, but a Member State still has a preferred answer to the question(s) referred. Such 
preferences may be directed at the detail of EU provisions or general principles, or both. 
The possibility of such preferences being wholly disinterested is raised here mainly to be 
dismissed. It is conceivable that a Member State’s preferred answer may simply be a matter of 
legal logic. However, it is more likely that a case might be relevant to an issue of particular 
national concern—whether ideological, party-political or constitutional—or that the case falls 
into what could be called a legal-development arc in which a Member State is particularly 
interested. The most likely scenario is one in which both legal and policy concerns are raised. 
Dederke and Naurin offer some guidelines in distinguishing between a Member State’s political 
or policy views and its views on the legal issues.30 They suggest that legal salience may be 
measured by the content of each case in terms of important legal doctrines such as direct effect 
and sovereignty, or alternatively by how frequently each case is cited subsequently. For political 
salience, they score cases based on how controversial an issue appears to have been during the 
EU’s legislative process. 
It should be noted that governments may not necessarily only intervene because they are afraid 
that the Court would otherwise reach an unsatisfactory conclusion; they may, in fact, expect the 
Court to arrive at their preferred outcome but wish to ‘future-proof’ the decision by ensuring that 
the Court’s legal reasoning will withstand scrutiny. 
Before discussing these (not always distinguishable) situations, it is worth remembering that a 
government may be restricted from discussing issues that concern it even when a case appears to 
raise them. There are significant limits to the scope of the issues that the Court will consider if the 
referring national court did not raise them. However, the Court has shown itself to be more ready 
to discuss principles of EU law that arise out of an order for reference than to consider new 
questions. 
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An example of a case where a government might be responding only to the legal logic of a case, 
or to be disinterestedly assisting the court, was Melloni.31 Arabadjiev suggests that the UK was 
acting as a ‘“neutral” and “unbiased” … amicus curiae’ in the case, which concerned the 
European Arrest Warrant and, in particular, the perennial question of whether a national court 
could apply a higher standard of fundamental rights protection than that afforded by the Charter. 
Arabadjiev argues that the UK’s submission favoured a more expansive interpretation of the 
Charter than ‘the narrow national interest’ would imply and ‘thus acted as a special ‘neutral’ 
counsel to the Court.’32 It is difficult to distinguish this motivation from no 11 below, in which it 
is argued that a Member State may intervene in support of the overall health of the EU legal 
order. 
In other cases, such supposed neutrality may reflect a Member State’s finding itself in the 
position of having to make a strategic decision in a situation in which the interests of a national 
industry conflict with considerations of national sovereignty. For instance in Nouvelles 
Frontières, the UK’s observations supported the direct effect of competition rules in the air 
transport industry—therefore speaking in favour of an extension of the Single Market—to the 
benefit of its industry but, at least theoretically, at the expense of its sovereignty.33 In such 
circumstances, the Member State’s motivation for making a submission can only be determined, 
if at all, by examining each case on its own merits. Governments’ preferred interpretations of the 
EU’s rules and principles are, as Cramér and others point out, revealed preferences that constitute 
valuable empirical data to studies of judicial politics.34 It is unfortunate that, for the reasons 
enumerated in Chapter 2, their utility is restricted by their inaccessibility. 
There is a further situation possible, in which a Member State might make a submission only 
because of a government’s policy of doing so in all cases resulting from its national courts. As 
Arabadjiev comments, the contents of such submissions ‘do … not necessarily reflect a 
government’s litigation strategy as a whole’, and provide less information than submissions in 
other states’ cases.35 Several countries have such a policy: Poland, Romania and Malta had made 
submissions in every case from their courts as at the end of 2013, and eight others in more than 
90% (all newer Member States apart from Portugal and Finland). It is also worth noting that one 
                                                   
31 Case C‑399/11 Melloni EU:C:2013:107; Arabadjiev (n 26) 8. 
32 ibid, 9. 
33 Joined Cases 209 to 213/84 Asjes EU:C:1986:188. 
34 Per Cramér and others, See You in Luxembourg? EU Governments´ Observations Under the Preliminary 
Reference Procedure (Swedish Institute of European Policy Studies 2016).  
35 Arabadjiev (n 26) 2. 
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country, Bulgaria, had never intervened in another state’s case. In the latter situation, more can 
perhaps be learnt from the national cases in which it did not make observations. 
4. A government is acting in support of another Member State 
A government may proffer an answer to a question in which it has no apparent direct interest 
because it is acting in support of another Member State. However, it may also do so because it is 
unsure if a result that is directly applicable to the referring Member State might also have legal 
implications at home, 36 or it may be motivated by a more theoretical concern over a point of law. 
In either of the latter situations, the Member State may have been waiting for an opportunity to 
express its preferences, but a relevant case may not have come before its courts. The need to wait 
for a more-or-less genuine national case is a persistent problem with using the preliminary 
reference system as a means of uploading national preferences. In any event, these motives are 
not mutually exclusive, and it may be impossible to determine which applies in a given case. 
 
Research into the degree to which the Member States cooperate in their submissions is very 
limited. In an interview, the Joint Head of EU Litigation at the Cabinet Office commented that in 
the UK, the legal agents who prepare and deliver observations could be expected to have forged 
links with government departmental lawyers in other Member States. She said that there was 
lively correspondence within a network of EU litigation specialists, drawing each other’s 
attention to upcoming cases of interest and making sure that everyone knew which Member 
States intended to make submissions and what line each wanted to take. If they found that the 
governments were in agreement about what answers to recommend to the questions referred, the 
group would calculate whether there was a sufficient weight of Member States already intending 
to intervene or whether others should be encouraged to add their voices.37 Granger’s interviews 
with legal agents elicited that at least some Member States occasionally held intergovernmental 
meetings to coordinate their positions, as did van Stralen’s with civil servants. Although this does 
not imply that any of the participants were doing so without a national interest, it does make it 
clear that governments did consider their strategic relationships with the other Member States 
when planning their submissions, or lack of them.  
Van Stralen’s interviews with Dutch and Swedish civil servants elicited two very telling 
statements. One, by a member of the Dutch Ministry of Finance, was expressed in terms of 
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37 Interview with the Joint Head of the EU Litigation Unit, Shasa Behzadi Spencer, 23 July 2014. 
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diplomatic tact: they said ‘if the Netherlands does not show up to support another Member State 
in tax cases, it is effectively a signal that the Netherlands thinks that Member State’s legislation is 
wrong.’38 The use of such a signal is predicated on other Member States’ expectation of support 
from the Netherlands. Another of van Stralen’s interviewees stated that the Dutch environment 
ministry occasionally helped other Member States by suggesting legal arguments to support their 
cases, but that this occurred chiefly in cases in which the Netherlands did not intend to 
participate. This could be taken as an example of the Dutch government supporting another 
Member State, but it also suggests that the ministry recognises a third option besides ‘make 
submission’ and ‘do not make submission’, which is ‘support another country’s submission’. Far 
from offering disinterested support, the Netherlands could be said to be soliciting help from the 
other Member State in a case of intermediate importance to it.39  
More generally, Granger’s interviews with government legal agents elicited references to 
cooperation between the agents of Belgium, Denmark, Finland, Sweden and the United 
Kingdom.40 
Cooperation between the Member States may not only be to their mutual benefit but may be 
useful in conveying their consensus to the Court or—where there is more than one ‘camp’—to 
allow the Court to assess the differing opinions. 
5. A government feels the case is relevant to national constitutional interests 
It is possible to argue that the preliminary reference procedure provides an opportunity for some 
kind of constitutional impact assessment of EU legislation by the Member States. The result of 
such an assessment might be of theoretical interest to the Court, but it would mainly be of 
importance to the Member States. However, it is not clear that governments invariably recognise 
this opportunity or, if they do, that they avail themselves of it. 
Although many cases are relevant to national constitutional interests, it can be argued that a 
‘constitutional’ case is one that considers the three-way legal relationship between states, the EU 
and citizens, in some general, overarching manner, and where the relationship falls within the 
scope of the Treaties. Constitutional issues may, therefore, range from specific questions of 
national sovereignty, the supremacy of EU law, defining the proper limits of judicial power, and 
                                                   
38 Stralen (n 1). 
39 Stralen (n 1) 34.  
40 Marie-Pierre F Granger, ‘When governments go to Luxembourg ... the influence of governments on the Court 
of Justice’ (2004) 29 ELR 3, 14 and fn 79.  
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state liability to, for instance, the Court’s fundamental rights jurisprudence. Matters of 
subsidiarity and the procedural autonomy of the Member States also fall under this heading. 
However, it is rare for these issues to be mentioned in the order for reference; instead, they are 
usually uncovered by the Court. 
While doctrinal accounts of EU law concentrate on individual ‘constitutional’ cases through 
which the Court has expounded constitutional doctrine and expanded the reach of EU law, those 
cases are not necessarily recognised immediately—least of all by governments. Some cases that 
are now treated as central to the constitutional narrative of EU law seem to have arrived at the 
Court entirely beneath Member States’ radar: Stauder v Ulm, Ratti and Marleasing, for instance, 
received no state observations at all, and Mangold only one.41 These figures should be considered 
in the context of an overall rate of Member State intervention of 79%.42 It might be argued that 
these significant decisions simply took governments by surprise, or occasionally that 
governments disbelieved that a particular conclusion was possible.43 However, an analysis of 
member-state governments’ observations does suggest that the concerns of those whose task it is 
to make submissions to the Court are more likely to reflect government policy at the level of the 
dispute, or to defend national procedural autonomy, than constitutional considerations. An 
example of the latter would be cases that hinge on whether national procedural rules may place 
time-limits on the exercise of rights under a Directive.44  
As an aside, it could be argued that this apparent concentration on matters of practicality rather 
than principle tends to support the theory that government observations form an aspect of the less 
consciously directed neofunctionalist model, rather than being evidence of intergovernmentalism. 
In other cases, Member States do anticipate that a constitutional issue might be addressed and 
may even see an opportunity to force into the open an issue that the Court did not intend to 
discuss. An example of the latter is the UK’s observations in Pringle, which were chiefly directed 
not at the question referred but at encouraging the Court to make a statement about the scope of 
the simplified revision procedure.45 
                                                   
41 Case 29/69 Stauder v Ulm EU:C:1969:57; Case 148/78 Ratti EU:C:1979:110; Case C-106/89 Marleasing 
EU:C:1990:395; Case C-144/04 Mangold EU:C:2005:709. 
42 4,051 out of 5,103 cases for which judgments were available at the end of 2013. 
43 As in, apparently, Mangold (per Dashwood). 
44 See e.g. Case C-63/08 Pontin EU:C:2009:666 where the Luxembourgish government defended such time-
limits; Case C-105/14 Taricco EU:C:2015:555. 
45 Case C‑370/12 Pringle EU:C:2012:756 (ibid). 
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It is not surprising that Member States might wish to influence the outcome of constitutional 
cases. What requires explanation is that they do not make the attempt more often. One possible 
argument is that, in cases where governments have challenged constitutional developments via 
Court proceedings, they have tended to fail. Stein, in his landmark 1981 paper on the Court, 
looked at eleven such cases in which governments had submitted observations and found that in 
ten out of the eleven, governments had argued against the development being contemplated (and 
supported by the Commission). In all eleven, the Court followed the Commission.46 It is unclear 
to what extent this finding is particular to constitutional cases; Stone Sweet and Brunell have 
found that the statistically most substantial influence on the Court’s judgments, in general, is the 
position of the Commission.47 Failure may in any case not be absolute; Arabadjiev observes that 
‘an argument [that] failed to change the outcome of a given case, might have influenced the Court 
in a different way, for example by adding a nuance to its reasons or by omitting certain 
considerations which could have otherwise been made.’48 It is also worth noting that the Court 
does not necessarily answer all the questions referred and may prune out legal arguments relating 
to questions it does not wish to answer. Thus some member-state observations will be disregarded 
on those grounds alone. 
Whatever the reason for Member States’ apparent reluctance, a satisfactory model of the 
relationship between member-state governments and the Court must take into account this 
relative dearth of observations in constitutional cases. Nevertheless, constitutional issues form the 
backbone of the narrative on EU law and are looked at in more detail below. 
5.1. Sovereignty, subsidiarity and competence 
As was noted above, it is necessary to have a convincing explanation for those occasions when 
member-state governments do not submit observations to the Court of Justice, despite apparently 
having a strong interest in so doing. Earlier chapters have considered reasons why some particular 
Member States rarely intervene. This particular sub-heading, however, looks at a legal principle 
that seems to garner fewer observations than might be expected from all Member States: that is, 
cases that pit national sovereignty against the supremacy of EU law. They are briefly compared 
and contrasted with cases on the related issues of subsidiarity and competence. 
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48 Arabadjiev (n 26) 3. 
140 
 
The limitations placed on national sovereignty by the Treaties were first articulated in van Gend 
and Costa, which received observations from Belgium, Germany and the Netherlands, and Italy, 
respectively. The same form of words (‘The Community constitutes a new legal order, for the 
benefit of which the States have limited their sovereign rights, albeit within limited fields, and the 
subjects of which comprise not only the Member States but also their nationals’) was repeated in 
Cassis de Dijon, which received two observations from the then nine Member States.49 The 
immediate subject-matter of these cases—a customs classification, a lawyer’s challenge to his 
electricity bill and the alcohol content of crème de cassis—might initially suggest that the 
Member States did not intervene because they failed to anticipate that issues of sovereignty might 
arise. However, the example of cases on state liability—which involves not just a challenge to the 
state’s sole authority over its citizens but requires the state to compensate those that EU law 
regards it as having wronged—suggests that failure to anticipate the principles a case might 
uncover is not a complete explanation. 
There were 39 decided cases on state liability up to the end of 2013, and every case received 
observations from at least one Member State. But in eight cases, no observation was submitted by 
the originating state, and the average number of interventions for all cases was 3.3. Bearing in 
mind that the founding case on state liability, Francovich,50 reached the Court in 1990 when there 
were already twelve Member States, this is somewhat surprising. Nearly two-thirds of the 
submissions came from just five countries: the UK, Germany, Italy, Netherlands and France, 
whereas five countries made observations in only one case and eight in none. While the average 
number of interventions for cases on all topics over the same period was 2.1, some individual 
cases received as many as 14 from 15 Member States (BASF, on patents, and Banco Popolare di 
Cremona on turnover taxes).51 Are national governments more concerned about the fine detail of 
patents and taxation than about their sovereignty? This is not to suggest that taxation is a matter 
without constitutional significance: as Granger notes, ‘taxation is one of the last bastions of state 
sovereignty, and a significant policy tool.’52 But government observations were generally 
                                                   
49 Case 120/78 Rewe-Zentral EU:C:1979:42; observations from Germany (by request of the Court) and 
Denmark. 
50 Joined cases C-6/90 and C-9/90 Francovich and Bonifaci EU:C:1991:428; Francovich itself drew 4 member-
state submissions. 
51 Case C-44/98 BASF EU:C:1999:440; Case C-475/03 Banca popolare di Cremona EU:C:2006:629. 
52 Marie-Pierre Granger, ‘States as Successful Litigants before the European Court Of Justice: Lessons from the 
“Repeat Players” of European Litigation’ (2006) 2 Croatian Yearbook of European Law and Policy 27, 39. 
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expressed more in terms of procedural autonomy than of sovereignty per se.53 An exception 
might be Transportes Urbanos y Servicios Generales, in which the Spanish government’s 
observations were directed at the question of whether the Court was competent to examine the 
judgments of a Member State’s constitutional court and hence its constitutional arrangements.54 
No other Member State submitted observations in that case. 
Other examples of an unexpected scarcity of observations in cases that raised sovereignty 
questions include Internationale Handelsgesellschaft (two observations from six Member 
States)55; Simmenthal (1/9);56 Macarthys v Smith (1/9);57 Von Colson (3/10);58 Marleasing 
(0/10);59 Foster v British Gas (1/12);60 and more recently Landtová (2/27).61 The Factortame 
cases provide another illustration of this unpredictable response: Factortame I, which 
contains the critical supremacy decision, garnered two member-state observations from the then 
twelve Member States, from Ireland and the UK; Factortame II on the compatibility of the UK 
merchant shipping registration scheme with EU law, received seven observations.62                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                               
Factortame II was one of the three cases (the others being Brasserie du Pêcheur/Factortame 
III on state liability and Faccini Dori on untransposed directives) that received observations 
from the highest percentage of Member States of all the ‘constitutional’ cases from 1961 to 
2013, at seven from twelve states.63 By contrast, the six cases that received observations 
from more than 90% of the existing Member States were on competition (three cases), VAT, 
IP and gambling. 
A closely related issue to sovereignty is competence; indeed, the two may be difficult to 
distinguish in the wording of a given case. One of the most notable examples of member-state 
                                                   
53 See discussion in Case C-5/94 R v MAFF, ex p Hedley Lomas (Ireland) Ltd EU:C:1995:193, Opinion of AG 
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54 Case C-118/08 Transportes Urbanos  EU:C:2010:39. 
55 Case 11/70 Internationale Handelsgesellschaft EU:C:1970:114. 
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60 Case C-188/89 Foster v British Gas EU:C:1990:313. 
61 Case C-399/09 Landtová EU:C:2011:415. 
62 Case C-213/89 R v Secretary of State for Transport, ex p Factortame EU:C:1990:257; Case C-221/89 R v 
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participation is in Opinion 2/15 of the Court,64 on whether the EU had sole competence to reach a 
trade agreement with Singapore. 24 of the 28 Member States submitted written observations and 
one further state participated in the hearing, leaving only three states not having intervened.65 
Other cases that generate a great deal of member-state concern are those on the principle of 
‘Kompetenz-kompetenz’ with Member States repeatedly asserting the right of their constitutional 
courts to decide who has jurisdiction over matters, particularly, of fundamental rights. 
The majority of references to competence are, however, largely incidental. The issue of 
competence arises at least in passing in some 13% of preliminary references. However, the 
pattern of member-state submissions in these cases does not differ significantly from that overall: 
they drew observations from an average of 14% of the Member States. In the cases which drew 
the most submissions (73% of the then fifteen Member States in British American Tobacco on 
tobacco marketing rules and Vanbraekel on hospital treatment in other Member States), the main 
topics were what attracted attention.66 Sixteen other cases in which competence was relevant 
drew observations from more than half of the Member States, including Factortame II and 
Faccini Dori, Reyners on establishment and Viking and Laval on posted workers; others were 
competition, tax and IP cases.67 Meanwhile, 8% of the cases received no observations at all. 
There are several possible explanations for an apparent relative lack of member-state engagement 
in sovereignty issues as compared with more practical matters. They include the likelihood that 
issues of principle are unlikely to be heralded in an order for reference and the fact that the civil 
servants in individual ministries are more likely to be engaged with EU law at the level of 
departmental policy than at that of overarching principle. The important point is that any 
convincing model of Member State interaction with the Court of Justice should be able to 
accommodate this finding. 
5.2. National balance of power 
Another related constitutional issue upon which governments may wish to be heard is the balance 
of power between different domestic institutions and actors. Börzel and Risse observe that there 
may be ‘institutional misfit’ between the structure of governance at the EU level and national 
                                                   
64 Opinion 2/15 concerning the competence of the EU to conclude the Free Trade Agreement with Singapore 
(EUSFTA) EU:C:2017:376. 
65 Non-participating Member States were Croatia, Estonia and Sweden. 
66 Case C-491/01 British American Tobacco EU:C:2002:741; Case C-368/98 Vanbraekel EU:C:2001:400. 




rules, procedures and constitutional conventions, which may disturb the domestic balance of 
power. In particular, they argue that EU decision-making empowers governments at the expense 
of other domestic actors.68 At the same time, the preliminary reference procedure offers an 
opportunity for the judiciary and governments to assert themselves at the expense of the 
legislature. This takes place within a framework in which the institutions and actors at the 
supranational and national levels are linked, and within which their relationships may be 
elucidated and adjusted if an opportunity arises. The ability to create such an opportunity, 
however restricted it may be, can be argued to empower individuals and pressure groups vis-à-vis 
governments. Hence governments may either wish to argue in support of a shift of power towards 
themselves, or in favour of the status quo, versus (for example) a pressure group. 
As with questions of sovereignty, however, concerns over the domestic balance of power may 
both impel governments to intervene or, paradoxically, make them reluctant to do so. The mere 
existence of the preliminary reference procedure is uncomfortable for some Member States in that 
it can be perceived as the exercising by national courts of a power of judicial review over the 
other branches of government. This is particularly so in countries where the courts have no power 
of review of primary legislation, such as the UK, or where a majoritarian tradition has generally 
prevented such a power being exercised.69 In the case of Denmark, for instance, Rytter and Wind 
argue that the legislature is regarded as the primary legitimate source of authority and it is 
regarded as unacceptable that ‘non-elected quasi-guardians’—the judiciary—should have the 
power to impose limits on the actions of a legislature elected by popular mandate.70 Thus, they 
argue, Danish judges have been relatively unwilling to refer questions to the Court of Justice of 
their own initiative.71 Wind, Martinsen and Rotger use this as an explanation for Denmark’s low 
absolute rate of making preliminary references—Danish courts only having referred 131 cases in 
the period to the UK’s 461—but reference rates are affected by many factors, including a 
country’s population and hence its level of judicial activity.72 Danish courts have referred more 
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cases per head than the UK. It can be argued that Denmark’s adherence to a particular 
understanding of constitutional propriety serves as a better explanation for the government’s low 
rate of submitting observations to the Court. Thus it attempts to preserve its domestic balance of 
power more by non-participation than by defending it before the Court of Justice. 
A consequence of the fact that a government ministry is a party in the majority of referrals is that 
a government may feel the need to defend itself at the level of the Court of Justice from its own 
national court’s understanding of the case. In most instances, the government’s assessment of the 
court’s position will be educated guesswork. However, in some jurisdictions, a national court 
may be asked for a ‘preliminary opinion’ on (for instance) the legality of a proposed change to 
legislation. A preliminary opinion may itself then be the subject of a preliminary reference.73 
Nyikos finds that, where such preliminary opinions have been referred, the government’s 
observations disagree with the national court’s view about 70% of the time. She concludes, 
‘Hence, governments are driven at least in part to submit observations by disagreement with and 
reactions to the national court’s position.’74  
Meanwhile, national courts may be inspired to refer questions to the Court based on their 
perception of the shortcomings of domestic law, and a government to submit observations in its 
defence. In Taricco, AG Kokott observed that ‘contrary to the view taken by the Italian 
Government, the referring court is not prevented from making the systemic shortcoming of Italian 
criminal law … the subject-matter of a reference to the Court.’75 The Italian government was here 
arguing that the Court of Justice had no jurisdiction over its system of limitation periods. In 
contrast, the national court argued that Italy was neglecting its obligation under EU law to 
provide for effective penalties in the event of tax fraud. 
Another factor in the domestic balance of power is the relationship between the government and 
industry. While governments may put pressure on individual companies, the Court of Justice 
provides a more plausible forum for maintaining pressure on particular sectors of industry. One 
example is the gambling industry. As van den Bogaert and Cuyvers observe, ‘gambling presents 
Member States with a dilemma: how to regulate an activity which is perceived as morally 
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objectionable and socially harmful, yet which generates significant revenue … and seems 
impossible to prevent anyway.’76  
Gambling is increasingly a cross-border, online activity and is the focus of criminal activity. Thus 
it is an industry that governments seek to regulate firmly. This is evident from the fact that no 
gambling cases have gone without government intervention and only 13% have had only one 
submission; in fact, the average gambling case receives observations from around a quarter of 
Member States. Some stand out as having attracted very high levels of interest indeed, notably 
two cases on lotteries: Schindler, which received observations from eleven out of twelve states 
and Stoß which received observations from thirteen of the then 27.77 The most frequent intervener 
is Belgium—in over two-thirds of the cases—closely followed by Portugal and Germany. Both 
the importance of gambling issues and the less usual protagonists suggest that this is not just an 
area where the Member States feel that EU law needs to be elucidated, but one where the 
Member States are actively intervening to keep the industry in check. 
As Larsson observes, ‘[i]f the decisions of judges affect policy and in effect change laws, they 
also change the rights and duties of the citizens of a polity, and redistribute resources among 
them.’
78
 It can be argued that governments are aware of the Court’s potential for reaching 
decisions in favour of other societal actors beside themselves, and one motive for governments’ 
submission of observations is to counteract this potential redistribution of power and resources. 
Effectively, observations take their place among the checks and balances of a working political 
system. 
5.3. The balance of power between Member States and the Court of Justice itself 
While the potential effect of Court proceedings on the balance of power within a Member State is 
rarely considered, challenges to the balance of power between the Member States and the EU 
preoccupy the literature. The question of the supremacy of EU law versus national sovereignty 
was considered at the beginning of this section, but the specific issue of the perceived 
empowerment of the Court of Justice vis-à-vis Member States was not discussed. 
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There is an extensive literature on how the Court is empowered by its role as the final interpreter 
the Treaties.79 As Shapiro points out, entities bound by an incomplete contract such as the 
Treaties must commit in advance to the jurisdiction of the body that interprets the treaty and fills 
in its lacunae.80 This does not, however, prevent governments from seeking to limit this 
commitment and to try and take advantage of third-party dispute resolution without allowing the 
Court to trespass beyond the boundaries of those disputes. 
The literature of the Court’s supposedly expansionist law-making will not be reviewed here. 
What is clear is that authors have supposed the Member States to be trying to limit the Court’s 
role right from the first preliminary reference case to reach the Court. In that first case, Bosch, 
four of the six Member States submitted observations, with the French government attempting to 
employ a typical method of attack: to argue that the Court lacked jurisdiction.81 The same 
argument was used in van Gend, in which the Belgian, German and Dutch governments argued 
that, while the Court could decide on the interpretation of the Treaty of Rome, it had no 
jurisdiction over its application in an individual case—and, as a consequence, that Treaty 
provisions could not have direct effect.82 Interestingly, Davies notes that the German Justice 
Ministry ‘agree[d] with the rejection of direct effect … but stated that for clarity’s sake, it would 
be a good idea to issue the ECJ a government statement so that the court would feel obliged to 
explain its reasoning more fully.’83 This alludes to a motive for submitting observations that will 
be discussed in section 7. 
Subsequently, Member States’ hostility to the doctrine simmered down. Alter argues that conflict 
on this point was avoided in the context of infringement cases by the Commission’s concentrating 
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on cases with low material impact that did not ‘arouse political passions.’84 The same could be 
argued to apply to preliminary reference cases, where the quotidian nature of the topics is rarely 
such as to rouse political ire. Weiler argues that preliminary reference cases gave the Member 
States little foothold for battling the doctrine of direct effect because they were forced to make 
their arguments in a judicial arena in which precedent on the one hand, and a presumption that 
governments would stand by their declarations on the other, discouraged diplomatic 
manoeuvring.85 The reception of the doctrine of direct effect became, in de Witte’s words, ‘rather 
successful, on the whole’. 86 Any remaining challenges by governments have been directed less at 
the Court’s jurisdiction and more at the scope of the doctrine’s application, in particular that a 
case refers to a ‘purely internal situation’. Incidentally, the argument that a case refers to a purely 
internal situation may also be put by the Court in refusing jurisdiction: see, for instance, the 2018 
case of Bán.87  
6. A case is relevant to a government’s economic or political/policy preferences 
Governments may tend to intervene in individual cases that they see as relevant to their specific 
economic or political preferences. Mattli and Slaughter identify a desire to support one economic 
sector over another, to put economic interests over social interests or to defend the rights of their 
nationals over those of nationals of other Member States.
88
 A decision about whether to intervene 
may involve the government balancing multiple goals—for example, good industrial relations 
versus promotion of a national industry—in the context of a court that is also balancing different 
considerations and is perceived to have different priorities from the Member States.89 The Court 
has found itself asked to step into economic areas that Member States are used to regarding as 
wholly within their purview, such as industrial relations.
90
 Member States may well feel 
compelled to defend the balance of power between themselves and the Court in these just as in 
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more abstract constitutional cases.91 They also, as Greer and Martin de Almagro Iniesta point out, 
have an incentive to avoid political change and instead to invest effort in maintaining their 
policies and politics.92 
An example of a policy area that is of high importance to Member States is, unsurprisingly, 
citizenship. Over half of Member States demonstrate a higher likelihood of participating in 
citizenship cases than their average across all the substantive topics, and fourteen, including two 
of the three 1973 accession states, participated more than twice as often. 
Denmark, which has strong national concerns about citizenship, made submissions in 32.6% of 
the cases on citizenship that were referred to the Court, five times its overall average of 6.4%. 
Ireland did so in 16.3% of citizenship cases, nearly four times its average of 4.5%. The UK was 
also more active in these cases, making observations in 45.3% of citizenship cases, nearly twice 
its average of 23.5%, plus 30% of free movement cases and 42% of asylum cases. Despite the 
high salience of EU citizenship issues to the 1973 states, there were only three cases in which the 
three all submitted observations: Ibrahim, McCarthy and Dereci.93 All asked important general 
questions about immigration law and they received four, five and eight member-state submissions 
respectively. 
There may also be areas that are of significance to a Member State as a matter of more 
disinterested national policy, such as transparency to Sweden.94 Although the access-to-
documents cases in which transparency has been the central issue have been direct actions, van 
Stralen, who interviewed Dutch and Swedish civil servants about their countries’ submission 
policies, says:  
[S]everal Swedish interviewees mentioned the furthering of transparency within the 
EU as a reason to submit observations. This commitment to transparency can in and 
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of itself, motivate a Swedish submission: ‘transparency, that’s very important so if 
any case concerns this principle of transparency, we enter and defend it.’95 
7. A government feels a case offers an opportunity to clarify the law  
Member States may submit observations that convey their belief that an area of law is in urgent 
need of clarification. Depending on the scope of the uncertainty, governments may be unable to 
find an intelligible framework of EU law within which to operate, or they may need to establish 
certainty concerning a single point of law that is of concern to a government, its companies or 
citizens. Many such observations are of reciprocal benefit to the Court and the Member State. 
An example of an area of law within which the Member States have sought to establish legal 
certainty is that of the interpretation of national laws in the light of Directive 93/13 EEC, the 
Directive on Unfair Terms in Consumer Contracts. It seems unlikely that the institutions or the 
Member States originally envisaged the importance that the Directive, a solid Single Market 
provision, would attain in the aftermath of the financial crisis of 2008 onwards. The number of 
applications for preliminary rulings on the Directive multiplied from only one in its first decade 
to 46—mainly on consumer credit—in the last five years of this study,  resulting in 27 judgments 
of the Court. Although 17 of these cases drew either one or two observations, one case received 
six and one, CHS Tour Services, seven.96 The Member States most keen to be involved were 
Spain, which submitted observations in thirteen cases, Germany (10), Hungary (8) and Austria 
(7). Denmark and the UK submitted observations in one case each and Ireland in none. 
These consumer protection cases demonstrate that a government may submit observations, not 
because its departments, or its companies or citizens, are concerned in a case, but because it 
anticipates that problems might arise in the future if the law is not clarified. Member-state 
concerns may be directed towards an entire area of the law or a single legal point. The two cases 
in which Denmark and the UK submitted observations illustrate the Member States’ drive 
towards legal certainty. Denmark was one of four Member States that submitted observations in 
Hypoteční banka, which concerned Czech court procedures that enabled actions against foreign 
nationals whose whereabouts were unknown.97 The four intervening member-state governments 
agreed, and the Court concluded, that the Czech procedures in question were indeed conducive to 
legal certainty. CHS Tour Services, in which the UK made observations, arose from a dispute 
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between two Austrian companies and otherwise affected only their exclusively British customers. 
However, in addition to Austria and the UK, observations on the interpretation of EU consumer 
law provisions were submitted by Germany, Italy, Hungary, Poland and Sweden. 
This line of cases has continued beyond the period of this study, mainly examining the legality of 
national provisions that make it difficult for courts to assess the compliance of consumer credit 
agreements with the Directive.98 It can be argued that consumers now experience better 
protection as a result of greater consistency in Member States’ compliance with the Directive—
itself partly a result of greater legal certainty. 
8. A government wishes to guide the evolution of EU law 
A closely related category is where Member States are motivated to make submissions by a wish 
to guide an evolving area of the law in its preferred direction, or contrarily hope to limit the 
Court’s jurisdiction over a subject area. More generally, a Member State may see a case as 
providing an opportunity to upload its specific ideological, economic or political preferences. 
This category of motivation, and the concept of uploading, will be discussed at more length in 
Chapter 7. 
This is the most specifically political category of submissions. As such, it is one in which the 
Member States often break up into opposing groupings in their observations. A classic example 
of this may be found in the observations submitted in the Viking and Laval cases.99 These pitted 
the right of workers to take industrial action, as enshrined in Article 28 of the Charter of 
Fundamental Rights and elsewhere, against the freedom to provide services and the freedom of 
establishment. In both cases, the industrial action was aimed at preventing a company engaging in 
a form of social dumping, undercutting wages and employment conditions in an older Member 
State by seeking to employ workers from a lower-wage Member State. 
In Viking, in which a company wished to reflag a ferry from Finland to Estonia to take advantage 
of lower wages in Estonia, the Court received thirteen submissions from Member States plus 
observations from Norway. Laval, which concerned workers posted from Latvia to Sweden, 
received fourteen, plus observations from Iceland, Norway and the EFTA Surveillance Authority. 
In both, there was a striking contrast in the answers proposed by the 2004 accession group and 
the older Member States. 
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In Laval, where the contents of the observations can only be determined from the AG’s Opinion, 
it is apparent that the older states (plus Iceland and Norway) argued that the right to take 
collective action was a fundamental right outside the scope of the Treaties.100 Opposing 
submissions came from Czechia, Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania and Poland. The same pattern can be 
seen in Viking, for which the Report for the Hearing is available. The older Member States and 
Norway produced several arguments: that the right to take collective action was outside the scope 
of the Treaties; that either collective action could not count as a restriction for the purposes of 
Article 43, or that it was objectively justified, or that Article 43 did not, in any case, have 
horizontal direct effect. Czechia, Estonia, Latvia and Poland argued variously that collective 
action was not outside the scope of the Treaties, that it was a restriction under Article 43 and that 
that the Article had direct effect, but also that collective action in these cross-border situations 
was directly or indirectly discriminatory. Denmark’s position was similar to that of the new 
Member States. It argued that, while the EU was not competent to regulate trade union action, 
action taken to prevent a company exercising its right of freedom of establishment by reflagging a 
ship was not protected collective action and therefore constituted a restriction under Article 43. 
The UK’s main argument was that there was no fundamental right to take industrial action 
protected by EU law. 
The government positions in both cases, although argued in terms of EU law, chiefly reflect 
economic and political considerations and, most notably in the case of the UK’s observations, a 
long-standing policy position that is hostile to the provisions of the Charter. They are also 
characteristic of a general trend of conflicts between the submissions of newer and older Member 
States to which Larsson and Naurin, and Cramér and others, draw attention.101  
Areas of conflict between the Member States have been studied more comprehensively in the 
context of legislation. Thomson, for instance, demonstrates that there is the least conflict in the 
areas of agriculture and the free movement of goods, and most in the areas of the free movement 
of labour and associated employment rights, and in issues of European integration.102 Cramér and 
his collaborators echo these observations. 
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This (hardly unexpected) continuity has been analysed statistically by Dederke and Naurin. They 
noted that, if a state had expressed a strong opinion in the Council, that opinion was more likely 
to surface in its observations.103 This unsurprising continuity between Member States’ policy 
positions at the legislative stage and their likelihood of submitting observations in those policy 
areas will be returned to in Chapter 7. 
A Member State’s strategy in these cases may be less than explicit. It may consist less in making 
legal arguments that state a government’s position but instead in nudging the Court to categorise 
a case in a certain way, either by uncovering a broader issue lurking in a reference or in extracting 
what the Member State wishes to be the ‘right’ question. Alternatively, a state may try to deflect 
the Court away from a category that the member-state government would rather not see expanded 
or to exclude specific questions, usually based on jurisdiction. 
9. A government sees political benefits in being seen to participate 
In this chapter, the benefits to the Member States of participating in Court proceedings have 
mainly been expressed in terms of three things: financial benefits to governments and their 
national companies, the preservation of the legislative status quo, and the defence of 
governments’ policy preferences. Each of these concrete benefits may gain a government political 
advantages at home and internationally. A governing party may also, however, act only to boost 
its political standing or prestige, with no expectation of a direct benefit. At home, it may act to 
maintain its standing within the current parliamentary session and with an eye to the next general 
election. It may also act in support of what Wendt describes as ‘collective self-esteem’, that is, 
the maintenance of national (as opposed to party) prestige.104 
The topic of prestige is a wide one and has not been extensively discussed in the context of 
membership of the European Union. While a detailed consideration is outside the scope of this 
thesis, it is worth pointing to some issues that may be significant in governments’ interactions 
with the Court of Justice. Member States’ prestige is usually analysed as being won on a broad 
stage: being seen to take part in international law-making and being one of a group of states that 
assume a collective identity.105 It can be argued that participation in the Court’s proceedings 
contributes to these achievements not only by achieving results but simply by participating and 
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being listened to. Dowding and Mergoupis link this to the concept of Voice, arguing that giving 
people (or, in this context, governments) a voice raises their self-esteem and their identification 
with the larger group.106 
It is difficult to ascertain how reliably prestige can be turned into influence. However, Wendt’s 
‘collective self-esteem’ can arguably be linked to the degree to which a given Member State has 
what the Harvard political scientist Joseph Nye describes as ‘soft power’: the ability to achieve its 
diplomatic ends by co-opting favourable opinion.107 This soft power may be brought to bear both 
on the EU and outside it, and exercised both as a nation state and as a Member State, i.e. as an 
individual country and within the collective scope of the EU’s external relations. 
Prestige is not just a concern of larger states: Novack, for instance, argues that national self-
esteem is a motivator for Finland and Sweden in their relationships with the EU.108 By contrast, 
Rytter and Wind, referring to the Court specifically, argue that Danish politicians have not seen 
the Court as ‘a site for influence or policy-making’.109 Granger notes that French agents have 
used possible damage to France’s long-term reputation as a reason not to take certain positions in 
submissions to the Court.110 
Whether the Member States’ domestic audiences are aware of the positions taken by their 
governments is questionable. If the assumption is made that domestic audiences will only learn 
about their governments’ actions via the press, it is possible to make some general observations 
about news coverage. First, the generally technical nature of the questions referred makes it 
difficult for the news media to spot upcoming issues that might, in principle, be of interest to their 
audiences. As a result, coverage of non-exceptional cases tends to be confined to legal or business 
journals or the relevant trade papers. In the UK, for instance, the Court is mentioned around three 
times as often in The Economist than in the (apparently obsessed) Daily Mail. Second, the degree 
of coverage does vary from country to country: for instance, in his thorough examination of the 
reception of the Court’s early jurisprudence in Germany, Davies demonstrates that there has been 
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significant coverage of EU law in the German press.111 Third, the nature of the coverage depends 
on the political alignment of the publisher. Indeed, it could be argued that any action by a 
government that appears to conceptualise the EU in supranational terms, including 
acknowledging the authority of the Court of Justice, may outrage the Eurosceptic press. 
Apart from in the work of Davies and Granger, there appears to have been little analysis of the 
political and diplomatic effects of Member States’ mere participation at the Court of Justice. 
Granger asserts ‘Having in mind the nature of political life, it does happen that, at times, 
governments’ participation in ECJ proceedings is motivated only by the need to show domestic 
constituencies that they are trying to do something about it, without the government having any 
hope (or even desire) of winning the case or influencing case law.’112 Granger argues that, for 
some countries, participation can be tied to the electoral cycle and thus favours participation only 
in cases where the government expects an immediate political return on its investment of 
resources; she identifies Luxembourg as a Member State where such a short-term advantage is 
the government’s only motive in making its ‘very occasional’ observations.113 
Davies argues that in Germany, there was a significant public discourse in the 1960s and 1970s 
concerning EU law and that this public discourse influenced the Federal Constitutional Court in 
its Solange judgment.114 Davies bases his conclusions on an analysis of the news media of the day 
and identifies a critical awareness of EU law on the part of the general public, albeit framed in 
terms of the inferiority of EU law’s fundamental rights protection to that guaranteed by the post-
WW2 Grundgesetz or Basic Law. While Davies chiefly demonstrates that public opinion affected 
the interaction of the German legislature with EU law, he argues that the German government 
was undoubtedly concerned about the domestic reception of its actions concerning EU law in the 
1960s and 1970s and provides some examples of pressure on the government from the press. For 
instance, he notes that, in response to German doubts after the Costa decision over the supremacy 
of EU law, Die Welt called upon the government to represent ‘the German point of view’ on EU 
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law.115 It should be noted that this was in 1965, three months into the Empty Chair Crisis and at a 
time when Germany wished to be seen as the Good European in contrast to Bad European France. 
There are, of course, cases at the Court that catch the headlines elsewhere: an example from the 
UK is the press coverage of Factortame.116 Geddes refers to Factortame having been greeted by a 
‘chorus of disapproval’ in the press, and the case is still being cited in arguments about Brexit.117 
Other cases with constitutional significance may, however, be overlooked. 
Just as ‘the government’ is not a monolithic entity, ‘the public’ consists of several constituencies, 
only some of which governments intend to appeal to directly—although for cases that have come 
to popular attention, those constituencies may include the news media. Even if a government does 
not canvass an affected sector in advance of making observations (as, for instance, the UK 
Intellectual Property Office does in IP cases), it is likely to consider its audience. It may also 
make a government position that failed known to those interested after the hearing, as the UK 
government did following the Court’s decision in Tele2 Sverige. Following this case, which drew 
15 submissions from member-state governments, the UK published a ten-point reaction to the 
Court’s judgment on the data retention provisions of Sweden and the UK.118 
The view that a government might wish to make known the position it took in its observations is 
somewhat contradicted by evidence of the UK’s inconsistent approach to issuing such 
information. In Briels, both the UK’s written and oral observations were put into the public 
domain, as were its written observation in ATAA; its written observations in Gambazzi were 
released as the result of a Freedom of Information Act request.119 However, a request for the same 
information was rejected by the Information Commissioner's Office (ICO) in Alimanovic on the 
grounds that such documents were not created for proceedings before a national court and 
therefore did not fall under the provisions of the Act.120 The ICO said: 
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The Commissioner is therefore satisfied that [the Freedom of Information Act] 
allows sufficient leeway for an authority to rely on the exemption in cases where the 
court in question … does not exercise the judicial power of the state and yet is an 
international court whose jurisdiction the UK has recognised that exercised the 
judicial power of the state.121 
Similarly, Ireland refused an FOI request for all its observations made up to 2013.122 There 
appears to be a tension between demonstrating to a particular community that the government is 
acting to its benefit (in general) and acceding to requests for specific information about a 
government’s position from individuals. Notably, these call for responses from different levels of 
government. 
Nevertheless, it can be argued that being seen to participate in the decision-making processes of 
an EU institution may in itself contribute to a perception that a Member State has influence both 
inside and outwith the EU. It is unfortunate that relatively little of such government activity is 
exposed to domestic audiences, via the news media or otherwise. This is not so much from the 
viewpoint of governments’ status, but because it could be argued that, from the moment that van 
Gend was decided, Member States had a responsibility to make the public aware that EU law was 
a guarantor of individual rights that could be vindicated both domestically and, ultimately, at the 
Court of Justice.123 
10. A government sees the benefit of strengthening the EU’s dispute resolution 
system and the long-term health of the EU legal order 
This final category of motivation—that governments seek to strengthen the EU’s legal system— 
may be the hardest for which to find convincing evidence, despite being proposed several times. 
Mattli and Slaughter argued in their seminal 1993 paper that the first potential category of state 
preference was a preference for ‘an effective dispute resolution system—a mechanism for 
enforcing voluntary agreements and bargains.’124 The assumption that non-state users of the EU 
legal system are seeking an efficient cross-border dispute resolution mechanism is one of the 
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bases of the neofunctionalist model of the European Union. Equally, to the extent that 
governments tend to make submissions in support of national companies and industries in cases 
in which they are not parties, it should also be an aspiration of Member States. 
There is no doubt that Member States have expressed, in various ways, a desire to see the legal 
system of the EU operating smoothly. The UK House of Lords has, for instance, produced two 
reports on the efficiency of the Court’s procedures, in 2011 and 2013.125 Kilbey points out that 
Member States—including the UK—have argued strongly in favour of strengthening the Court’s 
enforcement mechanisms in infringement actions.126 States are more likely to comply with the 
Court’s findings if they have a reasonable expectation that other states will be held up to the mark 
by the Court if they fail to implement provisions of EU law or do not enforce them. 
The argument may also be posed in terms of legitimacy. Just as Member States’ participation in 
the Treaty revision procedure lends the Treaties legitimacy, their participation in Court 
proceedings also has a decisive role in the legitimacy and acceptance of the acquis 
communautaire, including Member States’ willingness to implement or comply. 
Finally, it can be argued that Member States have a broader constitutional stake in the success of 
the EU legal system. Dougan argues that ‘the process of legislative experimentation and 
discovery [enhances] the long-term health of the Community legal order’ and participation in the 
Court’s proceedings is undoubtedly part of this process.127  
Conclusion 
While there are reasons for a member-state government to intervene that are concerned with high-
level political concerns—its constitution and the national and international balances of power—
responses to cases are not usually, or perhaps ever, instigated at a political level but at a 
functional level - within government ministries and by civil servants. This research did not 
uncover any examples of ministers initiating observations, contributing to them or even seeing 
them in advance. It is tempting to look upon government contributions in the most important 
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cases as representing some form of constitutional impact statement, but while they may have this 
effect they rarely seem to have been conceived in those terms. Nevertheless, this classification of 
Member States’ reasons for making submissions to the Court reflects responses to issues that 
have political, as well as legal, salience to governments. Both are significant. They are in practice 
hard to separate, and it could be argued that each category listed may involve legal and political 
considerations to greater or lesser degrees. Governments may also respond to cases for reasons of 
fiscal prudence, as in the Imexpo case highlighted in the previous chapter, or out of a desire to 
avoid making changes to legislation.128 
It will be argued that any theory of the interaction between Member States and the Court must 
take all of these motivations into account. It must also acknowledge that governments’ 
submissions are of value to the Court as well as the Member State. 
It is not suggested that political scientists are unaware that preliminary references may be 
concerned with technical matters or that some government observations merely serve to clarify 
national legislation. Instead, it can be argued that these day-to-day exchanges of information may 
be played down in support of particular theories. Typically, the position being defended is one in 
which the Court is considered to have an integrative agenda against which the Member States 
have to defend themselves. Much statistical endeavour has been devoted to evaluating such 
empirical evidence as exists in an attempt to assess the credibility of Member States’ ‘threats’.129 
It can be argued that it is significant that, despite this mathematical effort, the argument rumbles 
on. 
The next chapter will compare and contrast the motives of the 1973 Member States in submitting 
observations to the Court and will relate the findings to the classification laid out in this chapter. 
  
                                                   
128 Case C-379/02 Imexpo Trading EU:C:2004:595. 
129 Bernadette A Kilroy, ‘Integration through the Law: ECJ and Governments in the EU’ (PhD Thesis, UCLA 
1999); Clifford J Carrubba, Matthew Gabel and Charles Hankla, ‘Judicial Behavior under Political Constraints: 
Evidence from the European Court of Justice’ (2008) 102 American Political Science Review 435; Clifford J 
Carrubba, Matthew Gabel and Charles Hankla, ‘Understanding the Role of the European Court of Justice in 
European Integration’ (2012) 106 American Political Science Review 214; Olof Larsson and Daniel Naurin, 
‘Judicial Independence and Political Uncertainty: How the Risk of Override Affects the Court of Justice of the 







Chapter 6: Denmark, Ireland & the UK 
Introduction 
This chapter will examine the relationship of Denmark, Ireland and the UK with the Court of 
Justice. It will demonstrate that the categories of motives laid out in the previous chapter are, to 
different degrees, relevant to each of these Member States. 
The three states of the first, north-western, expansion of the European Community form a group 
mainly only in their length of membership, forty-one years as at the end of 2013. They constitute 
three of the four states1 that Schimmelfennig and Winzen identify as most strongly demonstrating 
‘constitutional differentiation’ in their acceptance of EU policies. In comparison with the original 
six member states, the 1973 states joined with more significant constitutional concerns—about 
sovereignty and aspects of national identity—and were able to secure differential treatment, in 
terms of treaty opt-outs.2 One thing they do have in common is that none has a constitutional 
court, although Ireland’s Supreme Court has the jurisdiction to conduct judicial review of 
legislation, as does Denmark’s Højesteret at least in theory, if rarely in practice. Whether states 
without constitutional courts are more or less likely to submit observations, all other things being 
equal, has not been tested here. However, their constitutional structure means that if the 
compliance of a national measure with EU law is challenged before a lower court, that court will 
often have no recourse but to remit the question to the supranational level. Accordingly, there 
might be more national cases in which the government feels obliged to defend itself.  
                                                   
1 The fourth being Sweden. 
2 Frank Schimmelfennig and Thomas Winzen, ‘Instrumental and Constitutional Differentiation in the European 
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3 Population figures from Eurostat, 2011 Census 
<https://ec.europa.eu/CensusHub2/query.do?step=selectHyperCube&qhc=false> accessed 28 July 2020; GDP 
figures from International Monetary Fund World Economic Outlook Database October 2013 
<http://www.imf.org/external/pubs/ft/weo/2013/02/weodata/weoselco.aspx?g=110&sg=All+countries+%2f+Ad
vanced+economies> accessed 26 July 2020. 
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Nevertheless, the differences within the group are greater than their similarities, and thus they can 
usefully be compared and contrasted. Some differences are simply down to size: as far as their 
legislative power is concerned, Denmark and Ireland are of a similar small size, and under the 
Treaty of Nice they had equal voting weights (7 votes each) in the Council of the European 
Union.4 By contrast, as Naurin and Lindahl point out, the UK’s natural comparators are the other 
three large Member States: Germany and France, which are larger than the UK, and Italy which is 
slightly smaller; each had 29 votes.5 Additional comparisons and contrasts lie in their 
constitutional traditions and histories. Denmark and the UK are constitutional monarchies and 
Ireland a republic; each embodies a distinctive version of constitutional democracy; Denmark is a 
civil-law jurisdiction and Ireland and the UK common-law jurisdictions. All three states 
demonstrate suspicion of some aspects of EU law and have both opt-outs from, and referendum 
locks on significant changes to, the Treaties. Denmark is regarded as a somewhat paradoxical 
‘good citizen’6 while the UK remained the ‘awkward partner’7 to the end.  
In the context of their application of EU law, Denmark and Ireland are both reasonably prompt 
and accurate transposers of EU law, with 30 and 38 infringement proceedings open respectively 
as at 31 December 2013. The UK was somewhat less so and had 53, the eighth highest number—
although to put this figure in proportion, Italy (consistently the worst offender) had 104. By 
comparison, in the year to 31 December 2013, Denmark referred 6 cases for a preliminary ruling 
in 2013, Ireland 4 and the UK 14. Over the period studied here, the totals are Denmark 132, 
Ireland 61 and the UK 460.8 Thus, as de la Mare and Donnelly express it, the three Member 
States display different ‘reference potentials’.9 As was noted in Chapter 3, Denmark participated 
in 6.4% of all preliminary reference cases between 1973 and 2013, Ireland in 4.5% and the UK in 
24% (see Figure 16). To gain an idea of the proportion of cases in which, say, the UK submitted 
observations, it is necessary to sum the blue sector (of the three, only the UK submitted 
                                                   
4 Council of the EU – Majority Voting <http://www.consilium.europa.eu/en/council-eu/voting-system/qualified-
majority/> accessed 26 July 2016. 
5 Daniel Naurin and Rutger Lindahl, ‘Out in the Cold? Flexible Integration and the Political Status of Euro Opt-
Outs’ (2010) 11 European Union Politics 485. 
6 Rebecca Adler-Nissen, ‘The Diplomacy of Opting-out: A Bourdieudian Approach to National Integration 
Strategies’ (2008) 46 Journal of Common Market Studies 663; Rebecca Adler-Nissen, ‘Justice and Home 
Affairs: Denmark as an Active Differential European’ in Lee Miles and Anders Wivel (eds), Denmark and the 
European Union (Routledge 2014). 
7 Stephen George, An Awkward Partner: Britain in the European Community (3rd edn, OUP 1998). 
8 Excluding references that were subsequently withdrawn. 
9 Thomas de la Mare and Catherine Donnelly, ‘Preliminary Rulings and EU Legal Integration: Evolution and 
Stasis’ in Paul Craig and Gráinne de Búrca (eds), The Evolution of EU Law (2nd edn, OUP 2011) 366. 
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observations), the turquoise sector (Ireland and the UK), the purple sector (Denmark and the UK) 
and the yellow sector (all three submitted observations).  
 
Figure 16: Proportion of observations submitted by Denmark, Ireland and UK 
Denmark, Ireland and the UK share the distinction of having negotiated opt-outs from the 
Treaties: Ireland and the UK on the Schengen agreement,10 Denmark and the UK on the Euro,11 
Denmark on defence,12 the UK (with Poland) on the Charter of Fundamental Rights13 and all 
three on the Area of Freedom, Security and Justice.14 
                                                   
10 Protocol (No 19) On the Schengen Acquis Integrated Into the Framework of the European Union; Protocol 
(No 20) On the Application of Certain Aspects Of Article 26 of The Treaty on the Functioning of the European 
Union to the United Kingdom and to Ireland [2010] OJ C83/01. 
11 Protocol (No 16) On Certain Provisions Relating To Denmark; Protocol (No 15) On Certain Provisions 
Relating to the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland [2010] OJ C83/01. 
12 Protocol (No 22) On the Position of Denmark [2010] OJ C83/01. 
13 Protocol (No 30) On the Application of the Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union to Poland 
and to the United Kingdom [2010] OJ C83/01. 
14 Protocol (No 22) On the Position of Denmark; Protocol (No 21) On the Position of the United Kingdom and 
Ireland in Respect of the Area of Freedom, Security and Justice [2010] OJ C83/01. 
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For charts depicting the percentage of cases on selected topics in which Denmark, Ireland and the 
UK have submitted observations, see Appendix D. 
Denmark 
There are two main matters to explain when looking at Denmark’s submissions to the Court of 
Justice. The first is the less complicated: why does Denmark make submissions in the cases that it 
does? The answer is most commonly that the government has an immediate, probably financial, 
interest in the outcome of a national case. Such a motive is common to all Member States and 
will be dealt with fairly briefly. Another particular feature is Denmark’s higher political 
sensitivity to issues around immigration and national identity than many other Member States. 
This is connected to the second matter, which is more individual to Denmark and bears detailed 
examination: Denmark’s broad reluctance to engage with EU law. This negative motivation, if so 
it can be called, will mainly be discussed under the heading of ‘national constitutional interests’. 
Denmark’s activity at the Court of Justice 
Denmark is considered to be conscientious in transposing and implementing EU law.15 Figure 17, 
however, gives a vivid illustration of Denmark’s relative inactivity vis-à-vis the Court of Justice. 
Denmark has sent relatively few cases to the Court—131 decided cases from 1973 to 2013—and 
made observations in 355 cases, 79 from its own courts and 276 from others. Its overall rate of 
submitting observations in its own cases, at 60%, is higher than Ireland’s (48%) and much lower 
than the UK’s (88%). It can be argued that the Danish government’s close control over the 
referral of cases from Danish courts (of which more below) makes it possible for the government 
to seek to influence cases as much by preselection as by submitting observations. 
As Table 6 indicates, 79% of the observations submitted by Denmark have been in cases from 
other states, although this represents only 6.5% of such cases. The percentage has slightly 
increased since the late 1990s to a figure of around 10% in recent years—slightly more than 
Ireland but less than half the rate of the UK. This nevertheless indicates that the Danish 
                                                   
15 Gerda Falkner and Oliver Treib, ‘Three Worlds of Compliance or Four? The EU-15 Compared to New 
Member States’ (2008) 46 JCMS 293, 309; Tanja A Börzel and others, ‘Obstinate and Inefficient: Why Member 
States Do Not Comply With European Law’ (2010) 43 Comparative Political Studies 1363; European 
Commission, ‘31st Annual Report on Monitoring the Application of EU Law’ (2014) 16. 
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government is becoming more engaged with EU law beyond its own cases, an intention 
confirmed in interviews carried out by Rytter and Wind in 2010.16 
A Member State’s reasons for limiting its involvement in EU law-making and dispute resolution 
may fall into two groups. The first result from the systemic factors identified in Chapter 3, being 
chiefly matters of resources. The second group of reasons are discussed in the previous chapter: 
constitutional concerns, a (lack of) desire to influence the development of particular areas of EU 
law or a government feeling that it will not gain political capital at the national level from being 
intervening. 
It will be argued that Denmark’s reasons for limiting its involvement with proceedings at the 
Court are little to do with size and resources but mainly to do with policy considerations, 
including its strong constitutional objections to a supranational legal system. These objections are 
also reflected in the Danish courts’ apparent reluctance to make referrals. Meanwhile, the 
observations that Denmark does make are mainly concerned with technical issues of EU law, 
although there are exceptions. In particular, Denmark tends to step outside its self-set boundaries 
in cases on citizenship. 
                                                   
16 Jens Elo Rytter and Marlene Wind, ‘In Need of Juristocracy? The Silence of Denmark in the Development of 
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Figure 17: Danish observations in own and other states’ cases 
Subject areas 
An analysis of the subject areas in which Denmark is more likely to intervene shows that 
Denmark has made observations more often than the average only in cases on EU citizenship - in 
around 33% of cases, as compared with about 13% for all Member States. It will be argued that 
this is unsurprising. The concept of citizenship of the EU raises issues that are of high salience to 
all Member States, not just because EU citizenship (now ‘the fundamental status of nationals of 
Member States’17) depends on citizenship of a Member State—a jealously guarded privilege—but 
because, as Barnard points out, most of the rights afforded by EU citizenship are enforceable 
                                                   
17 Case C-184/99 Grzelczyk EU:C:2001:458 para 1. 
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horizontally against an individual’s own state.18 However, Denmark can be argued to be 
especially sensitive to issues involving citizenship and sovereignty. 
While Denmark has intervened less than average in cases on all the other subject areas, its next 
most frequent subject is free movement (15% as compared with 16% on average). The subject 
area in which it has made observations the least often is the Area of Freedom, Security and 
Justice (AFSJ), in which it has extensive opt-outs and has only intervened in 3% of cases as 
compared with an average from all states of 20%. Thus the areas in which Denmark is most and 
least likely to submit observations can be argued to be two sides of the same coin, both being 
concerned with Danish sovereignty. 
Taxonomic analysis 
Examples of the Danish government’s submissions to the Court that might be attributed to the 
different headings that were described in Chapter 5 are set out in this section.  
1. Immediate interest in the outcome of a national case 
Denmark’s submissions that most clearly fall into this category are those in which Denmark was 
the only (or almost the only) intervener apart from the Commission. Between 1973 and 2013 
there were 23 cases referred by Danish courts in which Denmark submitted the only observations; 
17 of these concerned tax (9) or tariffs (8) and can be seen to have had immediate financial 
implications. For example, Imexpo turned on the tariff to be applied to plastic chair mats, the 
importer arguing that a tariff of 2.2% applied and the Danish government arguing for a tariff of 
10.7%.19 Cases with immediate effects in the referring state are the easiest to identify, but at the 
opposite extreme, a case may entail consequences for all Member States and therefore attract 
many submissions. An example is Vanbraekel—one of a line of cases on Member States’ 
responsibility to reimburse medical costs incurred in other states—with eleven submissions.20 
Denmark was one of ten countries that made no written submission but (presumably having 
identified an imminent threat) was represented at a reopened oral hearing. A similar case, but 
where one the outcomes feared by the Member States was legislative rather than fiscal, was 
Metock, where Denmark was one of the ten Member States that submitted observations but 
ultimately had to change national legislation. 
                                                   
18 Catherine Barnard, The Substantive Law of the EU: The Four Freedoms (5th edn, OUP 2016) 327. 
19 Case C-379/02 Imexpo Trading EU:C:2004:595. 
20 Case C-368/98 Vanbraekel EU:C:2001:400. 
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2. and 3. Preferred answer on a technical issue or a provision or principle of EU law 
It is often difficult to identify cases in which a Member State has submitted observations in terms 
of their content of technical issues versus issues of principle, not least because the latter tend to 
arise, sometimes unexpectedly, out of the former. An example of a case in which Denmark 
appeared to have no immediate financial interest or exposed national legislation, and for which it 
was possible to read Denmark’s observations, is Wall.21 This German case both concerned 
technical matters to do with public procurement and raised the issue of whether transparency was 
a general principle of EU law. The Danish government’s proposed answers were that the 
technical matters were a matter for the national awarding body and that the issue of transparency 
was outside the scope of EU law.22 
Another such case was Banca popolare di Cremona, on whether a regional direct tax on turnover 
was compatible with EU VAT legislation.23 Denmark was one of thirteen Member States to 
submit oral pleadings in a reopened hearing. At first sight, Denmark appears to have had no 
financial interest in the outcome. However, this case illustrates a not unusual phenomenon: 
Denmark had previously lost a case on a turnover tax, necessitating a change to its legislation, 
and as a result had particular expertise in the technicalities of the Sixth VAT Directive as regards 
such taxes.24 It can be argued that Denmark’s involvement in these cases demonstrates motives of 
both the expression of its preferences on technical issues, its concern with an important provision 
of EU law and its view on, arguably, a general principle of EU law. 
4. Support for another Member State 
Without insider knowledge, finding direct evidence of a Member State’s having made 
observations primarily in support of another is unlikely. Some authors have, however, found 
statistical evidence that it occurs. Both Mattila, and Naurin and Lindahl, found evidence of 
Member States voting in each other’s support at the Council.25 Mattila found that Denmark was 
most likely to work together with Finland, the Netherlands and Sweden against the majority. 
                                                   
21 Case C-91/08 Wall EU:C:2010:182. 
22 From Report for the Hearing held by the University of Gothenburg. 
23 Case C-475/03 Banca popolare di Cremona EU:C:2006:629. 
24 Case C-200/90 Dansk Denkavit EU:C:1992:152. 
25 Mikko Mattila, ‘Voting and Coalitions in the Council after the Enlargement’ in Daniel Naurin and Helen 
Wallace (eds), Unveiling the Council of the European Union - Games Governments Play in Brussels (Palgrave 
Macmillan 2008) 33; Daniel Naurin and Rutger Lindahl, ‘East-South-North: Coalition Building in the Council 
before and after Enlargement’ in Daniel Naurin and Helen Wallace (eds), Unveiling the Council of the European 
Union - Games Governments Play in Brussels (Palgrave Macmillan 2008) 73. 
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Naurin and Lindahl similarly found Denmark most likely to cooperate with Sweden, the UK, the 
Netherlands, Finland and Ireland. This indicates a clear geographical pattern, perhaps underlain 
by similar economic interests. Analysis of the Member States in whose cases Denmark is most 
likely to submit observations shows the same pattern (Table 7). In view of their findings, it is 
possible to argue that it is at least likely that Denmark makes observations in support of, 

























5. National constitutional interests 
As noted in the introduction to this chapter, Denmark is a paradoxical good Member State. It 
tends to have an almost isolationist approach to international cooperation and has secured opt-
outs on several matters of constitutional importance, but it transposes legislation reasonably 
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promptly and accurately and has accordingly had few direct actions against it. Meanwhile, it 
discourages its courts from referring questions of EU law to the Court of Justice and, while it 
shares many arguably constitutional concerns with the UK, it is much less likely to contribute to 
cases concerning them. 
The most important feature of Denmark’s relationship with EU law to consider is, therefore, its 
lack of involvement. This is first considered in general, and then some specific points are 
mentioned concerning the subheadings listed in the previous chapter: sovereignty, subsidiarity 
and competence; the national balance of power; and the balance of power between Denmark and 
the Court of Justice itself. 
It can be argued that an explanation for Denmark’s relative passivity at the Court of Justice may 
be found in its attitude to international legal regimes in general. Rytter and Wind’s observations 
on Denmark’s relationship with the European Court of Human Rights are relevant in this regard. 
They note that the assumption underlying Denmark’s 1992 Act incorporating the European 
Convention on Human Rights (ECHR) was that the Act should not alter the constitutional status 
quo, in which the Danish judiciary was subordinate to the legislature.26 As a result, Danish courts 
perceive their role to be confined to the implementation of Strasbourg case law rather than any 
interpretative obligation. Wind argues that the same principles are also applied to EU law.27 
More generally, Wind argues that any kind of judicial review of national legislation is seen as 
incompatible with Denmark’s particular model of democracy, in which the courts are regarded as 
subordinate to the elected parliament. The principle of the equal separation of powers that is 
considered to apply elsewhere, however imperfectly it may be realised in practice, is not 
fundamental to what Wind calls Nordic majoritarian democracy; on the contrary, it is regarded as 
unacceptable that non-elected ‘quasi-guardians’28—the judiciary—should have the power to 
impose limits on the actions of a parliament elected by popular mandate, and courts are expected 
to exercise judicial self-restraint. The Danish constitution of 1849 did not provide for judicial 
review of legislative acts by Danish courts, and although the Supreme Court developed such a 
concept, it was exercised under extreme self-restraint. 
                                                   
26 Rytter and Wind (n 16) 480. 
27 Marlene Wind, ‘The Nordics, the EU and the Reluctance Towards Supranatural Judicial Review’ (2010) 48 
Journal of Common Market Studies 1039. 
28 Robert A Dahl, Democracy and Its Critics (Yale University Press 1991) 155. 
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Rytter and Wind observe that it was not until the 1990s, twenty years after Denmark’s accession 
to the European Community and forty years after its accession to the European Convention on 
Human Rights, that criticism of Danish judicial self-restraint became widespread. A Danish 
Governmental Report on the Judiciary from 1996 stated: 
This development [the growing importance of European law] contributes, moreover, 
to a change in the role of the courts – a role by which the courts, to a larger extent 
than previously, are called upon to exercise an autonomous, law-making function. 
Consequently, it is to be expected that the judges must adopt a broader style of 
interpretation and a sources-of-law approach, which to a certain extent goes beyond 
and thereby in part differs from the current one.29 
Thus the Danish government was urging the courts to consider an interpretative obligation to 
which they had arguably been subject for twenty-three years. 
The interpretative obligation, however, represents only the minimum level of engagement with 
developments in European law. Denmark’s relatively small number of references to the Court of 
Justice has already been noted, and it can be argued that requesting a preliminary ruling is 
equivalent to inviting supranational judicial review. But Danish aversion to the practice of 
judicial review is not the only reason for the low level of referral. The Danish government’s 
attorney advised judges that, before a case could be referred to the Court of Justice, the national 
court must seek the advice (and, impliedly, the permission) of the parliamentary European Affairs 
Committee (EAC)30—and such permission is more often refused than not.31 The role of the EAC 
is discussed further below. 
Wind draws attention to a reluctance on the part of the public to take action against the state 
(which is your friend, not your enemy), also noting that it is not natural in Denmark to regard a 
                                                   
29 Jens Elo Rytter, ‘Constitutional Interpretation – Between Legalism and Law-Making’ (2007) 52 Scandinavian 
Studies in Law 255, citing Domstolsudvalgets betænkning (Proposal of the Courts' Committee) (Governmental 
Report No 1319, 1996) 176. 
30 Peter Biering, ‘The Application of EU Law in Denmark: 1986 to 2000’ (2000) 37 Common Market Law 
Review 925, 936. 
31 Rytter and Wind (n 16) 489, citing Peter Pagh, ‘Juridisk Special Udvalg Og Præjudicielle Forelæggelser for 
EF-Domstolen (The Judicial Committee and Preliminary References to the European Court of Justice)’ in B 
Olsen and K Engsig Sørensen (eds), Europæiseringen af Dansk Ret (Europeanisation of Danish Law) (Djøf 
Forlag 2008) 480. 
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court as the appropriate venue for conflict resolution. This could be argued to limit the flow of 
cases that might otherwise have given rise to preliminary references.32 
Denmark’s attitude to the Court appears to mirror the Danish perception of EU membership in 
general. Denmark’s government has been argued to perceive the Council as the only legitimate 
arena for its influence and, Rasmussen asserts, to regard Danish MEPs as having shifted their 
loyalty from Denmark to the EU upon assuming their seats in the Parliament.33 Rasmussen notes 
that until the mid-1980s, Denmark regarded European Affairs as falling under foreign, rather than 
domestic, policy.34 Thorsten Borring Olesen observes that, although EU rules have ‘deeply 
affected’ the organisation of the Danish state, political and media perceptions overlook this. He 
describes Denmark as ‘a pioneer in devising mechanisms ... with the ultimate aim of retaining 
democratic-parliamentary control over EU policy and safeguarding national sovereignty over key 
policy areas’. The prime examples of these mechanisms are the opt-outs, conceded by the 
Council in response to the ‘Denmark in Europe’ memorandum that was issued by the Danish 
government in 1990 after considerable parliamentary debate.35 In addition to the opt-outs on, for 
instance, defence matters36 and the AFSJ,37 the mechanisms include the control over the 
implementation of EU law at both the national and supranational levels by parliamentary 
committees38 and Denmark’s resistance in the Council to changes in the institutional structure 
that might alter the balance between small and large Member States.39  
On the face of it, it does not seem unreasonable to assume that Denmark’s influence over EU law 
and policy is not just lessened by its small size, but by its opt-outs and its lower participation in 
                                                   
32 Marlene Wind, ‘The European “Rights Revolution” and the (Non) Implementation of the Citizenship 
Directive in Denmark’ in Lee Miles and Anders Wivel (eds), Denmark and the European Union (Routledge 
2014) 171.  
33 Anne Rasmussen, ‘Denmark and the European Parliament’ in Lee Miles and Anders Wivel (eds), Denmark 
and the European Union (Routledge 2014) 131. 
34 Rasmussen (n 33) 130. 
35 Denmark and the Treaty on European Union [1992] OJ C348/1; the memorandum is reproduced in English in 
Finn Laursen and Sophie Vanhoonacker, The Intergovernmental Conference on Political Union: Institutional 
Reforms, New Policies and International Identity of the European Community (European Institute of Public 
Administration 1992) and discussed in Anna Michalski, ‘A Reluctant Partner: The Pattern of Denmark’s 
Involvement in the European Community’ (PhD Thesis, LSE 1995). 
36 Under Protocol 5 to the Treaty of Amsterdam. 
37 Under Protocol 22 to the Treaty of Lisbon. 
38 Thorsten Borring Olesen, ‘Denmark and the 1973 Enlargement: The Dual Impact' (UACES Forty Years since 
the First Enlargement Conference, London 12 April 2013). 
39 Rasmus Brun Pedersen, ‘Denmark and the Council of Ministers’ in Lee Miles and Anders Wivel (eds), 
Denmark and the European Union (Routledge 2014) 107. 
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Council voting.40 Denmark might, therefore, seek to redress the balance by more activity in the 
judicial sphere. However, the assumption that those states exercising opt-outs are ‘out in the cold’ 
at the Council has been challenged. Research by Naurin and Lindahl indicates that, while states 
with opt-outs may lack direct influence over those particular areas, they do not lose political clout 
in general.41 On the other hand, Warleigh regards ‘flexible integration’ as, in fact, the antithesis of 
integration42 and Adler-Nissen points to diplomatic measures undertaken by the UK and 
Denmark (which she describes as ‘the two opt-out champions’) to reduce their marginalisation.43 
The Danish government’s ex-ante control over preliminary references is unusual, but the limited 
extent to which it avails itself of the procedure for making observations is further evidence of its 
reluctance to participate in legal integration. Rytter and Wind express surprise that Denmark has 
not taken more advantage of the opportunity to submit observations,44 given that the Court is an 
arena where a small country may seek to influence the course of EU legal evolution on an equal 
footing with more prominent countries. This is all the more important when that small country 
has voluntarily excluded itself from certain policy areas at the Council level.45  
As far as the Court is concerned, it can be argued that Denmark has expended more energy on 
bolstering its perception that it has successfully evaded EU supremacy, than on taking advantage 
of the opportunity to influence the direction of EU legal evolution. Denmark’s somewhat 
contradictory, passive-resistant approach to EU law illustrates two ways in which a government 
                                                   
40 Simon Hix and Sara Hagemann, ‘Does the UK Win or Lose in the Council of Ministers?’ (The UK in a 
Changing Europe, 2016) <http://ukandeu.ac.uk/explainers/does-the-uk-win-or-lose-in-the-council-of-
ministers/> accessed 19 July 2020. 
41 Daniel Naurin and Rutger Lindahl, ‘Out in the Cold? Flexible Integration and the Political Status of Euro Opt-
Outs’ (2010) 11 European Union Politics 485, 504. 
42 Alex Warleigh, ‘Towards Network Democracy? The Potential of Flexible Integration’ in Mary Farrel, Stefano 
Fella and Michael Newman (eds), European Integration in the 21st Century. Unity in Diversity? (Sage 2002) 
108. 
43 Adler-Nissen, ‘The Diplomacy of Opting-out: A Bourdieudian Approach to National Integration Strategies’ 
(n 6). 
44 Rytter and Wind (n 16) 497. 
45 Although there is debate about whether Denmark’s influence in the Council is reduced by its opt-outs or 
whether, paradoxically, its influence is increased because its reservations force its officials to compensate by 
being more active and better prepared: Rebecca Adler-Nissen, ‘Behind the Scenes of Differentiated Integration: 
Circumventing National Opt-Outs in Justice and Home Affairs’ (2009) 16 Journal of European Public Policy 62, 
76; Jonathan P Aus, ‘The Mechanisms of Consensus: Community Asylum Policy’ in Daniel Naurin and Helen 
Wallace (eds), Unveiling the Council of the European Union - Games Governments Play in Brussels (Palgrave 
Macmillian 2008) 100–113; cf Daniel Naurin and Rutger Lindahl, ‘East-South-North: Coalition Building in the 
Council before and after Enlargement’ in Daniel Naurin and Helen Wallace (eds), Unveiling the Council of the 
European Union - Games Governments Play in Brussels (Palgrave Macmillan 2008) Figs 4.2 and 4.3. 
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can constrain the process of European integration. It can attempt to influence the direction of 
legal evolution by direct intervention in preliminary reference cases before the Court—an 
opportunity of which Denmark is not yet taking full advantage—or it may attempt to discourage 
the bringing of such cases by its national courts. The Danish government’s policy has been to 
influence the process of legal integration by controlling the flow of cases that proceed to 
supranational dispute resolution rather than by seeking to influence the outcome of cases that 
come before the Court (see Figure 17). 
Sovereignty, subsidiarity and competence 
It is clear that Denmark, while broadly compliant in implementing EU legislation, is 
uncomfortable with the idea of submitting to the jurisdiction of a supranational body. It is 
curious, therefore, that its contributions have been patchy in cases that might have afforded an 
opportunity to curb the scope of the supremacy of EU law. Denmark was among the majority 
who failed to submit observations in the important (if possibly unanticipated in their 
constitutional results) Simmenthal, 46 Macarthys v Smith,47 Solange II,48 Marleasing,49 Foster v 
British Gas50 and Factortame I. However, they joined the majority in making observations in 
Factortame II and III.51 The latter suggests a reactive, rather than a proactive, response to cases 
that raise issues that might affect the constitutional balance. 
The Court’s case law on subsidiarity consists mainly of direct actions. Those preliminary 
references that turned on subsidiarity—notably Alliance for Natural Health, BAT and Vodafone—
received no observations at all from the Danish government.52 This is curious because the 
European Affairs Committee of the Danish parliament has, since the Lisbon Treaty, become 
involved in scrutinising whether the subsidiarity principle is being observed in the creation of EU 
legislation at an interparliamentary level, most notably in orchestrating the rebellion against the 
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47 Case 129/79 Macarthys v Smith EU:C:1980:103. 
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49 Case C-106/89 Marleasing EU:C:1990:395. 
50 Case C-188/89 Foster v British Gas EU:C:1990:313. 
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Monti II regulations on the right to strike which led to the first yellow card being issued under the 
Early Warning Mechanism in 2012.53 
Denmark’s participation in cases on competence has mainly been confined to Metock, in which 
case its primary objective was to defend its immigration policy.54 Public opinion in Denmark (led 
by almost all its political parties) was subsequently focused on what was seen as political 
activism by the Court rather than on the competence issues raised.55 Notably, Denmark did not 
make any observations in Pringle, nor in important early cases in which competence was an issue 
such as Defrenne.56 
It is being argued in this chapter that the entire concept of the preliminary reference procedure is 
antithetical to Danish notions of constitutional propriety. Denmark’s failure to participate in cases 
that raise questions on constitutional issues can also be ascribed to a related phenomenon: the low 
political priority that successive Danish governments have ascribed to EU issues. Only in the 
aftermath of the Metock ruling—and an upsurge in public Euroscepticism—did a Danish 
government announce that it would give high priority to Denmark’s position in the EU, and that 
stance was short-lived.57 
The national balance of power 
As noted above, Rytter and Wind identified two principles that characterise Denmark’s form of 
majoritarian democracy. First, it is for the legislature, and not the judiciary, to ensure that Danish 
legislation complies with international legal obligations—indeed, that the courts may apply a 
rebuttable presumption to the effect that Danish legislation complies with both the ECHR and EU 
law. Second, the courts should refrain from the autonomous interpretation of the Convention and 
Treaties. Several consequences flow from this that affect the balance of power between 
Denmark’s institutions. Firstly, and by contrast with other Member States, the preliminary 
reference procedure neither empowers the lower courts relative to the Supreme Court (Højesteret) 
nor allows national courts to submit preliminary references entirely of their own initiative, at least 
                                                   
53 Ian Cooper, ‘A Yellow Card for the Striker: National Parliaments and the Defeat of EU Legislation on the 
Right to Strike’ (2015) 22 Journal of European Public Policy 1406. 
54 Case C-127/08 Metock EU:C:2008:449. 
55 Wind, ‘The European “Rights Revolution” and the (Non) Implementation of the Citizenship Directive in 
Denmark’ (n 32). 
56 Case C‑370/12 Pringle EU:C:2012:756; Case 43/75 Defrenne v SABENA EU:C:1976:56. 
57 Morten Kelstrup, ‘Denmark’s Relation to the European Union: A History of Dualism and Pragmatism’ in Lee 
Miles and Anders Wivel (eds), Denmark and the European Union (Routledge 2014) 22. 
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in principle. Secondly, the actions of the executive in respect of EU law are carried out under 
close supervision by the legislature in the form of the parliamentary European Affairs Committee. 
European Affairs Committee 
The influence over both references and observations of Denmark’s parliamentary European 
Affairs Committee has been noted above. Historically, though, the Committee did not initially 
appear to have conceived of the Court as being an arena in which Denmark should become 
involved unless it was fighting an infringement case. The EAC’s first statement on the Court of 
Justice—after the Metock58 case made it clear that Danish immigration law did not comply with 
the citizens’ rights directive59—was not issued until 2009. It consisted of a belated declaration 
that there was a need for the Committee to be advised of cases coming before the Court that could 
conflict with national law. Given that Denmark joined in 1973—when the implications of direct 
effect and supremacy were already clear to legal scholars—it is astonishing that the power of the 
Court of Justice was barely being acknowledged nearly four decades later. Rytter and Wind offer 
the explanation that such power attributed to a supranational body represents a ‘highly 
disturbing—and even illegitimate—element in the European political process’ with which 
Denmark does not wish to engage.60 
Nedergaard describes the EAC as ‘a concrete expression of the desire by the parliament to control 
the EU decision-making process that is predominantly handled by the executive’: the executive 
carries out the procedure under what amounts to a parliamentary veto.61 The process is 
nevertheless cooperative: EU cases are generally referred by a ministry to the EAC, the minister 
giving an oral presentation of the government’s proposed action. The case is then submitted to the 
relevant Special Committee(s), generally the Environmental, Agricultural and in particular the 
Special Judicial Committee,62 which issues its own opinion on the case. The committees report 
back to the EAC and, in potential preliminary reference cases, via the State Attorney to the court 
which raised the question of EU law. 
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60 Rytter and Wind (n 16) 497. 
61 Peter Nedergaard, ‘EU Coordination Processes in Denmark: Change in Order to Preserve’ in Lee Miles and 
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The Judicial Committee’s opinion is non-binding, but in practice, it is very influential. Pagh 
demonstrates that there is an unusually close relationship between the Danish courts and the 
Ministry of Justice, mainly as a result of a historical tendency to recruit judges from that 
ministry.63 Pagh and Wind both found that the courts received active discouragement from the 
EAC via the State Attorney to refer cases, Wind, in particular, finding that 69% of the Danish 
judges she questioned had chosen not to make a reference on the advice of the State Attorney. 64 
Wind notes a tendency for the Judicial Committee to ensure that, where a Danish court does refer 
a case, questions are framed in purely technical terms, leaving as little opportunity as possible for 
a dynamic interpretation.65 She does, however, observe that, where a case is between two private 
parties, the Committee is less likely to be involved and, when it is, it is less likely to object to a 
preliminary reference being made.66 Nevertheless, a potential conflict of interest arises when the 
organ of state responsible for implementing EU law is also tasked with permitting the courts to 
refer questions of interpretation. In addition, if applied to the Supreme Court, such 
discouragement could be in breach of the wording of Article 267 TFEU.67 
As far as government observations are specifically concerned, a comment that Rytter and Wind 
recorded in 2010 points both to the EAC’s attitude that the Court is a less important institution 
and to a sense that some suppression of interaction with the Court was felt by the executive as 
well as the judiciary. A legal official in the Ministry of Foreign Affairs told them: 
There is no doubt that we have become much more active in trying to influence the 
development in the past three to four years … It is not something we are flagging in 
the Danish European Committee in Parliament, but even the politicians there have 
                                                   
63 Peter Pagh, ‘Denmark’s Compliance with European Community Environmental Law’ (1999) 11 Journal of 
Environmental Law 301; Peter Pagh, ‘Præjudicielle Forelæggelser Og Juridisk Specialudvalg’ (2004) 41 
Ugeskrift for Retsvæsen 305, cited in Marlene Wind, ‘The Scandinavians: The Foot-Dragging Supporters of 
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Union’ (2009) 27 Nordisk Tidsskrift for Menneskerettigheter 272, 283. 
65 See also Biering (n 30) for a detailed analysis of Danish references from 1986 to 2000. 
66 Rytter and Wind (n 16) 492. 
67 ‘Where any such question is raised in a case pending before a court or tribunal of a Member State against 
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started to be a bit more interested in the Court—in particular, of course, in those 
cases where Denmark is a party.68  
This comment points to another paradox: the EAC both exerts control over the government’s 
interventions, and considers that the Court is not a primary, or arguably even legitimate, locus of 
activity for Denmark. The latter view is supported by the fact that the Court is only mentioned 
once in the EAC’s own account of its activities.69 
Balance of power between Denmark and the Court of Justice 
It was noted above that such power of judicial review as exists in Denmark does not stem from 
the Danish constitution of 1849 but was developed by the Supreme Court, which has exercised 
this power under a particularly strong form of self-restraint. Indeed, the Supreme Court has only 
once ruled in favour of setting aside an Act of the Danish parliament as unconstitutional, in 
1999.70 At the same time, in the Maastricht Ratification Case,71 the Supreme Court reserved for 
itself the power to review the compatibility of EU acts with the Danish constitution.72 This 
attitude renders the Court’s power to ‘interpret … EU treaties as if they represent a de facto 
constitution for Europe and exercise … judicial review over laws and practices within member 
states’ especially problematic for Denmark.73 Pagh observes: 
                                                   
68 Rytter and Wind (n 16) 494. 
69 Folketing’s EU Information centre, ‘The Folketing’s European Affairs Committee’ 
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70 The Tvind case (UfR 1999:841 H) in which the Supreme Court ruled that Parliament had acted 
unconstitutionally by using a special Act, rather than administrative procedures, to cut off funding to certain 
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71 Hanne Norup Carlsen v Prime Minister Poul Nyrup Rasmussen (UfR 1998:800). 
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reference procedure’ (2003) 40 CMLR 9. 
73 Geoffrey Garrett, Daniel Kelemen and Heiner Schulz, ‘The European Court of Justice, National 
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A preliminary reference to the European Court will [therefore] resemble a 
questioning of the state’s interpretation of EU law. Despite the fact that preliminary 
rulings are not formally a review of the limits of administrative power according to 
the constitution … the private party to a case will in such a situation experience it as 
very similar.74 
Thus the making of references by Danish courts may be regarded as a form of voluntary 
submission to supranational judicial review and to constitute a form of constitutional impropriety. 
It seems likely that the Danish government’s reluctance to engage in what it regards as 
unnecessary participation in other states’ preliminary references would be seen in the same light: 
as voluntary or enforced refraining from constitutionally inappropriate acts. 
Conclusion 
Most of the constitutional issues that are specific to Denmark can be regarded as negatives in the 
balancing exercise that is undertaken by a Member State that is considering intervening in 
proceedings at the Court of Justice. The constitutional reasons not to intervene may be 
outweighed by more persuasive reasons to intervene in a given case, but it can be argued that the 
assumption seems to be more strongly against intervening, all other things (resources) being 
equal, than in comparable Member States. 
6. Economic and political/policy preferences 
The balancing exercise that is carried out in deciding whether to intervene in a preliminary 
reference is a microcosm of Denmark’s dilemma about the EU as a whole. Kelstrup argues that 
Denmark’s European policy has always been to maximise the benefits of economic integration, in 
particular as regards market access for its agricultural products, while minimising political 
integration.75 This has, however, not led to significant participation in cases on agriculture (4% of 
the total during its membership) or Single Market issues such as the free movement of goods 
(6%), freedom of services and establishment (8%) or free movement of capital (7%). As noted in 
the introduction to this chapter, it is only in cases on freedom of movement of workers that 
Denmark is a relatively assiduous intervener, submitting observations in 15% of all cases 
brought. Granger also notes that Denmark does not appear to prioritise the defence of its 
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75 Kelstrup (n 57) 15. 
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economic interests.76 Thus it can be argued that the economic salience of an issue for Denmark 
does not equate to the likelihood of its government intervening in cases that do not affect it 
closely. 
The effect of the political salience of an issue on Denmark’s participation in a case might be 
argued to depend on that issue’s importance to the public. Cases of more abstract constitutional 
importance, say on subsidiarity, rarely collect observations from the Danish government. Those 
that are discussed in the public domain, by political parties and in the news media, are more likely 
to do so. Wind details the febrile atmosphere in Denmark concerning family unification versus 
immigration control in the period before and after Metock.77 Extensive political and media 
discussion culminated in a national newspaper launching a three-week campaign criticising the 
government for withholding information about the changes from the public, while almost all 
political factions in the Danish government supported the previous, more restrictive, Danish 
citizenship and immigration rules.78 It is unsurprising, in this context, that the Danish government 
chose to submit observations in Metock. Denmark has intervened in a third of all cases on 
European citizenship, making it by far the most frequent topic for submissions. It shares this 
preoccupation with Ireland and the UK, although there were only three cases in which all three 
submitted observations (Ibrahim, McCarthy and Dereci).79 
A contrast may be made with a topic that is perceived to be of particular importance in Nordic 
countries: that of the environment. Surveys of the Danish public reveal that Danish voters 
considered the environment the fourth most important policy issue (measured over the period 
from 1975 to 2002) after employment, economics and social problems.80 Despite this, Denmark’s 
rate of making observations in environmental cases is about 7% lower than average. 
A topic on which the Danish government has a clear policy of intervention is public access to 
documents (see section 8 below). It can be argued that the difference is that promoting the 
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environment may have significant economic consequences, even for a third-party Member State. 
In contrast, most access cases do not, freeing Denmark to make arguments in favour of access 
without financial risk. 
7.  Clarifying EU law 
Superficially, all observations are made to clarify the interpretation of EU law and to put forward 
a preferred solution to the question posed to the Court. In a given case, it may not be clear 
whether a judgment clarifies the law or whether it allows or encourages it to evolve. Thus there is 
considerable overlap with the next heading. 
A line of cases which demonstrates Danish interest in clarifying a topic is on sports and free 
movement. It started with Bosman, in which the Danish government specifically noted that 
clarification was required as to whether the football transfer rules led to discrimination under EU 
law.81 Denmark also submitted observations in the related cases of Deliège and Lehtonen.82 None 
appear to have had an immediate domestic application. 
It is, however, challenging to distinguish a Member State’s wish to clarify EU law per se from its 
having an apprehension that an interpretation might be contrary to its interests. A rare example is 
a line of nine cases on pregnant workers discussed by Cichowski.83 Denmark only submitted 
observations in Larsson, one of the three Danish cases and only then at the oral stage of the 
proceedings.84 However, Denmark’s observations were in support of Ms Larsson and not what 
was then the legislative position in Denmark, which at least counters the proposition that it was 
motivated by self-interest. 
Hagel-Sørensen and Rasmussen observe that among Denmark’s stated reasons for participation is 
to put observations that ‘are expected to contain points of view which are not submitted by 
anybody else’.85 This may suggest a slightly oppositional attitude to Court proceedings but also a 
desire to add a specifically Danish perspective to debates about interpretation and legal evolution. 
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It also offers one explanation for the frequency with which Denmark submits only oral 
observations. 
8. Guiding the evolution of EU law 
In her interviews with member-state governments’ legal agents, Granger was told by 
representatives of Denmark, France, Portugal and the UK that those governments made 
observations in order ‘to promote a particular vision of EU law’.86 She argues that these 
governments have shown themselves willing to favour the exertion of a long-term influence on 
legal developments over ‘the occasional defence of domestic interests’, where these conflict.87 In 
evidence, she cites Denmark’s support of the litigants in the Carvel and Hautala cases on access 
to documents.88 Granger regards Denmark as a ‘repeat player’ with a more proactive than reactive 
approach to the case law of the Court; this contrasts with the impression given in the 
‘constitutional’ cases cited above, in particular the Factortame series of cases, that Denmark 
intervenes reactively.89 The difference may lie in the quality of Denmark’s analysis of upcoming 
cases, in that the latter cases are ones in which issues of constitutional significance were not 
easily anticipated from the order for reference. Wind, on the other hand, regards Denmark as 
primarily a reactive player.90  
In general, Denmark’s efforts to promote its vision of EU law do not centre on the Court of 
Justice but the Council, despite the opportunity that the Court affords for Denmark to influence 
the course of EU law on an equal footing with the other Member States and in policy areas from 
which it has opted out.  
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9. Political benefits from participation 
Rytter and Wind argue that Danish politicians have not seen the Court as ‘a site for influence or 
policy-making’.91 However, this is contradicted by evidence that Denmark’s status as a repeat 
player on specific topics is maintained, to some degree, to support its international political 
reputation. Denmark’s longstanding policy on transparency and in particular, its interventions in 
cases on public access to documents, can be considered under this heading. Rossi and Vinagre e 
Silva observe that litigants have come to expect support from Denmark via observations in access 
cases; Denmark has never supported an institution against the applicant in such a case.92 They do, 
however, consider whether repeated submissions of the same argument may bolster the Nordic 
countries’ liberal reputations at the expense of the effectiveness of their governments’ 
observations—although they tentatively reject the hypothesis. 
It is more difficult to find examples of the Danish government making observations directly in 
order to play to a domestic audience, which can be presumed not to be familiar with the 
procedure of the Court and therefore not to be aware of the detail of efforts made on its behalf.93 
Certainly, Denmark’s observations in Metock will have been made with the domestic audience 
(and in that instance the far-right Danish People’s Party, upon which the government relied for its 
majority) in mind. However, any reputational effect can be argued to flow from a potentially 
favourable judgment rather than from the mere fact of participation.94 
10. The health of the EU legal order 
The promotion of the health of the EU legal order is the hardest of these categories for which to 
find evidence, chiefly because it is unlikely ever to be articulated in a case. It is also unlikely to 
be a principal motive for participating in proceedings at the Court. However, it may be an 
underlying reason for Member States to scrutinise incoming preliminary references and to 
cooperate with other states in agreeing a joint position. What can be said of Denmark is that, 
despite many reservations and despite its Treaty opt-outs, it recognises that its advantage lies in 
European integration. Kelstrup argues that it maintains a sort of pragmatic dualism in which it is 
likely to declare that its domestic policies are in line with EU rules while simultaneously failing 
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to implement them in practice or avoiding having them tested at the Court.95 He contends that, at 
the same time, Denmark is afraid of being excluded from the benefits of integration. At various 
points in its membership, Denmark has laid greater or lesser emphasis on the benefits of 
participation and of maintaining influence over EU law’s direction of travel. 
It is essential to recognise that the number of observations made in a subject is at best only a 
proxy for a state’s level of engagement with a particular area of EU law. Denmark illustrates this 
clearly, negotiating the dilemma of a strong economic interest in EU integration, combined with a 
generally Eurosceptic parliament and public, by being very selective in its participation at the 
supranational level. 
  
                                                   




Ireland’s accession took place after the enunciation of many of the core principles of EU law. 
Former Irish President Mary Robinson drew attention to their implications for Ireland’s legal 
system in 1973, and it seems that Ireland did not share Denmark’s aversion to the supremacy of 
EU law. Nevertheless, Ireland was to become an unusual member of the EU. As the ‘Celtic Tiger’ 
it enjoyed an economic boom in the years 1973 to 2008 that has been widely attributed to the 
more than €17 billion it received in EU Structural and Cohesion Funds.96 It joined the euro area 
and is a country where the public is relatively well-informed about the constitutional effects of 
EU membership, not least via media debate surrounding the nine referendums on EU matters that 
Ireland has held to date.97 Article 46 of the Irish Constitution provides that any amendment must 
be approved by referendum; thus, accession to the European Community was achieved via the 
Third Amendment, which was approved by referendum in 1972 on a 70% turnout. The 1987 
decision of the Irish Supreme Court in Crotty established a requirement that a referendum also be 
held on any alteration to the Treaties that altered the scope and objectives of the EU.98 As a result, 
Ireland held referendums on the ratification of the Single European Act and the Treaties of 
Maastricht, Amsterdam, Nice and Lisbon as well as on the European Fiscal Compact in 2012. 
Ireland has demonstrated reservations about the Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European 
Union that reflect its distinctive national traditions. It elected not to follow the UK in the latter’s 
partial opt-out from the Charter but secured a protocol expressing guarantees concerning the right 
to life, Irish military neutrality and tax harmonisation, Ireland having encouraged business 
investment via a low rate of corporation tax.99 Thus Ireland’s status as a Euro-enthusiast is at 
odds with its attitude to certain areas of EU activity 
Like Denmark, Ireland has interacted relatively little with the Court of Justice. Irish courts have 
made few references over the years, and the Irish government only submitted observations in 
4.5% of preliminary references in the period of this study. The reason for this lower level of 
engagement with the Court than the only slightly larger Denmark is not immediately apparent. 
Unlike Denmark, Ireland does not demonstrate a conspicuous tension between its constitutional 
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position and its economic interests. There is a relatively low level of hard political 
Euroscepticism, although the main party of the left, Sinn Féin, has evolved from outright 
opposition to EU membership to a position of soft Euroscepticism.100 Although all three 1973 
Member States share concerns about immigration and citizenship, Ireland’s longstanding 
Common Travel Area with the UK101 and the fact that Ireland’s switch from net emigration to 
immigration (of which two-thirds has come from the EU) has coincided with a period of 
economic growth and modernisation, have rendered immigration less politicised.102 The Irish 
public is considered to regard European integration favourably.103 Ireland’s reasons for its low 
engagement with EU law are distinct from those of Denmark, except insofar as both are small 
countries, and are, arguably, to be found in its relationship with the UK. 
Ireland’s activity at the Court of Justice 
Falkner and Treib describe Ireland’s record on transposing and implementing EU law as a 
‘combination of politicized transposition and systematic shortcomings in enforcement and 
application.’104 One would expect flawed transposition to result in more litigation as well as more 
direct actions. The latter is evident (100 direct actions for failure to fulfil its obligations, as 
compared with 27 against Denmark and 102 against the much larger UK) but the former is not: 
Fahey describes the Irish national courts as having ‘responded patchily to the actions or inaction 
of the Irish legislature’ and considers that ‘litigants and society at large are adversely affected.’105 
Falkner and Treib characterise Ireland as belonging to the ‘world of dead letters’, in which 
transposition is backed up neither by systematic application nor by judicial action initiated by the 
individuals affected.106  
Not surprisingly, in the world of dead letters, preliminary references are rare. Irish courts have 
made few preliminary references over the years—61 decided cases from 1973 to 2013—making 
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Ireland one of the seven Member States that have had more actions for failure to fulfil obligations 
than preliminary references per year of membership, and the one with the third-highest 
disparity.107 Up to the end of 2013, unlike in Denmark, there was little evidence of an upturn in 
references from the national courts. However, there has been something of an increase since the 
period of this study, with a high point of eleven references from Irish courts in 2017. 
The Irish government has submitted 248 observations, 33 in Irish cases and 215 in other Member 
States’ cases (Figure 18). As with Denmark, the increase in its rate of submitting observations 
(from just over 2% in the 1970s to 6.5% in the decade to 2013) suggests that the Irish government 
is coming to recognise that the Court represents an arena in which a small country can attempt to 
influence the evolution of EU law. 
 
 
Figure 18: Irish observations in own and other states’ cases 
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The subject areas in which the Irish government has submitted the highest percentage of 
observations have been citizenship (16% of cases), visa and asylum cases (12%) and social policy 
(12%). This indicates similar preoccupations to Denmark. It could be argued that Ireland’s 
longstanding free movement agreement with the UK causes the Irish government to view free 
movement as an issue for the UK and Ireland jointly. Ireland’s participation has been low in the 
areas where Ireland had opt-out protocols in the Treat of Amsterdam and in those parts of the 
Treaty of Lisbon relating to cooperation in criminal matters, with observations in only 4% of 
AFSJ cases. Ireland’s concerns about the uneven harmonisation of criminal justice standards 
across the EU have led it to limit its implementation of the European Arrest Warrant (EAW)108 
and to resist extradition where the Irish courts have considered that to do so would contravene a 
suspect’s rights under the ECHR.109 This is an area of law where Ireland has simply denied the 
unqualified jurisdiction of the Court, which may explain why Ireland neither referred, nor made 
observations in, any cases on the EAW in the period of this research.110  
Taxonomic analysis 
Ireland’s submissions to the Court that can be argued to exemplify the taxonomy of motives set 
out in Chapter 5 are described below. 
1. Immediate interest in the outcome of a national case 
Taking cases where the referring Member State made the only submissions, there were ten cases 
between 1973 and 2013 in which Ireland submitted the only observations. Three concerned 
agriculture and three social policy, with no other topic occurring more than once. The earliest of 
these, Pigs and Bacon Commission, will serve as an example.111 The case raised several issues, 
among them the legality of Ireland’s state aids to the pigmeat industry, and the Irish 
government’s observations were dominated by an unsuccessful defence of their existing system 
of support for the industry. At the other end of the scale, Ireland has submitted observations in a 
number of cases that have consequences across all Member States. Metock is again a notable 
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109 Eoin Carolan, ‘Reciprocity and Rights under the European Arrest Warrant Regime’ 197; The Minister for 
Justice, Equality and Law Reform v Bailey [2011] IEHC 177. 
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example.112 This reference from an Irish court had immediate consequences for Ireland’s 
implementation of Directive 2004/38/EC. The Irish Ministry for Justice, Equality and Law 
Reform (the government made no separate submission) presented observations in defence of Irish 
legislation in particular, and of the supposed right of Member States to determine their own 
immigration rules for the non-EU spouses of EU citizens in general. Other examples are D and A, 
and M, in which Ireland submitted observations in defence of its national procedures for 
examining asylum claims under Directive 2004/83/EC.113 
Evidence is thin of Ireland intervening in cases in support of Irish companies or industries 
independently of defending Irish legislation, although in Pigs and Bacon Commission the 
legislation being defended was itself designed to benefit an entire domestic industry. 
2. and 3. Preferred answer on a technical issue or a provision or principle of EU law  
Despite the considerable overlap between these categories, cases can be picked out in which a 
Member State submits observations in a case whose outcome is unlikely to have immediate 
domestic effects. An apparently straightforward example would be Spector, in which the Irish 
government argued for a strong interpretation of the rules on insider trading.114 The fact that a 
case will not, of itself, have any consequences at the level of EU law does not, however, preclude 
the possibility that the matter is of national interest. In this instance, the Irish High and Supreme 
Courts had recently wrestled (for 87 days in the case of the High Court) with similar facts in 
Fyffes v DCC.115 It can be argued that governments are most likely to intervene if the issues 
involved have come up at the domestic level—even if the facts in the domestic case did not put it 
within the scope of EU law—or if they can envisage such a case occurring. Nevertheless, 
member-state governments may have a preferred answer to a question referred that appears to 
have no domestic implications or, as will be argued in respect of the UK, which runs counter to 
their immediate interests. 
4. Support for another Member State 
Ireland’s close relationship with the UK could be argued to have had conflicting effects on its 
participation in cases at the Court of Justice. In terms of observations, Ireland has made 
submissions in more cases referred by the UK than any other country, 28% of its submissions 
                                                   
112 Case C-127/08 Metock EU:C:2008:449. 
113 Case C‑175/11 D and A EU:C:2013:45; Case C‑277/11 M EU:C:2012:744. 
114 Case C-45/08 Spector Photo Group EU:C:2009:806. 
115 Fyffes v DCC [2007] IESC 36. 
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being in UK cases, equivalent to 15% of all cases referred by UK courts. For comparison, 23% of 
Ireland’s submissions have been in cases from the German courts, equating however to only 3% 
of those, and 13% in Irish cases, equating to 54% of the total. In terms of making preliminary 
references, however, Fahey observes that ‘[t]he failure of the State to ... contribute to policy areas 
from which it is excluded is then notable, instead leaving the UK to exercise a more dominant 
role in this regard.’116 This failure may be attributable to Ireland’s more limited resources; other 
closely linked states might have made similar choices in the cause of cost-saving by the smaller 
state. In the case of Ireland, this can be contrasted with a more general movement away from the 
patron-client relationship that had dominated British-Irish relations before they acceded to the 
EEC and towards a more equal regional partnership.  
Ireland’s relationship with the UK is in tension with Ireland’s image as an enthusiastic member of 
the EU. Zimmer et al. point to a conflict of interest for the Irish, saying, ‘On the one hand, as 
receivers of subsidies they are closely attached to the southern states, while on the other hand 
they are affiliated with the English language and Anglo-Saxon constitutional, legal and state 
traditions’.117 The shared common law tradition of the two states has been invoked to explain 
Ireland’s tendency to support the UK in direct actions and preliminary references.118 Ireland 
followed the UK in opting out of the Schengen Agreement119, after balancing its advantages with 
those of maintaining the Common Travel Area between the UK and Ireland, and shared the UK’s 
opt-outs from the AFSJ.120 Indeed, although the UK subsequently opted into the provisions for 
police and judicial cooperation, Ireland has mostly chosen to do so only informally.121 Ireland’s 
policy stance in this area is so tightly tied to the UK’s that, according to AG Szpunar in 
McCarthy, ‘If the United Kingdom decided that it would no longer rely on its special power not 
to participate in the freedom, security and justice area, Ireland would decide likewise, for the only 
reason for its position is that it is linked to the United Kingdom by that common travel area.’122 
                                                   
116 Fahey (n 105) 9. 
117 Christina Zimmer, Gerald Schneider and Michael Dobbins, ‘The Contested Council: The Conflict Dimension 
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119 Under Protocols 19 and 21 to the Treaty of Lisbon. 
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A reading somewhat at odds with this suggestion may, however, be derived from studying 
Ireland’s record in the Council of the European Union. Mattila, Naurin and Lindahl looked at 
each Member State’s likelihood of either voting against the majority or abstaining (Mattila)123 
and the likelihood of two states cooperating to do this (Naurin and Lindahl)124. Their findings 
indicate that Ireland, during the period they studied (2005-6) was the state that was least likely to 
vote against the majority or abstain from votes on legislative acts (25th of 25), whereas the UK 
was quite likely to do so (8th of 25). This suggests that Ireland does not follow the UK’s lead, 
though it should be noted that the overall number of negative votes and abstentions was very 
small. I repeated the exercise for 2008, using the search facility on the Council website. During 
this period there were 149 voting results. The Schengen opters-out Denmark, Ireland and the UK 
were not included in 3 voting results. Ireland abstained alone on two occasions, on emissions 
trading and agricultural customs cooperation, and abstained alongside the UK once, on plant 
protection. The UK abstained once, on aviation security. The small number of non-unanimous 
votes makes voting patterns poor predictors of Member States’ behaviour in Council, as pre-vote 
negotiations cannot be deduced. However, what information is available does not, of itself, 
suggest that Ireland’s voting pattern is influenced by the UK’s. Conversely, Hix, examining the 
period from 2009-2015, found that the UK was more likely to vote with France than with 
Ireland.125 
It is important to recognise that, while Ireland may have submitted observations in many cases 
from UK courts, it does not always offer the same answers as the UK government. It does, 
however, do so in a slight majority. CERGU analysed the Reports for the Hearing from 1998-
2008 at the level of individual questions referred and found that, of the 221 occasions where both 
Ireland and the UK suggested answers to a question, they submitted the same answer to 126 
questions, which is 57% of the total.126 On a further 65 questions, one or the other country offered 
an answer that could not be classified sufficiently for a comparison to be made between the 
governments’ positions, leaving only 30 questions upon which they took opposing positions, or 
14%. Considering only the 129 individual questions referred by UK courts, Ireland agreed with 
the UK government’s proposed answers to the same percentage of questions, 57%, and disagreed 
in 13%. Thus, on this sample, Ireland is no more likely to support the UK’s position on questions 
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referred than it is to agree with the bulk of Member States. It is, however, more likely to intervene 
in UK cases than in those of other Member States.  
There are several possible explanations for a high rate of agreement between Member States that 
do not imply domination of one government by another and that are pertinent to Ireland. Larsson 
considers several interpretations of Member States’ shared preferences, considering both their 
attitude to the EU and domestic factors. He argues that states may share positions on ‘more 
Europe’ versus ‘less Europe’ which will lead them to answer questions in the same way: that is, 
in favour of more regulation at the supranational level or towards maximising national autonomy. 
Alternatively, they may draw agreement from their shared domestic economic models. Larsson 
attributes the general agreement between Ireland and the UK partly to their shared liberal market 
economies.127 While it is plausible for the two states to have a similar attitude to, for instance, 
regulation of business, it should be noted that the explanation would predict that Denmark, which 
Larsson (drawing on Scharpf) classifies as a welfare state economy, would take a different view 
from the other two 1973 accession states.128 However, of the 46 occasions on which Ireland 
answered the same question as Denmark, the two Member States agreed on 63% of the questions 
and definitely disagreed on only 9%. Within this small sample, the effect of any differences in the 
states’ economic models on their observations at the Court cannot be convincingly demonstrated. 
Indeed, Denmark and Ireland may be more similar to each other than either is to the UK, both 
being small but relatively prosperous (in terms of GDP per capita) countries with large 
agricultural sectors (Table 6). What demands further research is what, if any, effect the existence 
of the Common Travel Area has on Ireland’s participation in relevant cases as compared with that 
of Denmark. This would be challenging because, as was noted above, the Danish government 
shows concerns over free movement and citizenship that may manifest in similar ways. 
In conclusion, it can be argued that Ireland’s connection with the UK does influence its level of 
engagement with the Court, but not in a straightforward manner. Other shared characteristics may 
influence Ireland’s tendency to submit observations relatively often in UK cases, independent of 
the relationship between the two Member States. Ireland’s low submission rate can be attributed 
to its connection with the UK in some areas, such as those connected with the Common Travel 
Area, but in other areas is more likely to be a result of its small size. 
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5. National constitutional interests 
Ireland’s constitution explicitly provides for both judicial review of primary legislation129 and 
referendums.130 This distinguishes it from both the UK—with which it otherwise shares a 
common law tradition—and from Denmark. Both factors can be argued to influence Irish public 
opinion and Ireland’s participation in proceedings at the Court. 
Ireland held referendums before ratifying the Single European Act, the Treaty of Maastricht, the 
Treaty of Amsterdam, the Treaty of Nice (twice) and the Treaty of Lisbon (twice). This can be 
argued to have led to high public awareness of the debating points involved, particularly on those 
occasions when referendums were repeated after treaty revisions and public information 
campaigns. The most recent Irish referendum on Europe was held in 2012 to allow Ireland to 
ratify the European Fiscal Compact,131 before which considerable efforts were made to engage 
the public’s enthusiasm for the vote and to explain the complex economic issues involved.132 
Elkink, Quinlan and Sinnott found that the public’s voting patterns in the Lisbon Treaty 
referendums were explicitly linked to their support for European integration and that such support 
was influenced by campaigning.133 It is also notable that Hooghe and Marks found Ireland to be 
the country with the smallest gap between the level of support for European integration shown by 
the public and that shown by people in positions of authority.134  
Ireland’s constitution confers the power of judicial review on its Supreme Court, and it seems that 
the Supreme Court, in its turn, has been open to supranational provisions. As ex-Advocate 
General Nial Fennelly says, Ireland ‘… applied Factortame before Factortame and Francovich 
before Francovich.’135 Concerning the former, Fahey136 contrasts the Supreme Court’s untroubled 
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acceptance of an application for interim relief in the 1985 case of Pesca Valentia137 with the 
constitutional near-crisis induced in the UK by a similar application in Factortame,138 and she 
describes the Irish judiciary as ‘overwhelmingly pro-communautaire’.139 This may well be partly 
because several senior Irish judges have been judges at the Court of Justice, but despite the 
evidence of Factortame, it is also possible to argue that common law traditions may predispose 
both Ireland and the UK towards acceptance of the judge-made law of the acquis. Equally, if, as 
De la Mare and Donnelly suggest, one reason for governments to take part in discourse with the 
Court is to promote their own legal culture, Ireland may participate less because it perceives the 
EU’s legal culture to be a good fit with its own.140 
The combination of a government that recognises the legitimacy of judicial review, a pro-
communautaire judiciary and a public that has regularly been consulted on matters of EU law 
might be expected to lead to both a higher frequency of references to the Court and to a readiness 
on the part of the Irish government to seek to influence the Court. However, such an effect cannot 
be assumed, particularly in the context of a small country that is in several senses outweighed by 
its larger neighbour.  
Ireland has made relatively few submissions in the classic constitutional cases. It made 
observations that echoed the UK’s position in the Factortame cases and also intervened in 
support of the UK in the related direct action on freedom of establishment. However, that 
litigation followed a similar Irish case (Pesca Valentia),141 and Ireland had a direct interest in the 
results.142 Other notable cases referred by other Member States such as, for instance, Simmenthal 
drew no Irish submissions.143 Ireland’s observations in constitutional cases have mainly been 
confined to cases referred by its own courts. One such case, however, represents a strong example 
of Ireland wishing to upload its constitutional preferences to the EU as well as to defend its 
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consequent legislation. This case was, of course, Grogan,144 in which the freedom to provide 
services served as a proxy for Ireland’s express constitutional ban on abortion.145  
The status of Grogan as a case which is regarded by Ireland as concerning a constitutional issue 
rather than a mere policy preference puts it into a small category of cases concerning particular 
national apprehensions. Perhaps the nearest comparable case is Omega, in which Germany 
defended a ban on a laser game on the basis that ‘the commercial exploitation of a 'killing game’ 
… constituted an affront to human dignity, a concept established in the first sentence of 
Paragraph 1(1) of the German Basic … Law, although in the latter case the constitutional 
connection was less direct.146 In Grogan, both the plaintiff (an anti-abortion organisation) and the 
Irish government argued that Ireland’s constitutional provision could be used to restrict the 
dissemination of information about abortion providers in the UK, although the Court’s decision 
ultimately sidestepped the issue. 
An equally relevant case is Groener, in which the Court upheld a requirement that a Dutch 
national who had successfully held a temporary post in which she taught in English could 
nevertheless be required to be fluent in Irish to gain a permanent position.147 The Irish 
government explained its policy of reviving the Irish language—Ireland’s first language 
according to its constitution—and the Court was willing to put Ireland’s constitutional concern 
above the requirement in Regulation (EEC) No 1612/68 that language requirements must be 
reasonable and necessary for the job in question.148  
6. Economic and political/policy preferences 
Laffan and O’Mahoney emphasise that, since its membership, Ireland’s public policy has been 
profoundly influenced by that of the EU. Ireland has sought economic change within the 
European context, developing away from being an almost exclusively agricultural economy and 
beginning to shake off its co-dependent relationship with the UK.149 The degree to which Ireland, 
as a small Member State, has been successful in uploading its own economic and policy 
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preferences to the EU is harder to quantify, but it is possible to examine the extent to which 
Ireland has availed itself of the possible routes towards that goal. 
Analysis of Council voting shows that Ireland is one of the Member States that is least likely to 
abstain or vote against a proposal.150 Meanwhile, Panke finds that Ireland has been relatively 
active in negotiations in EU working parties and the Committee of Permanent Representatives, 
COREPER.151 While Laffan and O’Mahoney observe that ‘ensuring that there is adequate voice 
and representation for small states in the Union is a constant in Irish European policy’,152 Naurin 
and Lindahl found little empirical evidence of Ireland explicitly cooperating with the other small 
states in their study of coalitions in the Council.153 Mattli suggests that Ireland’s tendency to vote 
together with other small states in the Council is influenced mainly by their shared status as a net 
recipient of EU funds.154 Taken together, these findings suggest that, in the EU’s 
intergovernmental forums, Ireland’s main option is to seek influence via preliminary negotiations 
and soft power rather than by deliberate bloc voting. 
It might be argued that participating in proceedings at the Court would allow Ireland to influence 
EU law on a level playing field with larger states, and thus compensate for its inevitably less 
influential position in the Council. However, Ireland’s small size may also partly explain its low 
participation rate and therefore its failure to make full use of this avenue of influence. The 
empirical evidence for this explanation is, however, not convincing. Assuming that a Member 
State’s total GDP is most likely to influence the affordability of participating in litigation, Ireland 
falls into the middle third of economies in the EU, with a nominal GDP similar to those of 
Portugal and Czechia. However, it is the second least likely to submit observations within that 
group (Romania being the least) and only a third as likely to do so as Czechia (see Appendix E). 
Although Ireland claims to speak for the policy concerns of smaller Member States, it does not do 
so via this route. 
Another area where Ireland might have chosen to speak out at the Court is that of matters falling 
within the Area of Freedom, Security and Justice. Laffan and O’Mahoney were told by a senior 
official in the Irish Department of Justice, Equality and Law Reform that ‘the comments we make 
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on proposals on which we opt out are not recorded by the Council … it is a significant loss of 
influence.’155 Ireland has, however, not sought to redress the balance via the Court, submitting 
observations in fewer than 3% of AFSJ cases. Those in which it did concerned the measures on 
judicial cooperation in civil matters into which Ireland has opted. 
There is also little evidence of a general policy of Ireland using the Court of Justice to upload 
specific economic or political preferences. There are two areas in which it has submitted 
observations in a relatively higher percentage of cases: citizenship, immigration and asylum 
(considered together) and social policy.156 The former will be considered under the next 
heading—the clarification of EU law. Ireland’s observations in social policy cases have been 
relatively evenly spread across the period of its membership, bar some clusters of related cases 
such as three on pensions in 1991 and three on age discrimination in 2009. Cases on equal pay 
have continued throughout the period, but in general, Ireland has followed the topical issues with, 
for instance, a majority of cases on maternity rights in the early 1990s and on age discrimination 
in the late 1990s/early 2000s. Ireland’s observations in the period 1997-2008 show some 
evidence of uploading, in that Ireland several times took the opportunity to demonstrate to the 
Court that Irish law was ahead of the curve on social policy matters. For example, in Coleman, 
Ireland’s (oral) observations noted that discrimination by association had already been outlawed 
under their Employment Equality Acts.157 The same sample suggests that Ireland has no pattern 
of agreeing with the UK in social policy cases except where both states’ direct interests are 
equally affected. 
While social policy cases clearly have economic repercussions for Member States—most notably 
Preston, which was discussed in Chapter 5 and in which Ireland submitted observations—
Ireland’s participation in cases that reflect either its historical or current economic concerns has 
been low. Ireland has in made observations in fewer than 3% of the cases on agriculture, in only 
5% of tax cases (the vast majority of those on VAT) and 7.5% of cases on the free movement of 
capital and banking.  
In conclusion, Ireland does not appear to have a general policy of making observations on cases 
that touch on its economic strategy—or, indeed, of seeing the Court as an alternative to the 
Council in influencing EU law in any area other than that of (broadly) crossing borders. 
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7. and 8. Clarifying EU law and guiding its evolution 
The areas in which Ireland has contributed most submissions, at least in percentage terms, are 
those (relatively rare) cases concerning visas, asylum and EU citizenship. The visas and asylum 
category can probably be dismissed as one in which the Irish government has made a focused 
attempt to guide the evolution of EU law. The Irish government made observations in six, or 11% 
of the cases in the period: two from Irish courts plus three major UK cases and one from 
Germany, all of which garnered observations from numerous Member States.158 Two of these 
cases concerned third parties’ rights to work under accession treaties and occurred before the 
Court of Justice acquired a say over asylum matters with the Treaty of Lisbon in 2009. Ireland’s 
contributions in the other four do not appear to have added significantly to the law, its 
observations in the two Irish cases simply defending its national procedural arrangements.  
It could, however, be argued that Ireland’s contributions to the 15 citizenship cases (17%) in 
which it made observations were more purposeful.159 Ireland came relatively late to the issue of 
citizenship with Zhu and Chen in 2002, since which it has contributed observations in Metock, 
Ruiz Zambrano, McCarthy and Dereci among others.160As Lenaerts points out,161 the law on EU 
citizenship has been built ‘stone by stone’ by the Court and Ireland has been involved in this 
process, albeit by resisting the placing of each stone. Ireland, with the UK, argued against a 
parent gaining a right of residence in the UK from her Irish citizen child in Zhu and Chen—to 
which it also responded by revoking the constitutional entitlement to Irish citizenship of children 
born on the island of Ireland that had been a consequence of the Good Friday Agreement.162 
Ireland’s Minister for Justice, Equality and Law Reform was the defendant in Metock, after which 
Ireland had to amend its legislation. The Irish government put forward a ‘floodgates’ argument 
against similar reasoning to Zhu and Chen in Ruiz Zambrano; 163 nevertheless, after the judgment, 
the Minister announced that the Department would implement the Zambrano ruling in its 
                                                   
158 Case C‑175/11 D and A EU:C:2013:45; Case C‑277/11 M EU:C:2012:744; Case C-235/99 Kondova 
EU:C:2001:489; Case C-257/99 Barkoci and Malik EU:C:2001:491; Joined cases C-411/10 and C-493/10 NS 
EU:C:2011:865; Case C‑4/11 Puid EU:C:2013:740. 
159 Including Case C-127/08 Metock EU:C:2008:449, an Irish case in which the Irish government did not make 
separate observations from those of the ministry concerned. 
160 Case C-200/02 Zhu and Chen EU:C:2004:639; Case C-127/08 Metock EU:C:2008:449; Case C-34/09 Ruiz 
Zambrano EU:C:2011:124; Case C-434/09 McCarthy EU:C:2011:277; Case C-256/11 Dereci EU:C:2011:734. 
161 Koen Lenaerts, ‘EU Citizenship and the European Court of Justice׳s “Stone-by-Stone” Approach’ (2015) 1 
International Comparative Jurisprudence 1. 
162 Irish Nationality and Citizenship Act 2004 s 4; Good Friday (Belfast) Agreement 1998. 
163 Case C-34/09 Ruiz Zambrano EU:C:2010:560, Opinion of AG Sharpston para 114. 
199 
 
procedures.164 The judgment was followed by more than a thousand applications for Irish 
citizenship from the non-EU parents of children who had been born Irish citizens before 2005.165 
Ireland’s observations in McCarthy are not available, although it is likely that they took a similar 
conservative line to the UK, this time in accordance with the eventual judgment. In Dereci, 
Ireland was among the governments arguing that none of the families involved would be deprived 
on any of their rights as EU citizens by a failure to grant residence to a non-EU family member—
an argument with which the Court again agreed. 
It can be argued that Ireland’s interest in the evolution of the law on EU citizenship, particularly 
as it affects the status of non-EU family members of EU citizens, reflects the change in its status 
from a country of net emigration to one that has become a desirable destination for immigration. 
9. Political benefits from participation 
The political benefits of participation in the Court’s proceedings may, as noted in the discussion 
of Denmark, accrue at both the international and domestic levels. It was suggested above that 
Member States may bolster their international standing simply from participation, whereas 
domestic political benefits are more likely to accrue from presenting successful legal arguments 
to the Court, particularly in national cases.  
At the international level, Ireland shares with Denmark the reputational disadvantage of having 
opt-outs from various provisions of the Treaties.166 Ireland’s international standing is, however, 
more complex: Ireland’s neutrality, its boom years as the Celtic Tiger followed by its bail-out, its 
relationship with the UK and its entanglement with the politics of Northern Ireland all affect its 
reputation. Laffan and O’Mahoney argue that Ireland takes the opportunities offered at Council 
level for exercising soft power, the use of which could be argued to be predicated on a Member 
State having sufficient reputational capital.167 However, it is less clear that Ireland takes a 
strategic attitude to its participation at the Court. What can be said is that, in contrast to some 
small Member States, it has increasingly participated in those cases with EU-wide implications 
such as NS on asylum, Cadbury Schweppes on tax and Laval and Viking on workers’ rights 
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versus the freedom to provide services and the right of establishment.168 At best, Ireland could be 
described as an infrequent but mainstream participator. 
For there to be political benefits to the government, the most important prerequisite is for the 
public to be made aware of its government’s participation and standpoint in cases at the Court. 
Ireland benefits from regular reporting of legal matters in The Irish Times—the second-highest 
circulation newspaper in Ireland—including Irish appointments to the Court of Justice and 
coverage of cases in which Ireland is concerned. For example, it published eight articles on 
Metock, one of which notes both Ireland’s position in the case and its subsequent lobbying (with 
Denmark and Austria) to change Directive 2004/38/EC.169 This in itself does not necessarily 
imply that Ireland’s position provided a political benefit to the government of the day (the centre-
left Fianna Fáil party at the time), but it does demonstrate the necessary precondition: that the 
Irish public was informed of its government’s attempts to frame this important issue of EU law. 
10. The health of the EU legal order 
As noted above, it is hard to find explicit evidence of a Member State’s desire to promote the 
health of the EU legal order within its observations, even when its government is notably pro-
communautaire. One way of estimating the degree to which the Irish government takes a pro-EU 
position in its observations is by analysing its suggested answers to referred questions in terms of 
their support for EU-level authority versus national autonomy. The University of Gothenburg’s 
analysis of the answers to individual questions referred from 1998-2008 found that Ireland 
supported control over the issue at the EU level in 35% of its answers and member-state 
autonomy in 32%. The remaining questions had no obvious implication for the balance of power 
between the EU and the Member States.170 The percentages of EU-supportive versus national-
autonomy-supportive observations are almost the same as those of Denmark (35% and 30%) 
despite the two states’ contrasting images as pro- and anti-communautaire. These limited 
empirical findings cannot distinguish between two possibilities: that, notwithstanding their 
images at the senior government level, the two governments are in fact similarly disposed 
towards EU law at the departmental level at which submissions are compiled, or that observations 
are a poor measure of government commitment. However, given that the Member States’ 
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observations are frequently directed towards defending their implementation of EU law, the fact 
that over a third of suggested answers are in favour of EU-level control can be argued to support 
other findings that Ireland at least regards itself as a good EU citizen.171 Other evidence for a 
Member State’s commitment to reinforcing the EU legal order might be found in its degree of 
compliance with EU law as measured by direct actions at the Court, in which context Ireland may 
be regarded as less of a good citizen.172 
Despite the generally pro-European stance of the Irish business community, government, public 
and especially the judiciary, Ireland has participated relatively little in the preliminary reference 
procedure. In particular, it has arguably restricted its opportunities to influence the direction of 
legal evolution in favour of following the UK’s lead. However, unlike in Denmark, there seems 
to be no evidence of systematic blocking by the government. Hypotheses that might be explored 
include that Ireland’s lack of participation is the result of its asymmetric dependence on the EU—
Ireland has been a net recipient of EU funds and the government might not have seen any benefit 
in challenging EU rules—or that its pro-communautaire stance means that, on balance, the 
government sees little benefit in investing limited resources in challenging EU law. Nevertheless, 
examples can be found of Ireland making observations for almost all of the reasons that have 
been identified above. Ireland's dialogue with the Court may be limited in quantity, but it has 
been broad in scope. 
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By contrast with the discussion of Denmark and Ireland, this section seeks to explain the UK 
government’s relatively frequent participation in Court proceedings before 2020. This is analysed 
in terms of the motives laid out in Chapter 5, but also in terms of the UK’s historical development 
of the necessary administrative capacity to respond at will to questions referred to the Court of 
Justice.173 It is argued that the UK was more strongly motivated than its contemporaries by a 
desire to be at the centre of the elaboration and evolution of EU law. Evidence for the UK’s 
motivation has been drawn from interviews carried out in connection with this thesis and from the 
pattern of the UK’s observations in Court proceedings. 
UK’s activity at the Court of Justice 
In terms of cases that were initiated by domestic courts, the UK referred considerably more cases 
than either Denmark or Ireland, as might be expected from its larger economy (Table 6). In terms 
of actions for which the government was responsible, the UK was also more active in 
participating in preliminary reference cases than Denmark and Ireland, submitting observations in 
slightly over a third of cases referred by UK courts and 16% of those from those of other Member 
States. The UK government also had unsought interactions with EU law whenever it was on the 
receiving end of direct actions for failure to implement EU law correctly or in a timely fashion. 
The UK was the defendant in more actions for failure to fulfil obligations than Denmark, and 
slightly fewer than Ireland, although at the end of the period studied here it had more direct 
actions outstanding (Table 6).174 Nevertheless, the UK was relatively compliant with EU law and 
faced fewer direct actions than several of the less Eurosceptic large states that were more 
welcoming of European integration.175 The UK also participated voluntarily in other direct 
actions: it was the second most prolific intervener over the five years to 2013, after Czechia and 
equal with France. Denmark and Ireland were the seventh and fourteenth most frequent 
interveners respectively. 
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It could be argued that the UK’s performance in implementing EU law was subject to two 
opposing forces: an engaged and relatively efficient administration versus a lack of political will. 
Falkner and Treib consider the UK to belong to ‘the world of domestic politics’ in which the 
transposition of EU law was generally prompt unless national politics interfered.176 An example 
of the latter situation is discussed by Panke, in which employers’ organisations and a 
Conservative government resisted full implementation of the Collective Redundancies Directive 
for ten years.177 Such behaviour was not the rule, however: the UK was towards the higher end of 
compliance. Over the period from 2009-2013, it received the fewest new actions for failure to 
fulfil obligations among the large Member States: 11, as compared with Poland (the worst 
performer) with 47, Italy with 39, France with 31 and Germany with 23.178 Humphreys says that 
this was ‘a record which ministers [took] very seriously’ and that it was a key UK objective that it 
did not risk being fined.179 
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Figure 19: UK observations in own and other states’ cases 
The UK government submitted observations in 30 to 50 cases annually from the 1990s onwards. 
However, as the number of cases rose overall, this represented a drop in the percentage of cases 
where it submitted observations from around 40% in the mid-1990s to around 20% towards the 
end of the period (Figure 19). The UK nevertheless involved itself in a much higher proportion of 
cases than Denmark or Ireland. Part of this can be attributed to its greater size, but it can be 
argued that this was also down to the UK dedicating more administrative capacity to its 
relationship with the EU. Greer and Martín de Almagro Iniesta argue that the correctness of a 
Member State’s transposition of EU law depends not just on political will but on the attentiveness 
and willingness of its national bureaucracy.180 It can be argued that this is equally the case for the 
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submission of observations and that the UK’s frequent participation at the Court was down to the 
centrality of its EU litigation unit. 
The EU litigation unit 
The UK’s primary responsibility for  EU law during the period from 1973 to 2013 fell to the 
Treasury Solicitor’s Department (TSol).181 EU expertise in TSol was split into two teams: an EU 
litigation unit and the Cabinet Office Legal Advisers (COLA). Note that, although what follows 
refers to the department’s activities in the past tense, some of these activities continue under the 
aegis of the Government Legal Department. 
The UK’s submissions to the Court of Justice were coordinated by the EU litigation unit. The EU 
litigation unit’s position within TSol, which provides legal services to the majority of central 
government departments and which itself answers to the Cabinet Office,182 made it both 
organisationally and physically central to the government. As Bulmer and Burch observe, the 
combination of responsibility for European litigation and for legal advice to government 
departments in a single section, an arrangement that they consider to have been distinctive to the 
UK, was a significant factor in the UK’s active participation in proceedings at the Court.183 At the 
same time, the UK, along with Ireland, was distinctive in instructing private barristers as counsel 
in cases before the Court, rather than relying solely on in-house lawyers. 
In those cases in which a UK government department or agency was a party to the national 
proceedings, it was the EU litigation unit, rather than that department, that submitted observations 
to the Court and appeared at the oral hearing. Unlike in (reportedly) Denmark, however, the EU 
litigation unit could not discourage the making of a reference in the first place.184 The litigation 
unit decided which other cases, national or otherwise, required a UK response.  
The majority of cases were adopted reactively, in that the EU litigation unit continuously 
monitored the activity of the Court of Justice, the General Court and the EFTA Court and acted as 
a triage unit, identifying which government departments might be concerned with a particular 
legal development and informing them via a standard ‘new case letter’. The UK courts also 
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alerted the litigation unit whenever they were proposing to refer a case. Some areas of the law 
were also monitored externally; for instance, the Intellectual Property Office (IPO) had (and still 
has) procedures for monitoring relevant EU cases and informing its customers.185 It has been 
suggested that the IPO was so proactive, and its level of engagement with stakeholders so high, 
that it had to be restrained from exerting undue pressure on the government to submit 
observations in every case.186 In addition, some legal firms continue to provide a service of 
identifying upcoming preliminary references that are relevant to their clients. 
In a small number of examples, the UK government specifically kept an eye out for cases that 
might lend themselves to the clarification of a legal point about which it had concerns, or even to 
an attempt to overset the Court’s previous line of reasoning. An example of the former occurred 
in the 1990s after the Barber decision on pensions, when it is reported that ‘the Government, the 
Equal Opportunities Commission and various trade unions searched for appropriate cases to 
adopt’ concerning several areas of uncertainty.187 
In deciding whether to intervene, the EU litigation unit weighed the different factors: the benefits 
and risks of intervening or not intervening, what were the legal concerns, and whether there were 
other methods of putting the UK’s point of view, such as ‘piggybacking’ on another Member 
State’s submission. The latter option was facilitated by the UK’s involvement in formal and 
informal transnational groups of government lawyers which discussed coordinating national 
observations.  
Once departments came back to the litigation unit with their comments on an upcoming case, the 
unit checked if there were any fundamental disagreements. If there were, the matter was passed to 
the Cabinet Office where COLA and the European and Global Issues Secretariat attempted to 
broker a solution. Very occasionally, no agreement could be reached because two departments’ 
policy goals were irreconcilable.188 This usually involved an issue of principle, in which 
circumstances the UK did not submit observations in the case. That this situation was rare was, it 
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can be argued, a benefit of having a central, non-ministerial department coordinating the 
government’s response. In Germany, as noted in Chapter 3, the procedure is that if ministries 
disagree, there will automatically be no brief submitted by the government, and this impasse 
arises much more often.189 
Of course, it is possible for no observation to be submitted because the government either failed 
to spot that an issue of importance was lurking in an apparently technical case—Ratti and 
Marleasing might be cited as examples—or did not believe that a particular result was 
possible.190 Mangold reportedly came as a great shock, especially as, where issues of principle 
emerge from a case, the Court normally invites submissions from interested parties.191 
In normal circumstances, however, the litigation unit and their chosen counsel worked together to 
prepare a written submission, which might in exceptional cases have reached many thousand 
words and constituted a comprehensive analysis of the state of the law. Former judge of the Court 
Sir David Edward remarks that the UK’s contributions were considered to be singularly helpful: 
What has become more noticeable in recent years is the very high quality of British 
written pleadings, particularly those submitted by the United Kingdom government. 
More than one member of the Court has remarked that the quickest way to find out 
what a case is really about is to read the submissions of the UK government.192 
Edward attributes this partly to the extensive consultation between government departments.  
The oral stage of the proceedings depended heavily on the skills of the advocate instructed by 
TSol, who had a maximum of twenty minutes to recap the UK’s chosen position, to stress any 
arguments raised by others that supported that position, and to put forward any new arguments 
that might have arisen after the close of the written procedure. This last had to be exercised 
judiciously as the Court may refuse to consider new material that cannot be shown to be 
connected with the arguments made in writing. Again, Edward notes that the UK’s submissions 
were considered to be of high quality, which he attributes to the use of independent counsel 
experienced in oral advocacy. Indeed, he notes that it was only with the UK’s accession that the 
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members of the Court started to make a practice of putting questions to counsel appearing before 
them.193  
In conclusion, the UK’s high participation rate and perceived influence over the outcome of 
proceedings can be attributed to the coordinating influence of TSol and to the UK’s use of highly 
experienced barristers to draft and put forward the UK’s observations. 
The question that remains is why, historically, the UK had put these procedures in place. Bulmer 
and Burch attribute the UK government’s finely tuned responses to the length of time that 
Whitehall had taken an interest in EU law, which considerably predated the UK’s membership. 
They argue that it is necessary to look at the period of negotiations before the UK joined the 
Common Market, starting in the 1960s, in order to find the origin of the institutional practices 
that continued throughout the UK’s membership; some, indeed, could be traced to the early 
1950s.194 The Cabinet Office acquired responsibility for negotiations and policy coordination 
during the second application of 1966. It can be argued that the (in effect) three rounds of 
negotiations enabled the UK to refine the governmental machinery that, after accession, could be 
employed to coordinate the UK’s response to EU legal matters. 
Subject areas 
Table 8 shows the proportion of cases on various topics in which the UK submitted observations 
during its membership. It did so most frequently in cases on people: social provisions, 
citizenship, the Area of Freedom, Security and Justice and the free movement of workers. The 
next most common area was financial cases: tax, free movement of capital and banking issues: 
this is unsurprising, not just because of the UK’s self-perception as an international financial 
powerhouse, but also because tax cases, though neglected in constitutional readings of the Court’s 
activity, are among the most frequent to come before the Court.195 The UK also involved itself 
frequently in asylum and visa cases, and disproportionately infrequently in cases on agriculture 
and competition. Nevertheless, the UK’s choice of subject areas was unremarkable. This tends to 
confirm the observation made in Chapter 1—that so-called constitutional cases appear not to 
predominate. Although the UK’s contribution to those cases might have been important, it is 
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arguably the persistence of its presence in the Court’s everyday business that was the largest part 
of its influence, and one that is underestimated in the literature.196 
Table 8 UK observations by subject area 
Subject   




EU citizenship   44.3 
Social provisions   43.8 
AFSJ   40.4 
Visa/asylum/immigration   38.6 
Free movement workers   30.3 
Free movement of capital/banking   30.1 
Tax   27.0 
Environment   24.7 
Freedom of establishment & services   21.7 
Social security   19.8 
Free movement of goods   18.2 
Competition   18.2 
Agriculture   12.4 
 
Taxonomic analysis 
In this section, the UK’s submissions in preliminary references cases are analysed in terms of the 
motives set out in Chapter 6. 
1. Immediate interest in the outcome of a national case 
There were 136 UK cases in the period studied in which the UK was the only government to 
submit observations, making up 29% of the cases referred by UK courts. These are presumed to 
be cases of immediate, though not necessarily only, national interest. Some should probably have 
been recognised as having general significance (van Duyn and possibly Carpenter); others have 
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acquired importance with the benefit of hindsight, such as McCarthys v Smith, Marshall and 
Foster v British Gas.197 Others, however, are indeed cases that were of mainly national interest. 
These are divided between those where the government was financially concerned or defending 
national legislative measures, and those where it was defending British industry without having a 
direct interest. An example of the former is ClientEarth, in which an environmental organisation 
was challenging the UK’s postponement of the deadline for achieving certain air quality 
standards. The UK’s concern was immediate; while the Court’s judgment had the potential to be 
relevant to other governments that were struggling to meet the standards, the result would only 
directly affect the UK.198 An example of the UK government acting in support of national 
industry rather than in defence of its finances or legislation was noted in the previous chapter in 
Preston, where the government argued in its observations, ‘[W]hile it is difficult to estimate the 
amounts of money at stake in these proceedings, it would appear that … the financial 
consequences for employers and pension schemes could run to thousands of millions of 
pounds.’199 Its arguments were ultimately unsuccessful, an outcome that is underlined by the fact 
that the factors used in the calculation of a part-time worker’s entitlement to an occupational 
pension are now referred to as ‘Preston factors’.200 
2. Preferred answer on a technical issue 
As noted before, a Member State’s preferred answer on a narrow technical issue may be 
underlain by a fiscal issue or the need to avoid redrafting national rules. There are, however, 
cases where it is hard to discern any significant national concern. Cases where the UK’s 
observations appear to have disclosed no interest—financial or otherwise—in the outcome 
include Hamilton v Whitelock, in which the Court discussed whether or not breakdown vehicles 
were required to be fitted with tachographs;201 Wachauf, in which the UK argued that a milk 
quota could not be classified as an intangible asset; 202 and Centro Stauffer, on the German rules 
for tax exemptions as applied to a charity which was based in Italy and benefitted only Swiss 
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students.203 Cases such as these attract little academic comment, and individually they contribute 
little to the elaboration of EU law as a whole. Collectively, however, they form part of the 
discourse between the Court and the governments of the Member States. 
3. Preferred answer on a provision or principle of EU law 
The UK government took advantage of the opportunity to put forward its preferred interpretation 
of the principles of EU law from the beginning of the UK’s membership and was proactive in 
doing so in cases originating in the other Member States. An example is the UK’s early 
contributions to cases on services. The UK’s forceful submissions in other states’ cases on 
healthcare represent both an attempt to elucidate, and to limit, the principles around free 
movement in respect of the provision of medical services. In Pierik, for instance, the UK 
government said in its observations: 
[I]f … the regulation were interpreted as requiring the competent institution to accept 
liability for the cost of providing treatment which is not provided for by the national 
law of the Member State in question, the scope of those provisions would be 
distorted since they would have the effect of creating an independent social security 
law of the Community.204 
It can be argued that the UK’s observations were directed towards discouraging the formation of 
an EU-wide free market in healthcare and, as de Witte notes, an associated contractual liability of 
Member States towards their nationally insured citizens.205 
A similar tension between the constraint, and the elucidation, of free-market provisions 
characterised the UK government’s submissions in respect of other services. An example is 
Humbel, in which the UK argued that general academic education did not (unlike vocational 
education) constitute the provision of services, and also that the freedom to provide services 
across national borders did not imply an obligation to do so.206 
This dual intention behind the UK’s observations means that—like the Court’s judgments—they 
frequently served to provide the UK’s preferred answer to a specific legal or policy question and 
also to comment on an underlying principle. However, this could take the form of an attempt not 
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just to clarify but to limit the scope of a recognised principle of EU law, to guide what the UK 
saw as an evolving principle, or to prevent the recognition of a new general principle. Thus there 
was considerable overlap with categories 6, 7 and 8 below. 
4. Support for another Member State 
There is considerable anecdotal evidence that member-state governments cooperate in their 
observations, both out of mutual interest and occasionally as quid pro quo for another 
government’s support.207 As regards the UK specifically, however, there is a disparity between 
Granger’s findings in the late 1990s and the comments of several people interviewed in the 
course of this research. Granger included detailed questions about intergovernmental cooperation 
in a questionnaire that she circulated to government lawyers and agents, among others, and was 
told that the UK engaged in only limited cooperation with the other Member States.208 Her 
respondents said that the UK felt that the Court benefited from hearing a diversity of arguments 
and also that the procedure allowed insufficient time for regular consultation with other 
governments. This position was not, however, borne out a decade later in an interview with a 
Cabinet Office lawyer, who mentioned that cooperation was not uncommon and observed that 
email facilitated the rapid exchange of ideas on upcoming cases.209 The quid pro quo aspect in 
respect of the UK is implied by one interviewee’s statement to van Stralen that the Netherlands 
was reluctant to imply in its observations that another Member State was wrong, thus ‘you really 
do not like to get into an argument with your British colleague, if you need him for another 
political deal in Europe.’210 
Documentation of intergovernmental cooperation at the Court is not easy to find, even between 
the UK and Ireland. There is evidence of collaboration in direct actions, both when states 
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intervene in each other’s cases and when they are the subjects of parallel actions.211 Cooperation 
in preliminary references is unfortunately hard to detect from the available documentary 
evidence, not least because it is difficult to distinguish the situation in which a Member State 
makes observations in support of another from a situation in which it merely agrees with another 
as to the answers to the questions referred. Derlén, Lindholm and Naurin have made an 
interesting attempt to identify Member States which acted as ‘allies’ in making observations by 
focusing on specific wording in the Court’s judgments that indicates agreement between states.212 
Their study does not, however, distinguish deliberate co-operation from agreement based on 
common interests. 
It can be argued that the UK and Ireland tend to have similar policy preferences and to submit 
observations based on those rather than on any prior understanding. For example, in Campus Oil, 
the UK argued with Ireland that, while derogations from the principle of the free movement of 
goods should be construed strictly, they should not be so construed as to have no effect.213 This 
principle had the potential for future application to a UK measure, so the observations cannot be 
interpreted as altruistic. A later and more routine example is Impact, where the UK gave the same 
answer as Ireland to a question relating to Ireland’s employment of civil servants on fixed-term 
contracts. However, there is no internal evidence that this arose from anything other than self-
interest.214 It is notable that, of the 25 questions referred by Irish courts between 1997 and 2008 
that were analysed by the University of Gothenburg, the UK gave an answer to 16 but only gave 
the same answer as Ireland in three. Because the substance of these answers was derived from the 
summaries of the national positions in the Reports for the Hearing, it is impossible to know if 
those three answers were expressed in the same terms as those of Ireland. The evidence for the 
UK acting directly to support Ireland is therefore scant. 
5. National constitutional interests 
In the absence of a codified constitution, the UK is not unfamiliar with its courts deliberating over 
matters of the balance of power between its institutions. Thus it could be argued that the Court of 
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Justice’s role in setting the parameters of the relationship between the EU’s institutions and the 
Member States offended the UK’s sense of constitutional propriety somewhat less than it might, 
say, Germany’s. This is borne out by a comparison of the German Constitutional Court’s repeated 
decisions to the effect that Germany has the ultimate authority to accept or reject the Court’s 
jurisprudence on a case-by-case basis in the Solange and Maastricht cases,215 with that of the 
House of Lords in, for instance, Factortame (No 2).216 Equally, the UK joined the EU at a time 
when the principles of direct effect and supremacy were already faits accomplis, although much 
elaboration was yet to follow. Thus, several aspects of the Court’s constitutional jurisprudence 
should have been relatively uncontentious. However, in the absence in the UK of any judicial 
power of review of primary legislation, such a power invested in a supranational court has been 
controversial, if perhaps more so (in practice) with the press than with the government. These 
factors are the main features of the context in which the UK government engaged in cases with 
constitutional implications. 
5.1. Sovereignty, subsidiarity and competence  
The supremacy of EU law was recognised, in principle, in s2(1) of the European Communities 
Act 1972:217  
All such rights, powers, liabilities, obligations and restrictions from time to time 
created or arising by or under the Treaties, and all such remedies and procedures 
from time to time provided for by or under the Treaties … are without further 
enactment to be given legal effect [and] recognised and available in law, and be 
enforced, allowed and followed accordingly; and the expression ‘enforceable EU 
right’ and similar expressions shall be read as referring to one to which this 
subsection applies. 
It could be argued that the words ‘available in law’ acknowledged that the Treaties did not just 
confer rights and obligations on states but made rights available to their citizens, and thus that the 
UK conceded both sovereignty (within the scope of the Treaties) and the direct effect of Treaty 
articles, from the date of accession. 
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The supremacy of EU law rarely operates to disapply primary legislation—via what Dougan 
describes as its exclusionary effect—but more commonly by substitutional effects: allowing the 
implementation of EU measures to be challenged in national courts via the principle of direct 
effect.218 The UK government was involved in almost all the cases in which the principle of direct 
effect was elaborated. The three significant exceptions were, as noted earlier, Ratti, Marleasing 
and Mangold, the importance of which seems to have taken not just the EU litigation unit but all 
the Member States by surprise.219 
The UK did not submit observations in perhaps the first major case on supremacy per se that 
occurred after its accession, Simmenthal; indeed, only Italy, from which the case originated, did 
so.220 Simmenthal is another case whose mundane subject-matter appears to have concealed the 
importance of its legal logic. The next major litigation on supremacy—rather than the scope of 
direct effect—did not, however, evade notice. This was the Factortame litigation on the legality 
of the Merchant Shipping Act 1988, which sought to restrict the practice of quota-hopping, 
whereby fishing vessels from other Member States were re-registered in the UK so as to be able 
to fish against the UK’s quota. The associated preliminary references were (in order of referral) 
on the availability of interim relief, on the (in)compatibility of the Act with EU law and on state 
liability.221 The first two references were made in March and May 1989 respectively, and 
amendments to the Act were debated in Parliament in the following October, before the hearings 
in 1990 and 1991.222 It is unclear whether the UK’s written observations were made before or 
after the parliamentary debate, but they were undoubtedly made in full knowledge of the case’s 
constitutional importance. The government also issued a press release that announced the 
amendments and defended its position—which is mentioned in the judgment—and the 
proceedings were widely discussed in the press. 
Factortame is the most notorious of a small handful of EU cases that have acquired the status of 
touchstones for the Eurosceptic press and public. A speaker in the parliamentary debate described 
the amendments made in anticipation of the Court’s decision as ‘a humiliating and important 
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defeat because it is an historic surrender of some constitutional importance’.223 Factortame has 
been brought up by name in parliamentary debates on 94 occasions at the date of writing.224 
However, the government’s observations in cases with constitutional significance were rarely 
couched in the same terms as the parliamentary rhetoric on the same topic. An exception was the 
use of the word ‘plundering’ in reference to fish stocks, which strayed beyond the style typically 
adopted even by British barristers at the Court.225 The emphasis in the UK’s observations was on 
the procedural requirements for an interlocutory injunction and the argument that Member States 
had the sole right to decide on the registration requirements for ships and on the nationality of 
legal, as well as natural, persons. When Factortame (No 2) returned to the House of Lords, Lord 
Bridge said in the leading judgment: 
Some public comments on the decision of the European Court of Justice … have 
suggested that this was a novel and dangerous invasion by a Community institution 
of the sovereignty of the United Kingdom Parliament. But such comments are based 
on a misconception. If the supremacy within the European Community of 
Community law over the national law of member states was not always inherent in 
the E.E.C. Treaty … it was certainly well established in the jurisprudence of the 
European Court of Justice long before the United Kingdom joined the Community. 
Thus, whatever limitation of its sovereignty Parliament accepted when it enacted the 
European Communities Act 1972 was entirely voluntary.226 
This acceptance of supremacy and the attendant loss of sovereignty seems to have been reflected 
in the UK government’s observations as a whole, if not its political pronouncements. 
In a small number of cases, the UK put its sovereignty below the aims of the EU, at least by 
implication. In Nouvelles Frontières, for instance, the UK argued in favour of an extension of  
Single Market rules rather than its own sovereignty.227  
Nouvelles Frontières also emphasises the vital point that member-state governments do not 
necessarily agree with each other in their observations. The Netherlands (and the Commission) 
agreed with the UK that passenger air transport should be brought within the rules of the Single 
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Market, and the Italian and French Governments took the opposite view, even though all had 
national airlines that would be affected.  
The issues of competence and subsidiarity have been raised in preliminary references at a steady 
but low frequency. The question of where competence lies to determine the division of decision-
making between the EU institutions and Member States (Kompetenz-Kompetenz) is an unresolved 
problem. It has been discussed more widely in academic circles than raised in case law, but the 
Court’s settled position is that it alone determines this. No preliminary reference from a court in 
the UK concerned Kompetenz-Kompetenz and the UK government seems not to have addressed 
the issue in any observations. 
The principle of subsidiarity was explicitly introduced in the Maastricht Treaty. It was a primary 
issue in only five cases to the end of 2013: Bosman, Imperial Tobacco, BAT, Alliance for Natural 
Health and Vodafone.228 Apart from Bosman, in which the UK government did not submit 
observations, each was referred by a UK court, and the UK government’s position was either to 
support the basis under which the EU measure had been adopted or to argue that the principle of 
subsidiarity was not breached in that instance. After the introduction of the Impact Assessment 
framework for assessing subsidiarity in the Lisbon Treaty, the UK did not participate in any 
relevant cases. Thus, at least on the evidence of its observations, it can be argued that the UK did 
not feel the principle of subsidiarity to have been threatened. 
5.2. The national balance of power 
As noted in the previous chapter, Börzel and Risse suggest that Europeanisation not only has the 
potential to change the balance of power between the EU and a Member State, but ultimately 
between the state’s institutions.229 It can be argued that the Court of Justice provides one route to 
such changes. The preliminary reference procedure empowers lower courts against higher courts 
and national judiciaries against the legislature; it also has the potential to alter the balance of 
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power between the government and civil society organisations, trades unions and federal 
administrations. 230 
Several authors have suggested that the preliminary reference procedure empowers the judiciary 
against the executive.231 In the UK, where the courts have almost no power to review primary 
legislation, this would imply that the procedure offered the courts the opportunity to make 
references that were motivated by a desire to overstep this constitutional restriction. Broberg and 
Fenger, however, comment that it is ‘virtually impossible to prove or disprove’ whether national 
courts are motivated by something other a desire to see EU law properly applied.232 It could be 
argued that the UK’s submissions in the Factortame cases represented an attempt to fend off such 
a route to supranational judicial review, but such an interpretation is difficult to derive from the 
content of the observations. Instead, an analogy may be drawn with the courts’ execution of their 
duties under the Human Rights Act, whereby they steer carefully clear of trespassing upon the 
powers of Parliament. 
The Court may also empower, for instance, pressure groups and individuals at the expense of 
their governments.233 Governments may, therefore, submit observations against interest groups 
and lobbying organisations—even those set up by statute. For example, Barnard, and Alter and 
Vargas, draw attention to a series of cases on gender equality supported (and in one case brought) 
by the UK’s Equal Opportunities Commission.234 The UK government submitted observations 
broadly countering the EOC’s position in all eighteen cases that the latter supported. 
One aspect of the internal balance of power upon which EU law might bear is the relationship 
between regional bodies with law-making capacity and their central governments. Such 
arrangements produce an anomaly, in that regional bodies may be responsible for implementing 
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EU law, including decisions of the Court, but they have no power to put forward legal arguments 
if their implementation is challenged. In the UK this imbalance was manifest in the absence of an 
opportunity for the devolved administrations to make their own submissions in preliminary 
reference cases. Although the courts of Scotland and Northern Ireland could and did refer 
questions to the Court of Justice, the administrations lacked direct access to the Court. Such 
access was one of several demands made by a group representing Europe’s regions in the run-up 
to the Maastricht Treaty, but on this point, the Member States held fast.235 The devolved 
administrations, therefore, were instructed on the method of implementing EU Directives by 
central government,236 but were unable to take a direct role in presenting legal arguments to the 
Court and could bear the costs if penalties resulted.237 The administrations were, however, 
required to help prepare the UK government’s submissions. The Memorandum of Understanding 
with the devolved administrations says: 
Where a case partly or wholly involving implementation by a devolved 
administration is referred to the European Court of Justice, the devolved 
administration will contribute to the preparation of the UK's submissions to the 
Court. The devolved administration would take the lead in doing so for cases wholly 
concerned with implementation in relation to a matter falling within its 
responsibility, agreed as appropriate with the relevant Whitehall departments. The 
Cabinet Office and the Treasury Solicitor’s Department will co-ordinate the UK's 
submissions to the Court.238 
In this sense, the devolved administrations were treated like government departments.  
It could be argued that Scotland has, in practice, not been seriously deprived of the opportunity to 
make submissions in its own cases. Rodger identified five referrals from Scottish courts between 
                                                   
235 W John Hopkins, ‘A Tale of Two Europes: European Regions from Berlin to Lisbon’ (2010) 2 Australian 
and New Zealand Journal of European Studies 55. 
236 Department for Business Energy and Industrial Strategy, ‘Transposition Guide: How to Implement European 
Directives Effectively’ (2013) <https://www.gov.uk/government/publications/implementing-eu-directives-into-
uk-law> accessed 20 July 2020. 
237 Cabinet Office, ‘The Cabinet Manual. A Guide to Laws, Conventions and Rules on the Operation of 
Government’ (2011) para 9.17. 
238 Cabinet Office, ‘Devolution: Memorandum of Understanding and Supplementary Agreements: Between the 
United Kingdom Government, the Scottish Ministers, the Welsh Ministers, and the Northern Ireland Executive 
Committee’ (Cmd 7864, 2013) para B4.25. 
220 
 
devolution in 1999 and the end of 2013, in four of which the UK submitted observations.239 Three 
concerned VAT and the Scottish government was not concerned as such, but two agricultural 
cases—Booker Aquaculture and Feakins—named the Scottish Ministers as defendants.240 In the 
first, both the UK government, and the Scottish Ministers as defendants, made submissions in 
agreement with each other (and the other intervening Member States); in the second only the 
Scottish Ministers made a submission. Thus the Scottish administration was able to defend its 
position directly because it had been named as a party.241  
The extent to which observations prepared by the Scottish administration are adopted unchanged 
by the European litigation unit is unknown. However, in one case of which I am aware, 
observations were prepared by the Scottish government for a preliminary reference by the Court 
of Session that was subsequently withdrawn. The UK government then used the brief as the basis 
of its submission in a related English case in the same year.242 
5.3. Balance of power between the UK and the Court of Justice 
A Member State’s attempts to influence the balance of power may arise solely in the context of 
an individual case or, alternatively, may amount to a course of conduct that challenges the power 
of the Court more generally. In an individual case, the Member State may seek to question the 
Court’s power to adjudicate on the questions referred: this usually takes the form of arguing that a 
question can be solved entirely on the basis of national law or that it refers to a matter that is 
outside the scope of EU law. For example, in ICI, the UK government argued that any judgment 
the Court delivered on a question referred by the House of Lords would have no bearing on the 
outcome of the national case. The Court of Justice noted that the House of Lords felt that the 
disputed national provision could bear another interpretation than that mentioned by the UK 
government, in which circumstance the Court’s answer would be relevant, and that it was solely 
for the national court to decide if the Court’s answer was necessary for it to decide the case. The 
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question was, therefore, admissible.243 
 
Such attempts are tied to the specific facts of a case. A more general course of conduct can be 
detected in states’ repeated attempts to get the Court of Justice to reopen oral hearings. This 
possibility was discussed in Chapter 2, where it was noted that although in principle, an interested 
party may request that the oral hearing be reopened, such a request has never succeeded.244 The 
UK requested the reopening of the oral procedure in Alabaster because, it claimed, the Advocate 
General’s Opinion took an extraneous matter into account, but this was dismissed via the usual 
formula.245 Such demands arise from the circumstances of each particular case, but the success of 
any one attempt would represent a considerable change in the balance of power between 
intervening governments and the Court. 
6. Economic and political/policy preferences 
Granger observes that the UK, with its common-law recognition of the importance of case law, 
saw the Court of Justice as a forum for promoting its economic and political interests from the 
beginning of its membership.246 It did so more frequently and consistently than the other 1973 
states, despite—to a large extent—sharing their economic interests and political concerns. It will 
be argued in the next chapter that the UK might have used interventions in court proceedings as a 
second chance to make arguments that had failed at Council level. Although the UK abstained or 
voted against the majority in Council more often than, say, Ireland, it was still relatively rare for 
it to do so. This was chiefly because about 70% of Council business is settled in working parties 
and ‘corridor bargaining’, such that no Member States routinely vote against the majority in the 
Council. As a result, the observations the UK submitted to the Court may be a better guide to 
government policy than its voting record in the Council. An exception is if an issue came up 
simultaneously in both Court and Council. Then the EU litigation unit took into account whether 
the government’s line was felt to be likely to succeed in the Council and could decide that there 
was nothing to be gained by repeating the argument at Court level.247 
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As noted in the section on Denmark, the salience of an issue in a Member State is not always 
reflected in the likelihood of its government submitting observations in a case concerning that 
issue, whether or not there are ongoing Council negotiations. It can be suggested that this may 
indicate the difficulty of presenting an economic or policy argument within the confines of the 
internal logic of EU law. A Member State with fewer resources, or less willingness to participate 
in the mechanisms of EU law, is less likely to try to send what Pollak calls ‘political signals’.248 
The UK government, with its more frequent interventions, gave itself more opportunity to send 
political signals to the EU via the Court of Justice, even if these were couched purely in legal 
terms.  
Such signals may directly concern the subject of a case or may concern an issue that was not 
raised in the questions referred: as such, this category overlaps with number 3 above, but is 
intended to cover issues that are broader than direct challenges to EU legal provisions.  In 
Pringle, for instance, although the case hinged on whether there had been improper use of the 
simplified revision procedure, the UK wanted to emphasise that the procedure could be used for 
reducing EU competences, but not increasing them.249 In other words, a rather technical question 
was appropriated in order to respond to the potential political issues it raised. 
Political signals may be negative. Slagter suggests that the UK ‘might submit written 
observations in an attempt not to upload their own policies per se, but rather to prevent more 
adverse policies from gaining traction via the Court’s rulings.’ She argues that the UK was more 
likely to intervene when it perceived a potential policy to be ‘particularly burdensome’ and gives 
the example of Vroege, the case which led to Preston (mentioned in section 1).250 
The UK showed several consistent policy preferences during its membership, both positive (e.g. 
the Single Market) and more negative (e.g. the Common Agricultural Policy). Some examples of 
cases where the UK’s submissions express its support for the Single Market are mentioned in the 
section on guiding the evolution of EU law. Some of the UK’s preferences were shared with 
Denmark or Ireland: in particular, strong preferences about citizenship and family reunification: 
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the UK submitted observations in 44% of cases. The UK was broadly unsuccessful in swaying 
the Court in cases such as Zhu and Chen (the UK’s observations in which are recounted by 
Kochenov and Lindeboom)251, Baumbast and Metock.252 It can be argued that the UK’s 
observations represented a failed attempt to stem the incremental, ‘stone-by-stone’ development 
of EU citizenship law described by Lenaerts.253  
The UK also had strong policy preferences that were less likely to be expressed through the 
Court. For instance, despite political criticism of the Common Agricultural Policy (CAP) by all 
UK governments, the UK made submissions in only 11.5% of the cases on agriculture, about half 
of which were cases referred by UK courts. It could be argued in this case that disapproval of the 
principles and distributive effects of the CAP was a matter of ‘high politics’ whereas agricultural 
issues that reach the Court are mostly matters of ‘low politics’ that do not offer any opportunity to 
influence EU policy. In the early days of its membership, most of the cases in which the UK 
submitted observations could be described as explorations of the rules: cases on the common 
organisation of various agricultural markets, customs tariffs and pricing. Nearly a fifth of the 
cases in which the UK intervened concerned some aspect of the fishing industry (although these 
included the Factortame cases which were of undoubted wider significance). After 2000 the UK 
made very few observations in agriculture cases, with five years in which it made none at all. 
This suggests a simple pattern: of an area of EU law having been explained to the satisfaction of 
the UK government and courts, perhaps combined with a fall in the amount of secondary 
legislation that required interpretation. 
Other policy concerns may vary in prominence over time and between different governments; the 
variation in observations according to the contemporaneous political and social context would 
make an interesting study that is sadly outside the scope of this thesis. In this respect, it is worth 
noting that the head of the EU litigation unit stated that, although there was occasionally a ‘big 
thrust’ from the UK on a particular topic, usually there was no planned theme to UK 
involvement.254 To a large degree, this must be a consequence of the need for circumstances to 
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come together to allow broader considerations of policy to be brought before the Court of Justice: 
typically either a direct action by the Commission or a referral from a national court. 
7. Clarifying EU law 
The UK plainly had several non-altruistic motives for attempting to influence the Court in its role 
in clarifying EU law, both at the level of individual pieces of legislation and in terms of the 
development of large areas of the law. Arabadjiev observes, however, that the UK was one of the 
Member States that, in some cases, ‘act as unbiased counsel to the Court, assisting us in clarifying 
questions of common interest.’ He gives, as an example, the UK’s submission in CD, which, he 
says, ‘sought not only to defend its national legislation and practices which were being 
challenged but also to assist the Court on a controversial matter of high interest to the society at 
large.’255 The UK being at the time one of the few Member States in which surrogacy was 
regulated, its observations gave a detailed account of the reasoning behind its measures as well 
as, Arabadjiev says, ‘adding new perspectives into the discussion.’256 Granger similarly mentions 
that the UK government lawyers saw their role as both to defend national interests and to give 
disinterested advice.257  
Attention can be drawn to several instances of the UK making submissions that did not favour a 
national company or that criticised its legislation. Examples include Skills,258 in which the UK 
argued in favour of stricter interpretation of tachograph rules and contrary to the UK company 
that was the defendant, and Thames Water, in which the UK government’s observations drew 
attention to a lacuna in the Waste Water Directive.259  
Nouvelles Frontières, mentioned under several headings here, demonstrates the difficulty of 
drawing a hard line between the clarification of the law and attempts to guide its evolution—a 
conundrum that is the basis of much criticism of the supposed activism of the Court of Justice—
and therefore between cases that fall into the area where law and policies overlap. The UK’s 
observations in Nouvelles Frontières concerned the clarification of a legal issue (including the 
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significance of a previous judgment of the Court) but also made a more normative argument for 
widening the scope of the Single Market. 
8. Guiding the evolution of EU law 
There is abundant evidence of the UK attempting to influence the evolution of EU law, not just 
from the existence of an EU litigation unit that was organised so as to respond to cases referred 
by the courts of other Member States but discernible in the distribution of the UK’s observations. 
This motive was also freely acknowledged: for instance, Granger was told by the then head of the 
EU litigation unit that ‘It is the policy of the United Kingdom to take an active part in 
proceedings. It is thought that the direction of case law can be best influenced by good quality 
arguments presented by Member States .’260 This influence was frequently but not exclusively 
expressed in terms of limiting the scope of EU law, particularly in cases to do with citizenship 
and immigration (see Table 8).  
One area, however, where the UK expended particular effort and sought to expand the scope of 
EU law was the Single Market. The UK government was a strong promoter of the Single Market, 
both through diplomatic efforts and via the Court. As Geddes observes, governments of all 
persuasions saw the Single Market aspect of European integration as a key argument for British 
membership of the EU from the 1980s onwards.261 The House of Lords European Union 
Committee, reporting in 2014 on the financial crisis, said that ‘The UK remains committed to 
maintaining the integrity and operation of the single market and will work to ensure that this is 
upheld.’262 
At the Court, the UK was the second most frequent intervener in cases on three out of the four 
freedoms: to France in cases on the free movement of goods and to Germany in cases on workers 
and capital. It was equal fourth in cases on services, where Germany also came first. The UK 
was, however, the state that made the most observations in cases on Single Market issues from 
other Member States. In percentage terms, the UK’s observations in all free movement cases 
show two peaks: in the late 1970s and a broader peak in the 1990s and early 2000s; this is true for 
all four freedoms. The peak percentages vary by subject: for instance, in the decade to 2000, the 
UK made observations in an average of 26% of cases on the free movement of goods, 29% of 
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cases on services and establishment, 39% of cases of the freedom of movement and 20% of cases 
on capital (Figure 20). It is important to stress that the figure indicates the likelihood of the UK 
submitting observations on a given topic as a percentage of such cases, rather than absolute 
numbers: for instance, in 1978 the UK submitted observations in 16.8% of 24 cases on goods, 
20% of 5 on services and establishment, 66.7% of 3 on workers and in the single case of free 
movement of capital.  
The fact that the pattern is similar for each topic suggests that there should be a systematic 
explanation. It can be argued that the late 1970s represent a period when the UK was coming to 
terms with membership of the Common Market and wishing to assert influence over the details of 
its operation. The late 1990s and 2000s offered similar opportunities concerning the details of the 
Single Market. A detailed examination of the political circumstances prevailing at given times 
during the UK’s membership would no doubt yield useful insights but is outside the scope of this 
work. The decline in observations after the mid-2000s holds across all the subjects, despite the 
steady rise in cases on services and capital, and was not unique to the UK: Derlén, Lindholm and 
Naurin found that it was true across all Member States.263 It was, however, particularly marked in 
the UK; Derlén et al. suggest that the ever-increasing number of references led the government to 
become more strategic in which cases it chose to devote resources.264 Certainly there were 
concerns expressed about the number of cases reaching the Court in this period.265  
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Figure 20: Percentage of free movement cases in which the UK made observations 
There are clear examples of the UK making observations that supported the functioning of the 
internal market over national procedures and interests, several of which predate the Single 
European Act. An early example is Reyners, where the UK argued that limitations on the free 
movement of legal services for lawyers should be interpreted restrictively. The contemporaneous 
case of Dassonville, where the UK argued for the legitimacy of Belgian measures that the Court 
found were equivalent to a quantitative restriction, could be regarded as a counterexample, 
inspired by a perceived need to protect a national industry.266 Some key cases, such as Cassis de 
Dijon and Trailers, were perhaps overlooked at the time, although as Nicolaïdis recounts, Cassis 
de Dijon went on be an inspiration to Lord Cockfield in his efforts towards the completion of the 
Single Market.267 Its realisation has generally been treated—by British parliamentarians at least—
as a success of the UK government.268  
The UK also supported the legal basis on which internal market measures were adopted, where 
this was challenged, for instance in the combined direct action and preliminary reference cases on 
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tobacco advertising. In this case, the tobacco companies (and Germany) argued that rules on 
tobacco advertising were adopted for public health purposes rather than for the furtherance of the 
Single Market. The UK government, however, argued that ‘it is perfectly possible for a measure 
to pursue, indissociably, aims related to the internal market and aims related to a Community 
policy.’269 It could be argued that the UK’s analysis showed that it was willing to countenance 
some ‘mission creep’ in the development of the scope of the internal market. 
As was noted in Chapter 5, the UK’s observations in Nouvelles Frontières—which were in favour 
of the application of the general principles of EU law, including the competition rules, to the air 
transport industry—could be argued to constitute an attempt to guide the evolution of EU law. 
Whether the UK’s motive was disinterested was debatable: such support for an extension of the 
Single Market would come at the theoretical expense of the UK’s sovereignty, but would also 
benefit the British airline industry.270 Nevertheless, the UK’s contribution was phrased in 
evolutionary terms, including the observation that ‘it would be unacceptable nearly 30 years after 
the entry into force of the EEC Treaty for this sector to continue to be excluded from the scope of 
the competition rules.’271  
9. Political benefits from participation 
The political benefits that might have accrued to the UK government from participation at the 
Court have to be seen in the global and European frameworks, as well as in a purely national 
context. It can be contended, not least from international reactions to Brexit, that the UK stood to 
lose international standing from leaving the EU. This implies that, from an external viewpoint, its 
standing was boosted by membership. It is not obvious, however, that this was consistently the 
understanding of the UK government. It can be argued that, in its early years of membership, the 
government appears to have regarded membership as an economic necessity but felt that the 
development of the EU as a political body would weaken the UK’s international status.272 More 
recently, the UK’s Foreign and Commonwealth Office acknowledged the importance of the EU 
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to the UK’s status: in a 2016 speech, the then Foreign Secretary Philip Hammond said, ‘our 
global influence is enhanced by being a leading member of the world’s largest trading bloc.’273 
It is difficult to find evidence that participating in the Court as such affected the UK’s global 
prestige, or that the UK government expected it to. Participation was mainly seen in utilitarian 
terms rather than in terms of political benefits: for instance, the member of the Treasury 
Solicitor’s Department quoted above stated that it was ‘the policy of the UK to take an active part 
in proceedings before the Court of Justice’ but expressed this only in terms of government 
concerns about the Court’s legal developments.274  
The UK’s prestige within the EU varied over the years and is a complex topic that is outside the 
scope of this discussion. However, the effect of participation in court proceedings on the UK’s 
reputation among other Member States could be argued to have been relatively positive, at least 
in legal circles: Arabadjiev observes that ‘regardless of whether I have agreed or disagreed with 
the arguments put forward by the government of the United Kingdom, they traditionally stand out 
for their high quality, coherence and critical edge.’275 The UK’s participation may also have 
compensated somewhat for the loss of soft power and exclusion from informal networks that 
Lindahl argues that the UK suffered by its exclusion from the Euro. 276 As Zielonka points out, 
the UK ‘always underlined its right to be part of European economic governance’ despite 
choosing to stay outside the eurozone.277 The UK’s observations in Pringle, on the European 
Stability Mechanism, are a notable example of the UK asserting itself in a case that directly 
concerned the euro area.278 
Unlike with Denmark and Ireland, it is difficult to determine if the UK gained any domestic 
political advantage from its participation at the Court of Justice. Media reporting of EU affairs 
was inconsistent and rarely focused on Court proceedings; instead, it could be argued that the 
government of the day frequently perceived its domestic reputation to be bolstered by being seen 
to be in conflict with the EU at an intergovernmental level, although this varied over time. 
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Certain cases came to form part of a narrative of national loss of sovereignty to the EU, notably 
Factortame and the domestic case of Thoburn, but the UK government’s efforts at the Court in 
these cases were rarely discussed.279 More generally, cases of interest at the Court of Justice were 
reported, usually briefly, in several broadsheet newspapers and occasionally in more popular 
publications. Sporadic instances can be found of discussion of the government’s position and of 
the arguments likely to be put before the Court; a fairly recent example is Watson, a 2015 case on 
the UK’s Data Retention and Investigatory Powers Act,  which was discussed in several 
newspapers.280 In general, however, thoughtful discussion of cases that were underway was 
sufficiently rare that it could be argued that the government was unlikely to gain any public 
recognition for its submissions. Discussion of cases in trade journals has not been examined, but 
it seems likely that particular sectors of industry may have been more appreciative—being better 
informed of the arguments—of the government’s participation in the Court. 
10. The health of the EU legal order 
The UK’s degree of involvement in proceedings at the Court—particularly in other states’ 
cases—might be argued to imply that it had an interest, in both senses, in the EU legal order 
beyond its support, noted above, for the Single Market. In the UK’s case, there is some evidence 
in its observations that its motivations included a desire to promote the health of the EU legal 
order: for instance, in Courage the UK said, ‘the underlying rationale … should be the increased 
effectiveness of enforcement of Community law.’281 
This category could be argued to include the situation where the UK’s observations were 
intended to facilitate the Court’s proceedings. Several interviewees emphasised that the UK has, 
at least historically, often made observations that were purely designed to clarify the issues raised 
in an order for reference. 282 They felt that the UK’s observations were particularly helpful where 
the parties gave conflicting accounts of the legal issues or where the national court sent questions 
that only referred to the facts of the case without identifying the legal issues at all. They noted 
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that the UK extended this ‘help’ to the Court not just in British cases, but in other states’ cases in 
which unclear information was received from national courts. 
The University of Gothenburg’s analysis of the UK’s suggested answers to questions referred to 
the Court from 1998-2008 found that the UK supported control over issues at the EU level in a 
lower percentage of questions than either Denmark and Ireland. The UK supported control at the 
EU level in 24% of its 1,270 answers and supported member-state autonomy in 36%. In 16% of 
questions, the UK’s suggested answer was too complex to classify in this fashion, the remainder 
being questions where there was no obvious implication for the balance of power between the EU 
and the Member States. While this approach characterises the UK as having been more anti-
communautaire than Denmark or Ireland, a quarter of suggested answers were nevertheless in 
favour of EU-level control and a further 16% not clearly against. Thus it can be argued that the 
UK’s contributions were at least not consistently contrary to the health of the EU legal order.  
Using a Member State’s compliance with EU law, as measured by the number of direct actions 
against it, as a proxy for its support for the legal order, produces a similarly unclear picture. The 
UK had 53 open infringement actions at the end of the period studied here: more than Denmark 
(30) and Ireland (34) but half the number of Italy despite the UK having a slightly larger 
economy. It can be argued that a country’s compliance is more a product of its administrative 
arrangements and capacity than of its disposition towards EU control.  
The scale of the UK government’s participation in the preliminary reference procedure can be 
argued to have been both a product of its administrative arrangements and a guardedly proactive 
and constructive approach to EU law on the part of the government’s legal service and the 
national courts. The UK’s dialogue with EU law via the Court was comprehensive in terms of 
subject-matter and motives.  
Conclusion 
Analysis of the contributions of all three Member States suggests that those theoretical models 
which assert that governments are purely motivated to constrain the Court’s decision-making are 
inadequate because they fail to take into account both the complexities of the interactions 
between governments and the Court and the legal context in which they take place. The 
concluding chapter will argue that this analysis demonstrates that a satisfactory model of 
interactions between governments and the Court must account for all of these motives, for the 
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disparity in how compelling different Member States find them, and for the variance in Member 







Chapter 7: Governments at the Court and Council 
Introduction 
This thesis has so far highlighted the use that the Member States make of intervening in 
proceedings at the Court to express, and possibly impose, their policy preferences. The Court is, 
of course, one of a variety of routes by which governments attempt to influence the EU. Apart 
from Member States’ participation in the intergovernmental conferences that decide on treaty 
changes, the highest level at which states can convey their policy preferences is the European 
Council, where heads of state are involved in setting the policy agenda of the European Union. 
More routinely, the ministers of the member-state governments express their national preferences 
in the various formations of the Council of the European Union—or more precisely, these 
preferences are expressed mainly during the preparatory stages of the Council’s proceedings, 
which involve multiple institutions. It can be argued that Member States’ participation in cases at 
the Court is not entirely separate from this legislative activity but is part of a continuum of 
communication between the EU and the governments of its Member States. Despite the difficulty 
of discovering the content of Member States’ submissions, it can be argued that they may be a 
better reflection of national policy preferences than Member States’ votes in the Council. 
This chapter has two aims. The first is to assess the submission of legal arguments to the Court of 
Justice with reference to two models that together provide helpful frameworks for describing 
Member States’ motives in making submissions and how the Court receives those submissions. 
The second, which will expand some aspects of the first, will consider the relationship between 
member-state governments’ submissions to the Court of Justice and the positions that Member 
States express in the setting of the Council of the European Union. 
Models 
There have been attempts in several academic fields to provide a formal framework for the 
discussion of communication between the Member States and the EU. The substance of these 
attempts often depends on an author’s view of the vexed question of what the EU is: an 
intergovernmental international organisation, a confederation, a federal quasi-state or a system of 
multilevel governance (among others), and upon the academic preferences they bring to their 
analysis. Scholars of international relations are likely to construct a different model from 
constitutionalists or lawyers. 
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The models set out here do not depend heavily on the assumptions of a particular academic sub-
discipline; instead, it can be argued that they clarify—and to some extent reconcile—many of the 
competing models. The two models can be described as the ‘zone of discretion’ model and the 
‘continuous discourse’ model.1 It should be stressed that these models are not competing 
alternatives but two useful ways of thinking about the process of making observations, one 
mainly concentrating on the reception of observations and the other on the flow of information 
between the Member States and the EU. The continuous discourse model is further broken down 
into two different ways in which the flow of information can be characterised: as a manifestation 
of Voice or in terms of a bidirectional process of ‘uploading’ and ‘downloading’ policies and 
preferences between the Member States and the European Union.2 
The zone of discretion model 
In simple terms, the first model visualises the Court as operating within a strategic environment 
in which it gains its powers from the Treaties and the accumulated acquis communautaire. The 
Court’s powers are, however, lessened by the opposing powers that non-judicial authorities have 
to counteract them. This counteraction may consist of non-compliance by individual Member 
States, of legislative reversal of the Court’s decisions or, more probably, of implied threats to do 
either of these. The deliberate exercise of any of these powers by the Member States can be 
argued to be political in intention.3 Such constraints on the Court’s powers may be pictured as a 
theoretical boundary, beyond which external political considerations curtail the Court’s actions 
but within which is the Court is free to act as it thinks fit from a political standpoint. The 
influence of the Member States on the area within this ‘zone of discretion’ can only operate on 
the Court’s legal reasoning and must comply with legal rules.4 The boundary can be moved—
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witness the Court’s widening of its scope via the development of the principles of supremacy and 
direct effect—but to do so is difficult. 
This model can be argued to be the most general form of several competing theories of court 
behaviour, one main difference between which is in where they envisage this boundary as falling. 
In terms of the Court of Justice, the neofunctionalist model regards the Court as the trustee of the 
treaties, with broad powers that are minimally constrained by the Member States.5 It 
acknowledges the existence of the boundary but regards it as so widely drawn as to have little 
practical effect.6 Meanwhile, the strong intergovernmentalism espoused by Carrubba, Gabel and 
Hankla (among others) regards the Court as the agent of the Member States, with severely limited 
scope for autonomous action.7 
According to the model, the Court needs to estimate its zone of discretion before acting; thus, it is 
seen as continually weighing the possibility of government defiance against unhindered legal 
reasoning.8 Member States’ submissions provide this information to the Court. However wide its 
bounds are set, inside the zone of discretion the Court is considered to be protected from political 
influence. It is free to decide according to impartial legal principles—including that of 
maintaining consistency with the acquis communautaire—and according to the judges’ normative 
and ideological positions.9 Any external influence on the Court’s reasoning in this zone is a 
matter of persuasive legal argument. 
The Court’s reasoning can be described by the model even if the judges do not frame their 
thinking in precisely those terms. The Court remains conscious of the distinction between states’ 
legal arguments and any allusion they may make to the broader social and political context. The 
Member States, on the other hand, may or may not consciously make that distinction, partly 
depending on the clarity with which an Order for Reference lays out the EU law concerns of the 
referring national court. 
                                                   
5 Alec Stone Sweet, ‘The European Court of Justice and the Judicialization of EU Governance’ (2010) 5 Living 
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Court of Justice and the Judicialization of EU Governance’ (2010) 5 Living Reviews in European Governance 1, 
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In the zone of discretion model, the Court of Justice receives three kinds of information: 
straightforward factual information, Member States’ legal arguments and Member States’ 
positions regarding policy and politics. Member States’ provision of factual information impacts 
almost entirely on matters that fall within the scope of the Court’s purpose—however strictly it is 
drawn—and add to the effectiveness of the Court’s dispute resolution and the quality of its 
reasoning. As such, the information becomes part of the process within the zone of discretion but 
could be argued not to represent an unsought influence upon it. 
The distinction between legal arguments and those based on policy can be difficult to make in a 
particular case, as the Member States almost invariably couch their ‘political signals’ in terms of 
legal interpretation: usually, but not always, with reference to public policy exceptions to EU 
legal rules. A much-debated example of a case where the boundary between political and legal 
reasoning was at issue is Pringle, in which the Court was accused by some of erring in its 
statutory interpretation in order to uphold a political decision, thus defending the European 
Stability Mechanism.10 In total, twelve Member States submitted observations and the discussion 
in AG Kokott’s Opinion indicates that Member States’ arguments were phrased in legal and 
procedural terms. The UK government’s intentions were, however, to challenge the use of the 
simplified revision procedure to increase the competences of the EU, which could be argued to 
constitute a political motive beyond the legal arguments discussed in the Opinion.11 
In practice, the difficulty of distinguishing legal arguments from political arguments couched in 
legal terms is a stumbling-block for empirical research. Dederke and Naurin, for instance, 
acknowledge that there is a problem with identifying and operationalising the distinction between 
a Member State’s political or policy views and its views on the legal issues.12 They suggest that 
legal salience may be measured by the content of each case in terms of legal doctrines such as 
direct effect and sovereignty, or alternatively, how frequently each case is subsequently cited. For 
political salience, they score cases based on how controversial the issues were found to be at the 
legislative stage. This approach may well be appropriate for considering how the Court perceives 
observations, but there is a problem in applying it to Member States’ motives, which is that—in 
the absence of the actual observations or at least Reports for the Hearing—these are ex-post 
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assessments. An issue of, say, direct effect might not have been detected by the government body 
that made a submission.13  
The zone of discretion is regarded as delimited by the political tolerance of Member States. 
However, information about that boundary, and more generally about the political background 
and context of a case, may be conveyed to the Court by a Member State, a party, or the 
Commission. Politics should be distinguished from policy, which may frequently be a 
consideration within the zone of discretion. The Court of Justice not infrequently finds itself 
assessing the scope of national public policy limitations, and the Member States defending them. 
For instance, there were 146 cases in which the Court examined restrictions ‘on the grounds of 
public policy’ within the period of this study. Policy issues may, of course, be nationally 
politically sensitive, especially where matters of national identity or with financial repercussions 
arise, in which case it might be said that the zone of discretion has a broad or blurred boundary. It 
could be argued that this does not detract from the usefulness of the model but captures nuances 
that some models struggle to accommodate. 
The Court may actively seek to discover the limits of its zone of discretion when it sounds out 
Member States’ reactions to possible legal changes, in particular when the Court discusses 
extending the scope of EU law in the absence of a Treaty amendment. As noted in Chapter 4, the 
Court has occasionally reopened proceedings to request Member States’ views on possible legal 
developments. In Pfeiffer, a question on the Working Time Directive was first remitted to a five-
judge formation of the Court without an oral hearing. That chamber took the view that the 
question raised an issue of horizontal direct effect and referred the cases back to a full Court for 
an oral hearing. As AG Ruiz-Jarabo Colomer stated in his Opinion, ‘A hearing was arranged to 
discuss that point, to which the Member States, the Council and the Commission as well as the 
parties to the main proceedings were invited.’14As noted earlier, the four Member States that took 
part indicated strongly that the Court should not extend the scope of direct effect. Such an inquiry 
has been extended to Member States that are not currently affected by a measure, as in Tessili, 
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and it has been argued that this option may apply even where a state has an opt-out from the 
relevant area.15 
This sounding-out of member-state governments concerning the boundaries of the zone of 
discretion not only tells the Court where Member States’ limits are—within which they are 
unlikely to be non-compliant—but it can be argued that the process of consultation, or at least of 
allowing governments to be heard, may make compliance more likely. 
Another area where the boundary of the zone of discretion is relevant is to matters of 
admissibility and justiciability. Questions of admissibility raised by the Member States usually 
concern the order for reference—the facts and legislative context of the national case and whether 
the relevance of the questions to it has been made clear. These are matters of legal procedure that 
lie within the Court’s zone of discretion. Arguments relating to justiciability, on the other hand, 
concern the limits of that zone, often expressed in terms of competence and subsidiarity. 
Justiciability being—as Rasmussen points out—where politics intrudes into law, the limits of the 
Court’s discretion are of much interest to the Member States.16 
Some submissions are, at least in the main, disinterested contributions to the work of the Court. 
These include observations that clarify a confused order for reference or which explain the legal 
issues. Such submissions act purely within the zone of discretion. The same motive can usually 
be attributed when a Member State draws attention to matters that are not raised explicitly within 
an order for reference but can legitimately be inferred. However, as noted in Chapter 4 regarding 
issues of national identity, it is at least possible that matters concerning the boundary of the zone 
could be raised in this manner. 
An interesting point is raised by Larsson’s suggestion that the Court may analyse the Member 
States’ observations in order to identify points of disagreement between them. The assumptions 
of this theory are the same as those of various versions of the zone of discretion model: that when 
Member States particularly dislike a judgment of the Court of Justice, they have it within their 
power to reverse the Court’s decision by promoting and passing new legislation. In this way, as 
he says, the preferences of the governments do set boundaries to the Court’s discretion.17 Larsson 
suggests that, where there is substantial disagreement between the Member States, the Court may 
                                                   
15 Case 12/76 Tessili EU:C:1976:133; Morten Broberg and Niels Fenger, Preliminary References to the 
European Court of Justice (OUP 2014) 343. 
16 Catherine Barnard and Eleanor Sharpston, ‘The Changing Face of Article 177 References’ (1997) 34 CML 
Rev 1113. 
17 Larsson (n 1) 14.  
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recognise that their lack of consensus makes legislative override unlikely and use the opportunity 
to advance the law according to its own preferences. According to this theory, the Court is not 
merely the passive recipient of the Member States’ preferences but a sophisticated player in the 
system of law-making. It can be argued that (if he is correct) the Court may actively use 
differences between the Member States’ proposed answers to questions to move issues into its 
zone of discretion: that is, from the political field to the area within which the Court can exercise 
its own discretion.  
As noted in Chapter 4, the submissions of member-state governments may affect various aspects 
of case management, from the formation of the Court to whether or not there needs to be an 
Advocate General’s Opinion. These procedural effects can be argued to occur entirely within the 
Court’s area of complete discretion; indeed, the Court’s prerogative to deny requests for 
reopening of a hearing has invariably been exercised, while most of the effects that do occur, do 
so at the Court’s initiative without the Member States being aware of them. 
The final influence on the Court that was proposed in Chapter 4 was that the Member States’ 
opportunity to have their say in proceedings had the systematic effect of contributing legitimacy 
to EU law in general and the Court in particular. Further to this earlier discussion, it can be 
argued that the Court’s legitimacy (in the general sense) is bound to be harmed by suspicions that 
it is subject to political influence from the member-state governments. It is therefore essential to 
the Court’s legitimacy that it is seen only to recognise persuasive legal argument and that it 
evaluates national policy concerns only in the light of EU legislation and general principles of 
law. The zone of discretion model helps clarify the boundary between these legal influences and 
any illegitimate political pressure on the Court’s judgments. It can, however, be argued that the 
Court’s limited reporting of the contents of Member States’ submissions is unhelpful in allaying 
any fears about political manipulation. 
The continuous discourse model 
The second model proposed concerns the flow of information between the Court and the Member 
States rather than its effect on the Court. According to this model, Member States are always 
involved in the back-and-forth of EU decision-making, and the submission of legal arguments to 
the Court can be regarded as part of a continuous, dynamic process of communication between 
national governments and the European Union as a whole. On a particular topic, a Member State 
may fail to carry the day during the legislative procedure of the Council and find itself forced to 
adopt a position that does not (or does not entirely) reflect the government’s position. Intervening 
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in Court proceedings gives the Member State a final opportunity to speak on behalf of its 
preferred position. The state may not always intend to circumscribe the scope of the legislation 
that was passed: states not infrequently defend national legislation that goes further than the 
contested EU legislation. German efforts to uphold a higher standard of fundamental rights are 
well known,18 but another example would be cases in which a Member State has defended more 
extensive national environmental law.19 In this model, there is no rigid distinction between 
political and legal interventions: interventions are functional and may include information about 
both a Member State’s political stance on an issue and its preferred legal arguments. 
The continuous discourse framework may be considered in two ways. The first is to apply the 
Exit and Voice model that originated in economics and was applied to the EU by Weiler:20 
Member States that are unhappy with the EU may choose to leave, or at least to disengage from 
some areas of the EU’s legal regime (Exit), or they may attempt to change the EU from within 
(Voice).21 The submission of observations to the Court can be regarded as a strong manifestation 
of Voice, and indeed one in which smaller and less powerful states are given the same 
opportunity to be heard as larger and more powerful ones. The second model originated in 
Europeanisation theory22 and describes the bidirectional processes by which policies and values 
are ‘downloaded’ from the EU to the Member States and ‘uploaded’ from the Member States to 
the EU level.23 Both aspects of this bidirectional process can be seen in the working of the 
preliminary reference procedure. These two conceptual frameworks do not necessarily compete, 
although they arise from different academic sub-disciplines and rarely seem to overlap. Both cast 
a slightly different light on the communication between the Member States and the EU, and both 
                                                   
18 See e.g. Bill Davies, Resisting the European Court of Justice: West Germany’s Confrontation with European 
Law, 1949-1979 (CUP 2012). 
19 E.g. Case C-149/94 Vergy EU:C:1996:37; Case C-202/94 van der Feesten EU:C:1996:39. 
20 Joseph HH Weiler, ‘The European Community in Change: Exit, Voice and Loyalty’ (1990) 3 Irish Studies in 
International Affairs 15. 
21 Joseph HH Weiler, ‘The Transformation of Europe’ (1991) 100 The Yale Law Journal 2403. 
22 For a commonly agreed definition of Europeanisation see Robert Ladrech, ‘Europeanization of Domestic 
Politics and Institutions: The Case of France’ (1994) 32 JCMS 69: 'an incremental process re-orientating the 
direction and shape of politics to the degree that EC political and economic dynamics become part of the 
organisational logic of national politics and policy-making.' Later works regard Europeanisation as 
encompassing the reverse diffusion process to some degree. 
23 Kerry Howell provides a brief review of the concept of ‘uploading’ and ‘downloading’ of policy in the 
process of Europeanisation in a 2002 paper (Kerry E Howell, ‘Up-Loading, Downloading and European 
Integration: Assessing the Europeanization of UK Financial Services Regulation’ (2002)); Vivien A Schmidt, 




can be reconciled into a more nuanced description of the relationship between the EU and its 
Member States. They are, however, discussed separately here. 
Voice 
The concept of ‘Voice’, with its corollary ‘Exit’, is adopted by Weiler in his 1991 paper ‘The 
Transformation of Europe’24 from the work of the economist Albert O Hirschman two decades 
earlier.25 Hirschman’s 1970 conception was intended to describe what happened when customers 
were disappointed with an organisation. They could vote with their feet (Exit). Or they could 
remain loyal to the organisation and effect change by complaining (Voice). Hirschman regarded 
Exit and Voice in game-theory terms as factors in a zero-sum game: the more the opportunity for 
effecting change given to the customer, the less likely the customer was to go to another supplier, 
and vice versa. He proposed that the same model could be applied to states: citizens afforded little 
opportunity for Voice—democratic or other political power—could, if sufficiently determined, 
choose Exit and leave. 
Hirschman’s application of the model may seem a long way from the question of how to account 
for an emerging European polity, concerning as it does the choices of individuals. Weiler, 
however, applied the model to the relationship between the Member States and the EU, 
characterising Exit as either a Member State’s choosing to leave the EU—formal exit, which he 
optimistically regarded as improbable—or choosing either not to implement, or not to enforce, 
EU law. The latter could be described as selective exit, the opportunity for which he regarded as 
closed at the institutional and intergovernmental levels by direct actions, and at the national level 
by preliminary references.26 Exit thus being, in his analysis, impossible, Weiler regarded Voice as 
the only choice left to Member States that wished to register any disagreement with the EU. 
Voice can be analysed along several axes: it can be displayed most strongly in political or in legal 
terms at any particular time; it can be a force for integration or one for separation; it can be louder 
from some Member States than others. This last is manifested in the Council—not merely 
because the Member States differ in formal voting power27 in policy areas where qualified 
majority voting applies, but because some are more organised and skilled at negotiating than 
                                                   
24 Weiler (n 21).  
25 Albert O Hirschman, Exit, Voice and Loyalty: Responses to Decline in Firms, Organizations and States 
(Harvard University Press 1970). 
26 Weiler, ‘The Transformation of Europe’ (n 20) 2412-20. 
27 As represented graphically in Hirschman (n 25). 
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others. It can also be recognised at the Court, where Member States’ capacity and willingness to 
engage with the Court, and skill in doing so, vary considerably. 
Weiler analysed the political and legal developments of the EU in terms of different 
manifestations of Voice, from the strongest (the seizing of power by the Member States, 
particularly France, during the 1965 crisis and in its supposed resolution via the Luxembourg 
Compromise) to the most minor and technical.28 He observed that there seemed to be a balance 
between the political and legal manifestations of Voice. At times when the political Voice of 
governments tended away from European integration, especially during the ‘empty chair crisis’ of 
the mid-1960s, the legal Voice of the Court of Justice was simultaneously developing the 
constitutional principles of direct effect and supremacy. Weiler argued that, had these integrative 
legal principles not been balanced by Member States’ veto powers in the intergovernmental 
environment of the Council, it is unlikely that they—and the process of constitutionalisation that 
flowed from them—would have been accepted.29  
This description refers to a balance between the political and legal powers of the Member States 
en masse. A similar logic applies to an individual Member State: in particular, where a Member 
State is unable to achieve its objectives via the Council and therefore switches its attempts to the 
Court of Justice. A Member State’s interventions at the Court of Justice may be a manifestation 
of Voice—a downstream second chance for the Member State to recoup some of its losses at the 
upstream, legislative level or to reinforce legislation of which it is in favour. It can also be argued 
that interventions are a better source of information about the Member State’s real preferences. 
This point is discussed further below, but it is important to recognise that voting outcomes at the 
Council are the result of several stages of preparatory work, at any of which a Member State’s 
individual Voice may fall by the wayside. 
When a Member State fails to have its way via any of the routes available at the Council, it may 
elect not to comply, possibly triggering a direct action or (further down the line) a preliminary 
reference.30 Weiler predicts that non-compliance might become a deliberate strategy rather than 
                                                   
28 One can speculate that the behind-the-scenes negotiations necessitated by the Luxembourg Compromise 
solidified the practice of ‘corridor bargaining’ that renders national positions at the Council so opaque. 
29 Weiler (n 21).  
30 This does not preclude more explicit actions to overturn Council decisions via the Court, such as the attempt 
by the Netherlands to overturn Directive 98/44/EC on the patentability of biotechnology in Case C-377/98 
Netherlands v Parliament and Council EU:C:2001:523. 
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being the consequence of institutional incapacity.31 This non-compliance can take several forms, 
from the most overt, such as failure to implement a directive, to the more subtle, such as lobbying 
the Commission during the process of fine-tuning legislation that has already been approved by 
the Council and Parliament.32,33 Selective non-compliance could be regarded as the highest 
available form of Exit for a Member State that does not wish to exercise the option of 
withdrawing from the EU. Where non-compliance is challenged (most likely in the former 
situation since interference in the fine-tuning of ‘implementing acts’ may be impossible to detect 
and prove), any resulting legal actions give the Member State another—and often its last—
opportunity for Voice. 
A Member State’s arguments in its defence and interventions in actions against other states 
provide it with the best and most direct chance for Voice, but they require the state (or another) to 
decide not to comply, or to do so in so dilatory or imperfect a manner that the Commission is 
forced to step in. Indeed, a Member State may have strong views on an issue that has no 
immediate national application. Preliminary references provide a greater, but less focused, 
possibility of exercising Voice. The broader scope of member-state governments’ observations in 
preliminary references gives the opportunity for Voice to take many of the forms described in 
Chapter 5. It can, however, be argued that Voice is a better descriptor of, for instance, attempts to 
redirect the trajectory of an entire area of EU law or to defend a nation’s sovereignty than of 
observations that put forward a Member State’s preferred answer to a technical question. A 
Member State’s disinterested assistance to the Court falls outside the model entirely. 
As manifestations of Voice, ‘pure’ politics or law are rare, especially in the EU context. The 
Voice model of member-state observations at the Court sees them as different ways in which a 
Member State can attempt to achieve its ends, according to the forum in which the states’ efforts 
are being exercised. Weiler takes the view that the legal developments issuing from the Court of 
Justice were simply one aspect of the wider discourse between the Member States and the then 
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European Community. He points out that the ‘judicial characterisation’34 of the evolution of the 
European Union was deceptive and that ‘Legal and constitutional structural change have been 
crucial, but only in their interaction with the Community political process.’35 The ‘opposing’ 
forces are neither alternatives nor in opposition to each other, although they represent different 
intellectual models for analysis. 
Uploading 
Another way of describing the discourse between the EU and the Member States is to borrow 
terminology from Europeanisation theory. The processes of transnational EU policy-making 
involve flows of information about policy preferences between the Member States and the 
institutions of the European Union, which can be described as ‘uploading’ (the projection of 
national policy preferences onto the EU) and ‘downloading’ (a Member State’s accommodation 
to EU rules and priorities).36 The conventional view is that the more a state succeeds in uploading 
its policy preferences, the more EU law will be shaped after the national pattern and the easier the 
state will find it to accommodate the EU dimension at the national level.37 
Mainstream Europeanisation theory has tended not to involve much mention of the Court of 
Justice. Academic discussion of uploading has concentrated on how Member States convey their 
policy preferences into what Connolly describes as ‘the EU policy arena’38. This chiefly means 
Member States’ participation in the Council, but it may involve a Member State having experts in 
place in the Commission or in the bodies that contribute to the negotiation process before voting 
takes place.39 The inclusion of the Court of Justice within the EU policy arena is generally not a 
significant feature of the theory—making it substantially different from the ‘integration through 
law’ narrative—although the fact that the Court has some role is at least implied.40 It is not, 
                                                   
34 As exemplified, in Weiler’s example, by Stein’s 1981 paper (Eric Stein, ‘Lawyers, Judges, and the Making of 
a Transnational Constitution’ (1981) 75 American Journal of International Law 1). 
35 Weiler (n 21). 
36 Tanja A Börzel and Thomas Risse, ‘When Europe Hits Home: Europeanization and Domestic Change’ (EIOP 
European Integration Online Papers, 2000) <http://eiop.or.at/eiop/texte/2000-015a.htm> accessed 10 August 
2020. 
37 Börzel (n 2) 198. 
38 John Connolly, ‘Europeanization, Uploading and Downloading: The Case of Defra and Avian Influenza’ 
(2008) 23 Public Policy and Administration 7, 10. 
39 Börzel (n 2) 200; Diana Panke, ‘Small States in EU Negotiations: Political Dwarfs or Power-Brokers’ (2011) 
46 Cooperation and Conflict 123, 123. 
40 E.g. Claudio M Radaelli, ‘Europeanization: Solution or Problem?’ in Michelle Cini and Angela K Bourne 
(eds), Palgrave Advances in European Union Studies (Palgrave Macmillan 2006) 70. 
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however, necessarily envisaged as providing a route for the uploading and downloading of policy. 
Blauberger and Schmidt review some of the academic literature and note that, where 
Europeanisation theory has considered the Court, it has tended to be regarded as promoting 
negative integration, or the elimination of trade barriers.41 In that scenario, it is envisaged that 
there is little downloading of EU influence to governments (as opposed to judiciaries42) and no 
element of policy uploading from the Member States.43 
Some authors acknowledge that the Court’s interpretative role extends into making, and acting as 
a conduit for, policy decisions and consider the effect of Member States’ interventions in terms of 
uploading. Slagter in particular explicitly describes the Member States as uploading their policy 
preferences via the Court in their observations.44 Bulmer and Burch, discussing Europeanisation 
as it specifically applies to the UK government, note that the Cabinet Office European Secretariat 
‘articulate[s] UK interests in cases of significance to British European policy.’45 Treib considers 
the interrelationship between uploading and downloading via the Court and suggests that Member 
States employ their observations to convey their concerns about the direction of case law and 
offer the Court an opportunity to qualify its earlier decisions and render its interpretation more 
palatable to governments, thereby smoothing domestic implementation.46  
The occupational pension cases that followed Barber provide an example of this process. In 
Barber, the Court held that contracted-out occupational pensions were covered by the equal pay 
                                                   
41 Michael Blauberger and Susanne K Schmidt, ‘The European Court of Justice and Its Political Impact’ (2017) 
40 West European Politics 907, 913 and see Karen J Alter and Sophie Meunier-Aitsahalia, ‘Judicial Politics in 
the European Community: European Integration and the Pathbreaking Cassis de Dijon Decision’ (1994) 26 
Comparative Political Studies 535; Alec Stone Sweet and Margaret McCown, ‘The Free Movement of Goods’ 
in Alec Stone Sweet (ed), The Judicial Construction of Europe (OUP 2004). 
42 See e.g. Marie-Pierre Granger, ‘France Is “ Already ” Back in Europe : The Europeanization of French Courts 
and the Influence of France in the EU’ (2008) 14 European Public Law 335; Juan A Mayoral, Urszula Jaremba 
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Europeanization Mechanisms’ (2002) 41 European Journal of Political Research 258. 
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European Union (Manchester University Press 2013) 97. 
46 Oliver Treib, ‘Implementing and Complying with EU Governance Outputs’ (2014) 9 Living Reviews in 
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principle.47 The decision had significant consequences for the organisation of pensions schemes 
throughout the EU, and in a line of subsequent cases, Member States sought to circumscribe 
Barber‘s effects.48 The Court did make a limited retreat from its decision, but the usual caveat 
applies: that it is impossible to know how much, if at all, it was influenced by the Member States’ 
observations. 
It could be argued that the characterisation of the discourse between the Member States and the 
Court as uploading and downloading better addresses the totality of member-state governments’ 
interactions with the EU. The occasions upon which a Member State places extremely high stakes 
on an outcome at the Court or the outcome of a Council vote are relatively infrequent. A great 
deal of the EU’s business is relatively mundane and unlikely to lead a Member State to the edge 
of rebellion, and this is especially true of much of the Court’s day-to-day activity. While most 
cases raise issues of some economic importance to Member States, it is unlikely that a Member 
State would threaten non-compliance or, at the most excessive, to leave the EU over an unfair 
customs classification or the disapplication of a national measure on the categorisation of drinks. 
The uploading model accounts better for cases that are not legally ground-breaking but are 
everyday disputes about customs (10.3% of all cases in the period), VAT (8.7%) or social 
security (9.3%). From the Court’s point of view, uploading can be argued to bear mainly on 
matters within its zone of discretion. For governments, uploading can be argued to represent a 
better model than Exit and Voice, in that Exit is rarely under consideration. 
The continuous discourse model argues that Member States’ interventions in proceedings at the 
Court taking place in the same argumentative space as their contributions to the Council. While 
everyday cases are not necessarily directly linked to voting outcomes at the Council, it can be 
argued that academic analysis of member-states governments’ uploading policies in the 
legislative part of the policy arena can cast helpful light on the part that national executives play 
at the Court.  
The uploading policies of individual states  
Börzel observes that different Member States have different policies towards uploading their 
preferences, different policy goals and different success rates. She classifies those states that are 
relatively good at uploading their national preferences and enabling them to become the 
                                                   
47 Case 262/88 Barber EU:C:1990:209. 
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mainstream view as ‘pace-setters’ and those that are less successful—or less able to make an 
attempt—as ‘foot-draggers’.49 Those that chiefly choose to work in cooperation with other 
Member States, trading off their policy concerns in some areas in exchange for support in more 
nationally salient policy areas, she terms ‘fence-sitters’. Several writers have applied this 
classification to individual parts of the national executives: as regards the UK, for instance, 
Connolly found that the ministry of agriculture (DEFRA) was an active pace-setter with regard to 
uploading its policies on precautions against avian diseases whereas Slagter regards the UK as 
having been a fence-sitter with regard to social policy, attempting to block EU measures that it 
regarded as problematic rather than actively uploading its own policies.50 Börzel herself regarded 
the UK as something of a fence-sitter on environmental policy.51 
Differences in uploading between the Member States (or, as noted above, different ministries) 
may, of course, owe more to variations in their administrative capacity than to government 
policy. This was discussed regarding the submission of observations in Chapter 3. What follows 
is a brief examination of the effect of administrative capacity on the discourse in general between 
the EU and the Member States.  
Schmidt devotes a chapter of her book to a comparison of the respective institutional capacities of 
France, Germany, Italy and the UK. She argues that national political structure is of the first 
importance, both as regards the degree to which Member States are Europeanised, and their 
ability to influence the EU.52 She concludes that regionalised polities with partially diffused 
power, such as Italy, find it difficult to upload their preferences as effectively as unitary states 
such as France and the UK in which executive power is centralised.53 Truly federal states such as 
Germany may also find it less easy to upload their preferences, as executive power is divided 
between the federal level and that of the sixteen states, with little central control. Schmidt quotes 
a Belgian permanent representative on COREPER as saying that Germany’s performance there is 
‘typically, bad’ as a consequence of the rivalries between the centre and the Länder.54 As noted 
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earlier, the same diffusion of power can mean that, if German ministries disagree as to the line to 
be taken, the government will not intervene in cases before the Court. 
While a Member State’s degree of centralisation of executive power directly affects its ability to 
express and upload its policy preferences, the majority of such uploading is performed by its 
national executive. Thus the state’s administrative capacity is an essential factor which cannot 
readily be separated from the state’s constitutional structure. In this context, it is nearly 
impossible to avoid mentioning Italy. It is frequently argued that Italy’s diffused and contentious 
administrative arrangements render it poor at implementing EU provisions; certainly, it has been 
the Member State with the highest number of infringements declared by the Court.55 As far as 
downloading is concerned, Radaelli (admittedly writing in 1997) says ‘[G]iven the instability of 
Italian governments and the miserable state of Italian public administration, Italy has a low 
potential for policy change.’56 Schmidt observes that Italy has also been passive in projecting its 
policy preferences during the creation of legislation, while Thomson notes that a survey of 
officials working in the permanent representations of the Member States, the Commission and the 
Parliament reported that ‘the Italian delegation often appeared poorly organised and unable to 
articulate a clear position in Council meetings.’57  
Interestingly, however, Italy has been active in intervening at the Court of Justice,58 and not just 
in direct actions or its own preliminary references.59 In this case, it would be incorrect to 
generalise from Italy’s behaviour in the Council to its behaviour before the Court. Nonetheless, it 
would be interesting to discover why it is more organised at the Court. 
Radaelli contrasts Italy’s performance with that of the UK in terms of ‘macro-administrative 
variables’: that is, the administrative capacity and efficiency of Whitehall as compared to that of 
                                                   
55 See e.g. Court of Justice of the European Union, ‘Annual Report 2014’ (2015) Table 11, which shows that 
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Italy.60 Some factors that affected the UK’s government’s performance in uploading its 
preferences were discussed in Chapter 6: its constitutional history, which has given it a strong 
central administration, and the practical and historical factors that meant it developed the 
administrative capacity to deal with European matters in advance of membership. In addition, the 
UK’s relatively proactive approach to uploading its preferences could partially be attributed to a 
philosophical position on the EU that included objections to any lessening of parliamentary 
sovereignty and the exceptionalism that may have resulted from its long political stability and its 
island geography. The consequences of this philosophy must, of course, include its adverse 
effects on the UK’s standing with other governments and thus their likelihood of cooperating to 
upload policies. The UK was aptly described as ‘an awkward partner’—but it was still a partner, 
in both the Council and the Court.61 
There are several observations to be drawn from the foregoing. Firstly, member-state 
governments differ in their policies towards uploading their preferences. Secondly, and as noted 
in Chapter 5, ‘which part of government?’ may be an essential question. The third is that a state’s 
administrative capacity may influence its ability to upload its preferences, but it might not affect 
uploading via the Court in the same way as uploading via the Council. 
In the following section, the information to be gained about Member States’ revealed preferences 
from the two sources—the Council and the Court—will be compared and contrasted. This 
appraisal of the sources is equally applicable to the Voice and uploading models. 
Court v Council: the information to be gained from observations as 
compared to voting outcomes 
The simplest description of the activity of the Council of the European Union is that the relevant 
representatives of the governments of the Member States vote on legislative proposals from the 
Commission. This description implies that the votes indicate the policy positions of the Member 
States. Things are, however, not that straightforward. Just as there are problems with obtaining 
the contents of Member States’ observations at the Court, it may be difficult in practice to 
discover what position a Member State genuinely held during Council negotiations. The only 
evidence that is generally available about Council proceedings is the formal outcomes—voting 
results and any accompanying statements—and the information that can be derived from these 
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about member-state policy preferences is sparse. Firstly, recorded instances of voting against the 
majority or abstaining are relatively rare, and in their absence, it is difficult to discern a Member 
State’s real preferences. If more than a small number of Member States objected to a measure, it 
is likely either to have ‘stuck’ at a lower level than the Council debate or—if it succeeded in 
making it to the Council chamber—to have been remitted to a lower level for further discussion. 
In either case, the member-state objections may never have been reflected in the public voting 
results at all.62 
Secondly, what is discussed and voted on in Council may be a compromise in which some states’ 
preferences have already been obscured. A state may have had reservations about a measure, but 
the issue may have been insufficiently salient for the state to register a ‘no’ vote or abstain, or its 
reservations may have been negotiated away during secret ‘corridor bargaining’.63 Even if a 
country’s stated position in such bargaining were to be made public, there is a possibility that it 
would represent a negotiating position rather than being a reliable indicator of the state’s policy 
preferences. As Thomson points out, states’ policy positions are conceptually different from their 
policy preferences.64  
Thirdly, any negotiating that happens in the Council chamber (and beforehand) is secret and the 
Council has argued that it should continue to be so. In part, its argument is based on the second 
point: that what takes place is not necessarily a straightforward exchange of national preferences. 
The Council tacitly acknowledged this in Access Info Europe, in which it appealed a judgment of 
the General Court that Access Info should be allowed to see the unredacted records of a Working 
Party that had been set up to consider a new regulation regarding public access to European 
institution documents. The Council said, ‘[B]earing in mind the preliminary nature of the 
discussions under way at that time, disclosure of the identities of the Member States concerned 
would have reduced the delegations’ room for manoeuvre during the negotiations, which are a 
feature of the legislative procedure in the Council, and would, therefore, have impaired its ability 
to reach an agreement.65 A similar argument was expressed by the General Court in Carvel and 
Guardian Newspapers v Council: 
                                                   
62 Sandrino Smeets, Negotiations in the EU Council of Ministers: ‘And All Must Have Prizes’ (ECPR Press 
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Outlining the reasons underlying the principle of the confidentiality of its 
proceedings, the Council points out that it works through a process of negotiation and 
compromise, in the course of which its members freely express their national 
preoccupations and positions. It is essential that those positions remain confidential, 
particularly if the members are forced to move away from them in order that 
agreement may be reached, sometimes to the extent of abandoning their national 
instructions on a particular point. This process of compromise and negotiation is vital 
to the adoption of Community legislation, and would be jeopardized if delegations 
were constantly mindful of the fact that the positions they were taking, as recorded in 
Council minutes, could at any time be made public through the granting of access to 
those documents.66 
Smeets observes that the inner workings of the Council are directed towards achieving a mutually 
agreed text for legislation, where the participants simultaneously seek to reach a consensus and to 
legitimise their national positions. The arguments put forward are therefore more procedurally 
based than, and expressed in different terms from, the substantive positions of their 
governments.67 
In any case, the researcher can only rely on such information on Member States’ expressed 
preferences as is put into the public domain, which chiefly consists of actual voting results. 
Where states do persist in their disagreement and choose to abstain or vote against a measure, that 
fact is noted in the voting record, and they may also choose to submit a brief note of their 
reasoning. Such notes, and the voting records, may be obtained from the searchable register of 
official documents produced by the Council,68 which contains links to public documents plus 
references to those documents that are not available online. Unfortunately, this information is 
only available from 1999 onwards, leaving research into Council decision-making before this 
severely hampered. 
Mattila analysed Council voting during the period 2004-6, i.e. after the extension of qualified 
majority voting to almost all areas of policy.69 It should be noted that, given the low rate of 
dissent in the Council, his sample was small. His first notable finding was that the overall number 
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of negative votes and abstentions was very low. Ireland, during the period studied, was the state 
that was least likely to vote against the majority or abstain from votes on legislative acts (25th of 
25), whereas the UK, for instance, was quite likely to do so (8th of 25). Hix, examining the longer 
period of 2004-9, found that the UK was the equal most likely to vote with the minority (with 
Austria), but that this only amounted to 2.6% of votes.70  
For this paper, the exercise was repeated for 2008 using the search facility on the Council 
website. During this period there were 149 voting results, (including 12 that were packages of 26 
votes passed unanimously). The Schengen opters-out Denmark, Ireland and the UK were not 
included in 3 voting results: one package plus two single votes. There were only 18 voting results 
in which there were abstentions (32 abstentions in total) and 7 in which there were votes against 
(9 negative votes in total). 
Hix compared total votes in the period 2004-09 with 2009-15 and found a significant increase in 
the number of states voting against measures or abstaining. Nevertheless, the UK—the most 
likely to vote with the minority in both periods—voted with the majority in 87.6% of instances in 
2009-15. These findings together indicate that most Council voting results are achieved by 
consensus and are poor predictors of Member States’ policy preferences. Pre-vote negotiations 
cannot readily be deduced, although the likelihood of two states having cooperated to vote against 
or abstain as a course of conduct can be calculated. Naurin and Lindahl conclude that there is a 
very low probability of this occurring.71 
At the Council, a Member State that disagrees with the others has four choices: to block a 
measure where that is an option, to vote against the majority, to abstain or to concede. In areas 
that require unanimity, an individual Member State might block progress in the Council, but it 
cannot necessarily persuade the other states to adopt its position. The majority voting process 
could leave it equally unsatisfied: if it does not abstain, either its voting position might not hold 
sway, or it might be induced to vote with the majority in return for concessions elsewhere. The 
latter is not unusual: Weiler notes that there has been a tendency for national executives go to 
                                                   
70 Simon Hix and Sara Hagemann, ‘Does the UK Win or Lose in the Council of Ministers?’ (The UK in a 
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Enlargement’ in Daniel Naurin and Helen Wallace (eds), Unveiling the Council of the European Union - Games 
Governments Play in Brussels (Palgrave Macmillan 2008). 
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considerable trouble to achieve a consensus and avoid a vote.72 Such a consensus is achieved by 
bargaining, but not necessarily by bargaining within the Council or even beforehand at the 
Committee of Permanent Representatives, COREPER. Indeed, some authors have questioned 
whether negotiations in and around the Council can be characterised as bargaining at all: Smeets 
describes what takes place as a ‘non-competitive debate [which] consists of a series of individual 
attempts to get one’s concerns incorporated in the outcome.’73 Lewis points out that agreements 
in COREPER are achieved more collectively than adversarially,74 and Elgström and Jönsson 
argue more generally that ‘day to day negotiations in the EU are to a large extent problem-solving 
exercises’.75 
Mattila, Hayes-Renshaw, van Aken and Wallace analysed the period 1998-2004 and found that 
some 30% of Council decisions were reached on the legal basis of unanimity and that some 75-
80% of the decisions that might potentially have been decided by QMV had not been contested at 
ministerial level.76 They conclude that 70% of Council business was settled beforehand, in 
working parties comprised of officials drawn from the executives of the Member States. It seems 
clear that the arguments pursued in the working parties would give a more accurate indication of 
a Member State’s policy preferences than its votes in Council. It should be noted that the officials 
involved in the working parties may in some cases have close links with the legal advisers who 
might be called upon to compose any subsequent interventions in Court proceedings. This is 
certainly true of the UK, where the staff who give legal advice to the officials involved in EU 
negotiations and those who determine the content of UK submissions to the Court both fall within 
the Cabinet Office European Secretariat, combining legal advice and litigation responsibilities 
within the same division. Thus there is a direct link between the negotiating process before 
legislation is put to the vote and the preparation of government interventions and observations if a 
state’s implementation is subject to legal challenge, however long these may be separated in time. 
It can be argued that Member States are likely to see intervention in Court proceedings as a final 
opportunity to exercise Voice or to upload preferences, and that such an opportunity forms part of 
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a continuum of dialogue with the EU. In principle, it should be possible to connect occasions 
when a Member State has voted against a measure in Council, or at least abstained, with a 
Member State coming back for a final attempt at changing the interpretation of a measure or 
persuading the Court that its version of the measure’s implementation is the correct one. In 
practice, there are difficulties in pursuing this test. 
One problem with positing a direct link between a Member State’s Council votes and its 
interventions in Court proceedings is that the Member States cannot generally initiate Court 
actions themselves. They have to seize the opportunity to convey their preferences when the 
Commission challenges the implementation of a measure, or when a national court refers a case 
to the Court for its judgment on a point of EU law. It may take a long time for an issue that 
concerns a national government to come before the Court and for the member-state government’s 
Voice to be heard. This is not to say that a government cannot influence the likelihood of a 
referral. However, it can be argued to be more likely to discourage a referral than to encourage 
one—Denmark, for instance, is reputed actively to discourage its national courts from submitting 
references.77 Typically, however, circumstances have to come together to allow a government to 
bring broader considerations of policy before the Court of Justice. Thus, it may be impossible to 
find a case that deals with a specific Council measure to which a Member State has objected in 
the past. 
It is not quite so difficult to find Member States intervening in court cases on similar topics to 
those where they have manifested disagreement with the majority in the Council. The Nordic 
Member States, for instance, are both more likely to express strong views on environmental 
matters in the Council and to intervene in environment cases. For example, in April 2007, 
Denmark and Sweden both voted against a proposal to amend Council Directive 76/769/EEC so 
as to restrict the sale of mercury-containing thermometers to the public, on the ground that those 
states already had tighter restrictions on the use of mercury. To date, there have been no cases 
concerning that amendment. But later that year, a direct action was brought against Sweden for 
making a unilateral proposal to restrict a particular organic chemical, circumventing the 
                                                   
77 Jens Elo Rytter and Marlene Wind, ‘In Need of Juristocracy? The Silence of Denmark in the Development of 
European Legal Norms’ (2011) 9 International Journal of Constitutional Law 470, 489, citing Peter Pagh, 
‘Juridisk Special Udvalg og præjudicielle forelæggelser for EF-domstolen (The Judicial Committee and 
preliminary references to the European Court of Justice)’ in B Olsen & K Engsig Sørensen (eds), 
Europæiseringen af Dansk Ret (Europeanisation of Danish Law) (Djøf Forlag 2008) 480. 
256 
 
procedure provided by the same Directive.78 It seems reasonable to connect Sweden’s view that 
the Council provisions did not go far enough in protecting the environment from one pollutant to 
its actions in respect of another, and to consider its submission in the latter case to represent its 
policy preferences on the urgency of environmental protection in general. However, it is not 
unusual for no case to have been brought on a measure at all. 
Another difficulty, discussed in detail in Chapter 2, is that the content of member-state 
government submissions cannot be accessed directly but instead can only be deduced from the 
Reports for the Hearing, if any, or if they are mentioned in the Advocate General’s Opinion (also 
if any) or, rarely, in the Court’s judgment. In the absence of even that much information, it is hard 
to make general propositions about member-state governments’ reasoning. Some well-known 
works on member-state government interventions assume that interventions are automatically 
made in support of the correctness of national legislation, or in favour of ‘less Europe’ or ‘more 
national autonomy/sovereignty’.79 There are problems with such assumptions, not least that the 
most enthusiastic interveners make the majority of their submissions in other states’ cases. Many 
cases also turn on technical questions that cannot be characterised as ‘more Europe’ or ‘less 
Europe’. Naurin, Cramér et al., in a thoughtful discussion of what assumptions are legitimate, use 
the example mentioned earlier of Imexpo Trading,80 which turned on which of two customs tariff 
headings should be used for plastic chair-mats.81 At first glance, there is not much to be learnt 
about Danish government policy from its observations in the case. It could be argued, however, 
that it illustrates a tendency for Danish referrals to be confined to just such technical matters and 
to steer clear of ‘constitutional’ questions. 
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Another situation in which simple assumptions may be confounded is where Member States find 
themselves in a position of having to make a strategic decision in a situation in which the interests 
of a national industry conflict with considerations either of national sovereignty or, contrarily, of 
the general effectiveness of EU law. To take (yet again) the example of Nouvelles Frontières, the 
UK’s observations in support of the direct effect of competition rules in the air transport industry 
argue for ‘more Europe’.82  
Facile assumptions about a member-state government’s position also fail in those situations 
described in Chapter 5 where Member States make observations in preliminary reference cases 
that are intended only to clarify the legal issues or facilitate the Court’s proceedings. As noted in 
Chapter 6, the UK was known occasionally to make observations of this type. It is necessary to 
examine each case on its own merits. 
Finally, there is the question of what can reasonably be deduced from a Member State’s silence 
on an issue. Leaving aside those instances where a shortage of organisation and resources 
prevents a state from intervening when it would wish to do so, a member-state government may 
decide to refrain from intervening because it cannot reach a consensus on what to say: for 
example, in Case C-110/05 Commission v Italy (Trailers).83 As has been pointed out, Member 
States are not monolithic institutions but systems of multilevel governance, within which there 
may be divergences of opinion within a level as well as between levels. Notably in the case of 
Germany, no observations are submitted if two ministries disagree on what the state’s position 
should be. In these circumstances, it is difficult to distinguish a lack of interest in the legal issues 
raised in a case from what may be of great interest, but subject to a difference of opinion. Such 
instances may be of considerable intrinsic interest in terms of what they could tell researchers 
about policy disagreements that may not have been manifest in the particular conformation of the 
Council that reached a decision. 
A point which has not been touched on is the relative quality (as opposed to the content) of 
observations as compared with Council votes. Member States’ observations are, at least in 
principle, carefully thought-out legal arguments aimed at a highly trained judicial audience, 
whereas any public statements made on Council matters are either very general or intended for a 
political audience. As such, the latter are unlikely to display their reasoning. 
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What these difficulties emphasise is that drawing sweeping conclusions based on massed 
empirical data from the Council may be unwise. There is simply too little information to be 
extracted from Council voting records and too many circumstances in which even the information 
that is available may be misleading. Most of the difficulties mentioned above can be side-stepped 
by carrying out case-studies, but it should be recognised that solely following up those situations 
where there have been abstentions or negative votes in Council only tells a small part of the story 
of a member-state government’s behaviour. Despite this, it is possible to pick out some themes 
and to draw some general conclusions about possible continuities between member-state 
governments’ behaviour in Court and Council. 
Conclusion 
Superficially, both the Voice and the uploading models would seem to be similar, describing 
communication between the Member States and the EU (or, in the Exit and Voice model, 
communication as an alternative to non-participation). However, it can be argued that the Exit 
and Voice model describes power: Member States have the power to leave, or the power to force 
(or persuade) national preferences on the EU as a whole. To constitute Voice, national 
preferences have to be realised, at least to some extent. Uploading is subtly different in 
conception, although it describes the same phenomena. It is a transfer of policy-preferences, by 
whatever means, that does not, immediately and of itself, alter the balance of power between 
transferor and transferee. Of course, summed over a period, large-scale uploading and 
downloading are bound to change the status of both parties, ‘Europeanising’ a member-state 
recipient and effecting policy change and even constitutional change—witness Germany’s effect 
on fundamental rights via its constitutional court— on the EU as recipient.84 But they can be 
pictured less as shifts in power and more as mutual policy adjustments. More generally, some 
authors have taken issue with the whole concept of Europeanisation, claiming that it is not a 
separate field but merely a rebranding of (among other concepts and depending on the 
background of the critic) theories of European integration.85 It is hoped that the distinction 
between these models makes it clear that they are more than the same thing, rebranded. 
It can be argued that the two models—of Voice or uploading—lead to slightly different research 
questions. In the context of this research, the Voice model prompts the question of whether the 
                                                   
84 Bill Davies, Resisting the European Court of Justice: West Germany’s Confrontation with European Law, 
1949-1979 (OUP 2012). 
85 See Claudio M Radaelli, ‘Europeanization: Solution or Problem?’ in Michelle Cini and Angela K Bourne 
(eds), Palgrave Advances in European Union Studies (Palgrave Macmillan 2006) note 3. 
259 
 
behaviour of individual states at the Council and the Court supports the proposition that the Court 
may afford the Member States a last opportunity to exercise Voice. A fully comprehensive 
analysis would require a comparison of states’ (lack of) success in achieving particular legislative 
goals via the Council with specific attempts to persuade the Court to their view on the same 
issues, followed up with an examination of whether the Court’s judgment is followed by the 
national court and implemented at the national legislative level. This would make a useful and 
fascinating contribution to the field, but it is beyond the scope of this thesis. Meanwhile, the 
uploading model begs a comparison of states’ success in conveying their views in the various 
settings and the consistency of their messages.  
This chapter concludes that member-state governments’ observations in court cases not only form 
part of the evidence of Member States’ policy preferences and attitudes to the EU but may be a 
more useful source of information on those preferences and attitudes than can be deduced from 
their votes at the Council. A Member State’s vote does not necessarily indicate its true 
preferences but is the tip of an iceberg of bargaining and negotiation in a Council that still has a 
strong drive towards consensus, even when a qualified majority is all that is needed. By contrast, 
a Member State’s submissions to the Court are more likely to express its government’s real 
preferences. If the government has agreed a position with other Member States, it has probably 




Chapter 8: Conclusion 
It has been said that EU legal studies are under-theorised. But it could be argued that, in an area 
that stands on the fulcrum of political science and law, the process of seeking theories has caused 
researchers to tip towards one side or the other and in doing so to oversimplify their accounts of 
the alternative disciplines. Because they frequently overlook historical legal context and legal 
logic, political scientists’ models can be fragile. Meanwhile, it is easy for legal scholars to 
overlook the non-legal actors involved in cases and the political and economic context in which 
cases take place. There is also a tendency to regard the development arc of the acquis 
communautaire as the inevitable working-out of legal reasoning rather than something that is, as 
Nicola and Davies describe, more fragmented and contested.1 This is nowhere more true than in 
theoretical attempts to account for Member States’ interactions with the Court of Justice—and in 
the search for empirical evidence to back up such attempts. 
This thesis uses evidence drawn from Member States’ submissions to the Court to demonstrate 
that governments’ motives for interacting with the Court of Justice are more complex, varied and 
contingent than the standard theories assume. The empirical data—including not just the 
frequency and topics of Member States’ observations but, where possible, their content and 
inspiration—have been used to draw up a taxonomy of Member States’ motives. This taxonomy 
indicates the breadth of these motives and enables a theoretical framing which positions them 
within the argumentative space in which Member States convey their preferences to the EU. The 
taxonomy draws attention to features of the judicial relationship between governments and the 
EU that are frequently overlooked, and it provides tools for the evaluation of any model of the 
relationship between member-state governments and the Court.  
When this research was started, the intention was to look for evidence in support of the 
competing integration theories espoused by various schools of political science but then to 
analyse that evidence with due respect for legal reasoning. This search was to be limited to 
preliminary reference cases—a limitation that had already become so characteristic of much legal 
integration research as to become a trope. There were several reasons why the scope of the 
research eventually became more modest. The required statistical analyses beloved of political 
scientists were being done elsewhere by those with more resources and statistical acumen, if not 
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necessarily with more legal insight. It became clear that elaborate theoretical models were being 
constructed and defended without much regard for their prior assumptions. Analyses were being 
carried out based on the classification of Member States’ positions as ‘more Europe’, ‘less 
Europe’ and ‘neither of the above’ without regard to what questions the Court of Justice had been 
asked, what the Court asked of member-state governments and why, what it did with the 
information and why Member States chose to interact with the Court at all. A small number of 
researchers had asked empirical questions that addressed these issues, but their results had either 
been oversimplified in support of particular integration models or were expressed very generally 
such that they were of only preliminary assistance in exploring the dynamics of the relationship 
between the Court of Justice and the Member States.  
It became clear that it would be helpful to use the evidence available—quantitative and 
qualitative—to evolve a taxonomy of interactions between the Court and the governments of the 
Member States. By employing such a taxonomy, it would be more difficult for the legal aspects 
of such interactions to be ignored. In particular, it would be harder to overlook the procedural 
aspects, such as governments’ influence on the likelihood of an Opinion, which have been absent 
from political scientists’ discussions. Equally, it would assist legal scholars in keeping in mind 
that national governments’ involvement in EU law is not confined to voting in the Council. Most 
importantly, characterisations of member-state governments’ submissions to the Court either as 
attempts to exercise political pressure, or as merely conveying necessary information about 
national legal provisions, represent a false dichotomy. Not only are both of these motivations 
more complex than the theoretical models allow, but governments may be doing both of these, or 
something else, or may be divided such that different departments have different motivations. 
A taxonomy of member-state interventions with the Court must have some analytical and 
theoretical backing. The temptation was to analyse it in terms of the somewhat outmoded 
intergovernmentalism versus neofunctionalism dichotomy and to draw attention to those areas 
where the taxonomy did not readily fit either model. But in drawing up a taxonomy that 
acknowledged the role of legal reasoning in the relationship between the Court and the Member 
States, it was clear that neither model gave sufficient consideration to legal logic. 
Neofunctionalism tends to treat the Court as a black box which is fed disputes and disgorges 
judgments; legal reasoning takes place inside the box and is insulated from external influences. 
Meanwhile, intergovernmentalism portrays the Court as an agent of the Member States, which 
can subvert legal reasoning when their policy preferences are threatened. This view denies 
judicial independence, the logic of the Court’s reasoning and the degree to which that reasoning 
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is respected at the national level. Neither model accounts well for the range of everyday activities 
of the Court, although it could be argued that neofunctionalism better addresses the quotidian 
nature of most of the cases that the Court has to deal with. However, instead of trying to confine 
the categorisation of governments’ interactions with the Court to these well-worn tramlines, it has 
been argued that it is better to classify governments’ interactions with the Court in terms of a 
continuous dialogue between the Member States and the European Union—of which submissions 
to the Court are only one aspect. 
Most of the contention between integration models as they specifically concern the role of the 
Court of Justice can be argued to turn on a single aspect – the borders of the zone of discretion. 
Within the zone of discretion, the Court is envisaged as free to make decisions without external 
political influences. Outwith the zone of discretion, any ‘activism’ on the part of the Court may 
be ignored or repealed. The extent of the zone of discretion is relevant to both the 
intergovernmentalist and neofunctionalist models. Even intergovernmentalists acknowledge that 
the work of the Court is not invariably circumscribed by threats of override or disobedience. A 
zone of discretion exists, and its definition is of considerable importance in a minority of cases. In 
those cases, Member States’ observations are an essential tool in the process of walking the fine 
line between ensuring the effectiveness of the Treaties and triggering a backlash from the 
Member States. However, much of the work of the Court falls within the zone of discretion. The 
area inside its boundaries is far from being neofunctionalism’s black box. Inside the zone of 
discretion, Member States’ observations have precisely the effect that legal scholars would 
predict: that is, the Court’s decision-making is open to credible legal argument from member-
state governments. The evidence supports a finding that most Member States believe that they 
have sufficient influence on the legal argumentation of cases to invest resources in participating, 
and indeed their role is enshrined in Statute of the Court of Justice and encouraged by the Court.  
All the different legal integration theories vary as to where the zone of discretion ends. This 
boundary of the zone of discretion is where political and legal considerations meet, and where the 
dialogue between the Member States and the Court moves from the legal context to the political 
context. It should be understood that the Member States seldom make the position of the 
boundary explicit in their observations. Any attempts to express ‘thus far and no further’ are 
framed in terms of defending their interpretation of a provision of EU law, or casting doubt upon 
the admissibility of a question, or otherwise in terms of legal argument. However, it is argued in 
this thesis that many of the legal arguments made in Member States’ observations are, in any 
case, directed at legal issues within the zone of discretion. The government lawyers that draw up 
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written submissions and speak at oral hearings are attempting to persuade the Court of the 
correctness of their national legal reasoning. They are not explicitly laying out domestic political 
considerations, even if the political background is expected to be mutually understood. 
From the perspective of the Member States, their submissions to the Court are characterised in 
this thesis as one part of a continuous discourse between each state individually and the EU (in 
the form of its institutions), plus to a lesser degree with the other Member States. At one level, 
this is obvious: if a government feels strongly about an EU legal rule, it is likely to press its case 
at every step of the process of creating and interpreting the legislation. Thus it should be possible 
to connect a Member State’s position as manifested at the Council with the content of its 
submissions to the Court. However, as Chapter 7 discussed, a Member State’s vote in the Council 
may not represent its preferred policy position—in fact, it can be argued that its votes are less 
likely to do so than its submissions to the Court.  
While Member States’ interventions are potentially more informative than their votes, there are 
obstacles to making a direct connection between a government’s policy and its submissions to the 
Court. The first is that, unless it has been the subject of legal action by the Commission, a 
Member State must wait for a relevant preliminary reference to be made to the Court—which 
may never happen. And if a suitable case occurs, there may be minimal information available 
about the content of governments’ submissions and little prospect of obtaining more via a 
Freedom of Information request.  
Merely knowing that a Member State submitted observations—without knowing their content— 
is not, however, useless. It illustrates the question raised, in particular, by Granger: why do 
Member States submit observations, and—often more interesting—why do some not? Some 
general conclusions were reached in Chapter 3: the chief reasons why Member States choose not 
to participate in proceedings at the Court are a shortage of resources (financial or organisational) 
and the existence of constitutional objections to using the Court as a legitimate avenue of 
communication with the EU. The latter was explored in Chapter 6 regarding Denmark in 
particular. Participation is also affected by structural, historical, political and contextual factors. 
Equally, knowing the subject areas in which Member States chose to submit observations—
without knowing their content—is not without interest. It is unlikely to be coincidental that 
Denmark, Ireland and the UK are (or were) relatively more likely to submit observations in cases 
concerned with the free movement of workers, citizenship and national identity than with, say, 
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agriculture. For considerations of space, this topic was shelved, although charts of the 1973 
accession countries’ submissions in some major subject areas may be found in Appendix D. 
The benefit resulting from the discourse between the Member States and the Court of Justice is 
not confined to the Member States. The Court’s Notes for the Guidance of Counsel lay out their 
envisaged purpose: to ‘set out the factual circumstances of the case before the national court and 
the relevant national legislation’.2 The wider significance of governments’ observations to the 
Court are discussed in Chapter 5 and can be seen to extend well beyond any attempts to convey 
the whereabouts of their red lines. Some submissions may be classified as legal advice: clarifying 
the questions the Court needs to answer from an order for reference, drawing attention to their 
legal implications and analysing relevant case law. Others have an impact on the procedure 
chosen for a particular case: whether an Opinion is needed and what formation of the Court 
should consider the referred questions. It is also argued that the existence of the opportunity for 
governments to put arguments to the Court supports the authority and legitimacy of the Court and 
the acquis communautaire. Part of the inspiration for this project was the observation that such 
beneficial contributions to the process of dispute resolution by the Court were neglected by, 
notably, political scientists. 
Most popular models of the interaction between the Member States and the Court are more likely 
to examine the use to the governments of making submissions to the Court. Their analyses, 
however, are very different, and each can be argued to contribute to significant failings in their 
theories of the constitutionalisation of the legal system. Intergovernmentalist models have 
emphasised governments’ political red lines in their discussion of Member States’ motives for 
making submissions, to the detriment of considering their observations’ context and content. 
Legal/doctrinal accounts—if they discuss governmental contributions at all—may be better 
informed as to the legal purpose and content of observations and thus recognise a broader range 
of possible motives. Nevertheless, it can be argued that even legal/doctrinal models skate over a 
significant proportion of member-state interactions with the Court, taking into account mainly 
those that contribute to a constitutional narrative arc. While the neofunctionalist model is not 
guilty of cherry-picking cases to fit its theory, it demonstrates a different error: of according 
insufficient importance to legal reasoning and the history and ideological aims of the European 
Union. 
                                                   
2 Registry of the Court of Justice of the European Communities, Notes for the Guidance of Counsel (Court of 
Justice of the European Communities 2009) s 9. 
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The empirical evidence has been found to support none of the classic political science models 
completely because each neglects some discernible aspect of Member States’ motivation in 
participating in proceedings at the Court of Justice. As the previous chapters have shown, 
governments have many reasons for submitting legal arguments to the Court of Justice. The 
weight given to each of these reasons varies with time, the pertinence of the subject-matter and a 
state’s administrative capacity. Chapter 5 offers a taxonomy of possible motives, from the 
routinely financial to the strengthening of the EU’s legal system; from the small scale and 
technical to matters of broad constitutional interest; and from the disinterested clarification of 
matters of EU law to the expression of national red lines.  
Chapter 6 considers each of these motives with reference to Denmark, Ireland and the UK. Such a 
comparison is not an entirely straightforward exercise. Direct evidence—that is, evidence from 
the contents of submissions—is slight for some motives. Participating in proceedings in support 
of another Member State is an example of this. There is statistical as well as anecdotal evidence 
that it occurs, but it is hard to detect. Some motives, however, are evident in many interventions, 
and instances can readily be found in the observations of all three of the 1973 accession states. 
The clearest example is the defence of their transposition of EU law. 
Chapter 6 also considers the sources of the variations between these three Member States. It 
could be argued that the differences between these three by themselves should challenge models 
that generalise about Member States’ reasons for making submissions. Despite being 
geographically close, having joined at the same time with similar concerns about immigration and 
national identity, and having secured overlapping opt-outs, the three have significant 
dissimilarities as regards their interaction with the Court. The distinctive features of each are 
discussed in some detail in the chapter and can usefully be compared with the analysis of states’ 
overall engagement with EU law in Chapter 3.  
Some of the differences in readiness to intervene are simply the result of size and overall wealth, 
but as Chapter 3 identifies, the differences between similarly sized smaller states are significant. 
It is argued that the primary source of these further disparities can be found in the historical and 
constitutional aspects of their different relationships with the EU. Denmark’s majoritarian 
tradition makes judicial review unpalatable and judicial review by a supranational body more so. 
Its dialogue with the EU is mainly the responsibility of an executive body that not only stands 
between the Danish national courts and the Court of Justice but also limits its engagement with 
the latter. Ireland, meanwhile, is a more enthusiastic European but its relationship with the UK, 
combined with low institutional capacity tends to restrict its influence on EU law. Unlike with 
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Denmark, the UK’s status as the awkward partner did not limit its engagement with EU law. The 
UK developed the institutional capacity to identify and respond to any upcoming cases that the 
government regarded as requiring British input; consequently, it was able to submit observations 
in relatively many cases during its membership. The government’s policy of more frequent 
intervention also gave the UK scope for a broader range of motives, including submissions aimed 
at assisting the Court or promoting the health of EU law without any immediate domestic benefit. 
It is difficult to reconcile even this outline of the differences between the 1973 accession states 
with models that oversimplify or ignore the role of the Member States or portray them only as 
cooperating to limit the Court’s influence. Paradigms are only useful as long as they fit the 
evidence. When new evidence is recognised, paradigms shift. From a lawyer’s point of view, the 
intergovernmentalist and neofunctionalist positions can be seen as denying the internal logic of 
law; as Grimmel notes, ‘integration theory today treats the law as a black box: an object that has a 
shape but an unknowable content.’3 From a political scientist’s viewpoint, the legal explanation 
only draws on a subset of the evidence. It might be argued that integration theory treats 
governments as black boxes: as homogeneous entities with a single will. It can be seen that they 
are not. 
The paradigms can only be reconciled by accepting that reality is both more complex and more 
mundane. As the previous chapters have shown, governments have many reasons for submitting 
their own legal arguments to the Court of Justice. The weight given to each of these reasons 
varies with time, the pertinence of the subject-matter and a state’s administrative capacity. The 
characterisation of member-state observations has moved far beyond the threats of non-
compliance and legislative override detected by Garrett et al., Carrubba, Gabel and Hankla, and 
Kilroy (and challenged by Stone Sweet and Brunell).4 Far from being one-way ultimatums, 
governments’ submissions are of immediate use to the Court, and some of their content may be 
specifically requested. Equally, motives have been identified for the submission of observations 
that go beyond a Member State’s immediate benefit—even, arguably, with only the most tenuous 
                                                   
3 Andreas Grimmel, ‘Judicial Interpretation or Judicial Activism? The Legacy of Rationalism in the Studies of 
the European Court of Justice’ (2012) 18 European Law Journal 518. 
4 Geoffrey Garrett, R Daniel Kelemen and Heiner Schulz, ‘The European Court of Justice, National 
Governments, and Legal Integration in the European Union’ (1998) 52 International Organization 149, 150; 
Clifford J Carrubba, Matthew Gabel and Charles Hankla, ‘Understanding the Role of the European Court of 
Justice in European Integration’ (2012) 106 American Political Science Review 214; Bernadette Ann Kilroy, 
‘Integration through the Law: ECJ and Governments in the EU’ (UCLA 1999); Alec Stone Sweet and Thomas L 
Brunell, ‘The European Court of Justice, State Noncompliance, and the Politics of Override’ (2012) 106 
American Political Science Review 204. 
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expectation of any long-term advantage. But it is clear that submissions represent an exchange of 
ideas with the Court and that whatever benefit accrues may do so to both sides of the discussion. 
Member States do attempt to influence the Court—when they recognise the opportunity, when 
they think they can succeed and when they have the resources—but via legal arguments and legal 
logic. Governments’ observations are, after all, composed (usually) and delivered (invariably) by 
lawyers. The Court makes use of their contributions and often solicits them. At the same time, the 
Court is made aware, on the one hand, of political lines that it would be painful to cross and on 
the other, is influenced in both the substance and style of its judgments by the constant back-and-
forth of legal argumentation with the Member States. Whether this discourse is looked upon as a 
manifestation of Voice or as the uploading and downloading of influence, Member States have a 
genuine and essential presence on the judicial scene that must be accounted for in any convincing 
model of EU legal integration. 
Once governments’ arguments to the Court are comprehended in this way—as constituent parts 
of a more general discourse on EU law between the Member States and the institutions—they can 
be seen not just to be significant, if frequently overlooked, contributions to EU legal integration 
but to be one of the many threads of communication and cooperation that make up European 
integration as a whole. 
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Appendix A Subject Codes 
Subject Code Area 
Accession 301 ACC 
Compensation Payments on Accession 433 ACC 
   
Justice and Home Affairs 365 AFSJ 
Brussels Convention of 27 September 1968 403 AFSJ 
Brussels Conv Jurisdiction 404 AFSJ 
Brussels Conv Enforcement 405 AFSJ 
Lugano Convention of 16 September 1988 406 AFSJ 
Rome Convention of 19 June 1980  408 AFSJ 
Judicial Cooperation in Civil Matters 432 AFSJ 
Judicial Cooperation in Criminal Matters 461 AFSJ 
Customs Cooperation 434 AFSJ 
Area of Freedom, Security and Justice 460 AFSJ 
   
Agriculture 302 AGRI 
Animal Feed 303 AGRI 
Alcohol 304 AGRI 
Beef and Veal 305 AGRI 
Cereals 306 AGRI 
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Compensatory Amounts 307 AGRI 
Foodstuffs 308 AGRI 
Fruit and Vegetables 309 AGRI 
Dehydrated Food Grain 310 AGRI 
European Agricultural Guidance and Guarantee Fund 311 AGRI 
Processed Fruit and Vegetables 312 AGRI 
Products Outside Annexe II of the Treaty 313 AGRI 
Hops 314 AGRI 
Flax and Hemp 315 AGRI 
Milk Products 316 AGRI 
Oils and Fats 317 AGRI 
Monetary Measures 318 AGRI 
Eggs and Poultry 319 AGRI 
Sheepmeat and Goatmeat 320 AGRI 
Plants, Flowers and Foliage 321 AGRI 
Potatoes 322 AGRI 
Fisheries 323 AGRI 
Plant Health 324 AGRI 
Peas and Field Beans 325 AGRI 
Pigmeat 326 AGRI 
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Rice 327 AGRI 
Seed and Plants 328 AGRI 
Forestry Products 329 AGRI 
Agricultural Structures 330 AGRI 
Sugar 331 AGRI 
Tobacco 332 AGRI 
Veterinary Legislation 333 AGRI 
Wine 334 AGRI 
Silkworms 335 AGRI 
   
Common Foreign and Security Policy 384 CFSP 
   
European Citizenship 339 CITI 
   
Competition 343 COMP 
State Aids 344 COMP 
Dumping 345 COMP 
Undertakings 346 COMP 
Exclusive Contracts 347 COMP 
Dominant Position 348 COMP 
Concerted Practices/Cartels 349 COMP 
Industrial and Commercial Property 350 COMP 
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Development Cooperation 338 COOP 
European and Social/Territorial Cohesion 340 COOP 
Structural Funds 342 COOP 
Integrated Mediterranean Programmes 423 COOP 
Regional Policy 424 COOP 
   
Culture 352 CULT 
   
Data Protection 470 DATA 
   
Balance of Payments 337 ECON 
Conjunctural Policy 351 ECON 
Financial 358 ECON 
Budget 359 ECON 
EC/EU's Own Resources 360 ECON 
European Social Fund 363 ECON 
Economic and Monetary Policy 380 ECON 
Central European Bank 380 ECON 
European Monetary Institute 381 ECON 
European System of Central Banks 382 ECON 
Industrial Policy 385 ECON 
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Contractual Liability 391 ECON 
Trans-European Networks 392 ECON 
Protective Measures 394 ECON 
Transport 397 ECON 
Telecommunications 439 ECON 
Insurance 455 ECON 
Banking 546 ECON 
Financial Law  547 ECON 
   
Educational, Vocational, Youth 354 EDUC 
Research and Technology 390 EDUC 
   
Environment 355 ENV 
Energy 411 ENV 
   
Commercial Policy 356 EXTL 
Dumping 357 EXTL 
Coffee 402 EXTL 
Cotton 407 EXTL 
External Policy 412 EXTL 
African, Caribbean and Pacific States 413 EXTL 
EFTA 414 EXTL 
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Food Aid 415 EXTL 
External - Association 416 EXTL 
Quotas - Third Countries 417 EXTL 
African States and Madagascar 418 EXTL 
European Development Fund 419 EXTL 
GATT and WTO 420 EXTL 
   
Free Movement of Capital 366 FRCA 
Free Movement of Goods 367 FRGO 
Industrial and Commercial Property 368 FRGO 
Quantitative Restrictions 369 FRGO 
Measures Having Equivalent Effect 370 FRGO 
Monopolies of a Commercial Character 371 FRGO 
Customs Union 372 FRGO 
Charges Having Equivalent Effect 373 FRGO 
Common Customs Tariff 374 FRGO 
Value for Customs Purposes 375 FRGO 
Freedom of Establishment, Services 377 FRSE 
Freedom of Establishment 378 FRSE 
Freedom to Provide Services 379 FRSE 
Strengthening of Cooperation (43-45 EC) 435 FRSE 
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Free Movement of Workers 376 FRWO 
Social Security for (Migrant) Workers 395 FRWO 
   
Charter of Fundamental Rights 409 FUND 
Visa, Asylum and Immigration 431 IMM 
   
European Investment Bank 336 INST 
Provisions Concerning the EC/Institutions 364 INST 
Measures Adopted by Institutions 401 INST 
Privileges and Immunities of the EU 425 INST 
Contractual and Non-Contractual Liability of EU 427 INST 
Staff Regulations 428 INST 
Procedural Provisions  438 INST 
   
Trademarks (OHMI) (now see 451) 430 IP 
IP - Industrial and Commercial Property 450 IP 
IP - Trademarks/OHMI 451 IP 
   
Judicial Procedure inc standing re Art 267 426 JUST 
   
French Overseas Departments 353 OVER 
Overseas Countries and Territories 388 OVER 
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EC Public Works Contracts 422 PROC 
Public Procurement 440 PROC 
   
Consumer Protection 387 PROT 
Public Health 393 PROT 
Medicinal Products 399 PROT 
Textiles 429 PROT 
Gambling 459 PROT 
   
Social Provisions/Policy 396 SOCP 
Industrial relations 398 SOCP 
European Foundation for the Improvement of Living and Working Conditions 421 SOCP 
Employment (125, 130 EC) 436 SOCP 
   
Tax Provisions 361 TAX 
VAT 362 TAX 
   
Principles, Objectives and Tasks of the Treaties, and Non-Discrimination 386 TREA 
Approximation of Laws 389 TREA 















































Austria 31 3 1 2     37 
Belgium 32 1 3 10   2 48 
Bulgaria 5 1 3     3 12 
Cyprus 3   1       4 
Czech R 27 1   8 1 2 39 
Denmark 15     5 1   21 
Estonia 10 1 4 5     20 
Finland 11   3 4     18 
France 48 3 3 11 2 7 74 
Germany 67 1 6 13 3 2 92 
Greece 41 2 6   1 5 55 
Hungary 20 1 2 2 1 1 27 
Ireland 10     1     11 
Italy 52 4 6 3 2 14 81 
Latvia 5 1         6 
Lithuania 12 1     1 3 17 
Luxembourg     1 2     3 
Malta 1       2   3 
Netherlands 48 1 3 17   4 73 
Poland 46 2 8 8   3 67 
Portugal 28   2 1 1 1 33 
Romania 8 2 3   1   14 
Slovakia 1 1 2 2   2 8 
Slovenia     3   1 1 5 
Spain 36 5 9 5 6 9 70 
Sweden 14 1 1 8 2   26 
UK 33 2 6 14 1 4 60 






Appendix C Dutch checklist 
No. Question Yes No 
1 Is it a preliminary reference from a Dutch judge? 
  




Does the case potentially lead to modification of the regulations of 
(department)? 
  
4 Does the case potentially lead to modification of the policy or 
implementation practices of (department)? 
  
5 Does the case potentially lead to modification of forthcoming 
regulations or proposed policy of (department)? 
  
6 Could the case lead to a limitation of the discretion with regard to a 
core responsibility of (department)? 
  
7 Could this case take away uncertainties in the Netherlands about the 
correct application of the regulation? 
  
8 The policy area in question could be politically sensitive. This may give 
rise to two different questions: 
  
8a Does answering the questions of the checklist give cause for making 
written observations, while that is politically not desirable? 
  
8b Does answering the questions of the checklist not give cause for making 
written observations, while that is politically desirable? 
  
9 Are there possible financial consequences for (department) as a result of 
this case, also in the form of damages? 
  
10 Could the ruling in this case, because of the regulation at issue or 
because of its horizontal aspects, also have consequences for other 
departments than just (department)? 
  
11 Is there agreement with other departments (in sight)? 
  





13 Could this case lead to an important development in the European legal 
order? 
  
 Do you propose intervention? 
  
Document and  translation with thanks to Floris van Stralen.
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Appendix E Member States’ observations by GDP 
 
 
Figure 21: Observations by wealth of Member State 
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Figure 23: Middle third of economies 
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